FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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

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DE GAULLE: POSE AND POLICY

By Herbert Lüthy

AS long as French foreign policy is nothing else than the personal policy of President de Gaulle, any analysis of it depends essentially on an understanding of his personal psychology. While his psychology is not that of the ordinary political leader, there is nothing impenetrable or mysterious about it. Even the sphinx-like pose which he is fond of assuming is deliberate and calculated; from his earliest writings, he has been consciously creating the ideal portrait of *le grand chef,* who must, as he wrote in 1927, "possess something indefinable, mysterious . . . remain impenetrable to his subordinates, and in this way keep them in suspense." According to a more recent formulation of his, this mystery resides, too, in the political art of "not crystalizing in words that which the future is going to demonstrate," of not defining goals before being assured of their success, and then always appearing to have desired what comes to pass.

This is the A.B.C. of the art of politics. De Gaulle's mastery of *mystère,* which is above all the art of ambiguity and of Pythian formulas, permitted him, when faced with the gravest problem he ever had to meet—the Algerian War—to manœuvre among the reefs for four years, to envisage in turn every possible or impossible solution and to see them all miscarry. First there was the offer made to the Algerians to become "whole-share French citizens;" then the mission given the army to "integrate the souls" of the Algerian people; then the grand vision of an African California grouping Algeria and French Black Africa in a zone of prosperity around the oil of the Sahara; then the still ambiguous concept of an "Algerian Algeria," independent but associated—all leading finally to the collapse of French colonization in North Africa and the accords of Evian, now hardly more than a scrap of paper. At the end of this tortuous course, the wisdom of the

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statesman has been "to accept things as they are," to respect the Evian Agreements on his side and to accept unflinchingly the violation of them by the other side, in order to show that he is satisfied—and to keep the future open.

The extent of de Gaulle's success in this tragic imbroglio is shown by the fact that the whole world is convinced that from the outset he wanted in his secret heart to end up exactly where he did. This is an improbable hypothesis and, above all, terribly unjust, for it supposes that de Gaulle willfully deceived and betrayed all those who carried him to power in 1958; but the reputation for being a man of unfathomable cunning does not displease him, and in any case he prefers it to the contrary hypothesis—truer but less grandiose—that, unable to do what he wished, he wished for what he could do. The essential is that the prestige of the leader be preserved; the rest counts for little.

Charles de Gaulle is not a man of mystery. The air of mystery is part of the character which he has created, by calculation as much as by inclination, because it allows him to feint, to manœuvre in front of the obstacle and to withdraw, if need be, without losing face. What distinguishes his political style, and what makes him unique, is precisely that he knows how to be an opportunist without appearing to be one, and how to compromise without compromising himself. He believes profoundly in a fate which is stronger than men; and he knows how to take advantage of unforeseen events. His fatalistic side becomes stronger with the wisdom of age: "Regarding the stars, I am imbued with the insignificance of things." But his realism is limited by a number of fundamental ideas, which are unarguable and beyond compromise; they give his policies not only their content but their style. These constants consist of his conception of the world and of politics, the system of coördinates within which his thought evolves, and outside which he refuses to venture: a world of symbols rather than of realities. Before searching in his acts or in his words for hidden designs, we must grasp this basic point; from it all else follows.

The vision of the political world—the *Weltanschauung*—of General de Gaulle is a matter of individual psychology only in so far as his own predestined role in it is concerned. Apart from this crucial detail, it is a vision so imbued with French traditions of the most classic sort that individual psychology plays a lesser part than collective psychology; hence the power of suggestion

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which his vision holds for Frenchmen. Through de Gaulle a venerable and glorious France takes on the splendor of a spectacular sunset.

II

The biography of Charles de Gaulle (and especially his own version of it) is so well known that we can easily trace the origin of the elements that make up his vision. He was born into an exemplary family in which the father was a teacher of history, literature and classical languages at a Jesuit school in Paris, and in which the cult of France and nostalgia for the legitimate monarchy—*Dieu et le Roi!*—were celebrated with a religious fervor. Reading was in the classics and the lives of heroes: Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, Joan of Arc, the kings and marshals of France. He grew up among history books in which the world was illumined exclusively by the deeds of France—"nation of heroes and saints"—and among little lead soldiers with which the de Gaulle children reconstructed glorious battles of the past. Like most right-thinking families of the time, the de Gaulles abhorred the Republic and all the régimes which followed 1789, and from childhood Charles learned to make that distinction which for him remains fundamental: the sublime idea of France, predestined leader of the world as soon as she found incarnation in a legitimate sovereign or God-sent hero; and the mass of flesh-and-blood Frenchmen, dedicated to mediocrity, confusion and sterile partisan struggles when lacking the guidance of an anointed leader.

Nothing of the historical imagery and political convictions acquired in childhood was shaken by the years in a Catholic lycée, nor, evidently, by his education at the Ecole de Guerre. In World War I, the "ambition to serve France" was hardly satisfied by nearly three years of frustration as a prisoner in Germany, during which time he saw continental empires collapse on all sides. In 1927, at the age of 37, the thought of the young Commandant de Gaulle was summed up in a series of lectures given at the Ecole de Guerre, under the presidency of Marshal Pétain, then his idol and patron: "Military Action and the Leader," "On Prestige," "On Character." All were in the heroic and classic style inspired by Plutarch, Caesar and Machiavelli. In them de Gaulle portrayed his ideal of the leader born to command, a vocation to which he clearly felt called.

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All this—the naïve faith of childhood and the authoritarian conception of history forged by the military profession—passed into the grand design of his mature thought and took shape in "The War Memoirs" written during the period of his "withdrawal to the desert," 1952–1958. Actually, it is neither history nor recollections of war, but the monumental self-portrait of the solitary man who made himself the champion and knight-servant of "Our Lady France." Each sentence must be taken word for word—even (and indeed especially) in the rhetorical passages and the patriotic clichés—beginning with the celebrated passage at the opening of the Memoirs: "All my life I have thought of France in a certain way . . . like the princess of fairy stories . . . dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. . . . Providence has created her for complete successes or for exemplary misfortunes. . . . France is not really herself except in the first rank. . . . In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without *la grandeur*"; and, from early childhood, "I did not doubt that France would have to go through gigantic trials, that life's interest would consist in one day rendering her some signal service, and that I would have that opportunity."

All this still adds up to nothing more than the makings of a first-rate officer of the old French school. What has been joined to the faith which was instilled in the cradle, and what has differentiated de Gaulle from the intellectual environment in which he grew up, is something that at first appears very banal, but which has been decisive: namely, that very early he added to the glories of ancient France the glories of the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies. A monarchist by instinct and molding, he ceased to be one by ideology; indeed, with one stroke he disencumbered himself of all ideology, in order "to serve only France." This explains why, in the years when the menace of the Third Reich was mounting, he broke with the disciples of Maurras, who, disgusted with the France of the Popular Front and entranced by the Fascist dictators, put their ideological sympathies above the interests of France.

For de Gaulle, the philosophy of history and political philosophy are one. The generals of the Revolution and of the Empire "served France well," just as later the Communists in the Resistance and Maurice Thorez (as long as he was a minister under de Gaulle) "served France well." "Is it simply political tactics? The answer is not for me to unravel. For me it is enough that

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France is served." This ideological indifference, which springs not from opportunism but from unqualified nationalism, is what separated de Gaulle most sharply from all "party men" and what distinguished him as well from most of the leaders of the French army. It made it possible for him to decide in 1940 to break all traditions of discipline, to revolt against the authority and legitimacy of Marshal Pétain, and to proclaim that legitimacy now rested with him, the solitary soldier who picked up "from the mud" and raised anew the flag which had fallen from the hands of his superiors.

He was not anti-Fascist; little did it matter to him who ruled Germany: he refused to admit the defeat of France, and personally, in 1940–1945, he was much less at war with Germany than with the Anglo-Saxon allies who considered that "France was gone." Nor was he anti-Communist when, in 1947, convinced of the imminence of war between Russia and the West, he founded a party whose only ideology was to rally France around himself. He then excluded from the national community all those who put faith in Soviet Russia above patriotism, and in order to point out that this was not a question of ideology, he labeled them, not Communists, but "separatists," or "those who do not play the game of France." In the same way today he never speaks of the Soviet Union, but only of Russia, signifying that in his eyes what matters is the eternal Russia, so many times the ally of France and perhaps an ally again some day; and that ideologies are only a veil covering the timeless politics of national power.

Read in the last volume of "The War Memoirs" his portrayal of Stalin: ". . . astute and implacable champion of a Russia exhausted by suffering and tyranny but afire with national ambition . . . mightier and more durable than any theory, any régime . . . to unite the Slavs, to overcome the Germans, to expand in Asia, to gain access to open seas: these were the dreams of Mother Russia, these were the despot's goals." But also read the fascinated passage in which de Gaulle wrote of the suicide of Hitler ("So as not to be bound, Prometheus cast himself into the abyss"): "the terrible greatness of his combat and his memory," the "superhuman and inhuman attempt" of that "Titan who tries to lift the world," and whom Germany had "served with greater exertions than any people has ever offered any leader." Each was the embodiment of his nation and played the game of national ambition, as it is the role of great statesmen to do.

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What is true for Hitler or Stalin is also true for Churchill or Roosevelt. In the same "Memoirs" de Gaulle examines Roosevelt's conception of how the postwar world should be organized, with its Directory of the Big Four, *i.e.* Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, of whom the last two, he remarked, were dependent "clients" of the United States. De Gaulle's analysis is one of the most perspicacious that has been made—not only because he had reason to resent the American effort to discount France as a great power, but even more because of his haughty disdain of the ideological and idealistic aspects of Roosevelt's grand design. "As is human," de Gaulle wrote, "idealism here dresses up the will to power." International politics is and will remain what it has been since there have been rival states in the world—a game of power politics; and all the rest, ideologies and contrivances of international organizations, is nothing but masquerade and illusion. In this game, it is imperative that France play her cards well and sustain her role.

This view of international politics which, for all its apparent simplicity, is capable of every Machiavellian refinement, has at bottom always been the view taken by the man in the street following in his newspaper the endless conflicts of the "powers," whose leaders clash as often over precedence and prestige as over concrete conflicts of interest. The Gaullist version of this concept springs from European history, or rather from the dramatized, nationalistic version of it which, in the service of patriotic education, the history books of every European nation have imparted to generations of studious youths. It is a complicated history of an equilibrium which was forever in question among powers and coalitions of powers divided one against the other on a narrow continent, where each nation always had to guard its bridges against the enemy of the moment—and against the ally of the moment, who could be the adversary of tomorrow—and where, according to the historiographers who poisoned the minds of generations of Europeans, the increased status of one nation was always paid for by the decline of others.

The United States, which has dominated a vast continent almost from its birth, never knew the problem of "balance of power" until very recently, and then on a global scale. It is this very different historical experience which has resulted in so many misunderstandings between America and Europe, from Versailles to Yalta. But was Roosevelt's reasoning very different when he

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sought to found the postwar world on the basis of a personal entente among the Big Four of that time? That is the irrational way in which children imagine the world is ruled, and in this respect great statesmen and children are very much alike; nor is their view further from reality than the complicated models of political scientists. Even in the science of international law, until quite recently, Europe could not conceive of international relations except in allegorical terms—as relations between legitimate heads of state. When Europeans of General de Gaulle's generation were growing up, international relations were, in fact and in law, relations between dynastic sovereigns, equal in rank if not in power; and Frenchmen with family traditions such as those of de Gaulle suffered to see Republican France, and France alone in Europe, deprived of dynasty—that is, of personification, continuity and dignity.

The postulate of a single strong authority as head of state does not, for de Gaulle, spring from considerations of domestic social order or ideologies; it is an imperative imposed by the realities of international life, which demand that a country be "represented." He was enough of a modernist and a realist to resign himself to the fact that France was no longer a hereditary monarchy, but in his innermost self he never doubted that France needed a monarch—that is to say, an uncontested *chef*—in order to make her voice heard; and the course of events (and his will) finally permitted him to present a monarch to France: himself. His truly monarchical sense of the dignity of the head of state is what strikes one most in his ceremony, in his oratorical style and in his attention to precedence; but this is often misinterpreted. It requires perhaps a feeling for royal tradition to understand how a man can, in all humility, so venerate himself as the incarnation and symbol of his country, as a historical phenomenon distinct from his individual person and of different clay from ordinary men, and subordinate himself so entirely to the "heavy burden" of this self-imposed role which prevents him from ever descending to the level of simple humans; so must the ideal king sacrifice his ego to his royal function. Indeed, de Gaulle has pushed the distinction between himself, "the poor mortal," and Charles de Gaulle, who is invested by history with national legitimacy, to the point of grammatically separating "me" and "de Gaulle," whom he invokes in the third person. In the plebeian world of today, this aspect of his personality is doubtless as un-

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common as the appearance of a dinosaur among post-diluvian fauna; and one of the worst mistakes is to confuse him with the vulgar demagogues and rabble-rousers who abound throughout the present-day world. He plays this royal role to perfection and he knows the power of its attraction. There are few Frenchmen, even among those who are irritated by him or who make fun of him, who are not secretly under his spell and who do not experience at least an esthetic satisfaction in seeing France so regally represented after having seen it led so long by men of little stature.

III

What, then, are de Gaulle's policies? They have only one common and consistent thread: to "maintain his status," his and France's, the two being synonymous, "as long as God lends him life." In the key chapter of his Memoirs, programmatically entitled *Le Rang,* the words which endlessly recur are "rank," "prestige," "honor," "dignity," "power" and "greatness." As a retrospective exposition of his "great national aims," this apologia of de Gaulle's postwar policy is rather disappointing, and its concrete objectives are now only bad memories: the dismemberment of Germany, the extension of the French frontier to the Rhine, the annexation of the Saar and of some Italian territory, and the stubborn maintenance of the French imperial position in Asia and Africa. The alliance with Stalin, as a stratagem against "the Anglo-Saxon hegemony," remained utterly sterile, and the lofty vision—now revived—of an "association of Slavs, Germans, Gauls and Latins," uniting Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals," has never meant anything definable. We know only that the aim is to transform the continent into "one of the three planetary powers" which "one day, if necessary, could arbitrate between the Soviet and the Anglo-Saxon camps." Where, then, are the Urals? The common denominator of so many vague or contradictory projects was the high-minded determination to see France "act boldly, achieve stature, and nobly serve the interests of herself and of mankind."

To uphold status is an aristocratic ideal which can fill the life of a man and of a nation. What that ideal requires has less to do with actions than with attitudes. The criteria are simple and easy to understand. "France is only France when she is in the first rank;" she can never accept less; never recognize a hegemony

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other than her own; never join a group as less than equal with the greatest; never integrate—or rather, "dissolve herself"—in a supranational organization where her veto power would no longer come into play. The Atlantic Alliance may be a good thing, but an "integrated" Atlantic organization under command other than de Gaulle's is unacceptable. A European confederation under French leadership may be desirable, but a United States of Europe in which France might have to give in to the will of the majority is inconceivable. Partnership with the United States is something to be wished for, but an *Atlantic* partnership, in which the United States' partner would not be France, but an integrated Europe, can only be rejected. A United Nations in which France has an assured veto power and a seat in the supreme directory can be useful, but an international organization in which a majority can overrule her is an abomination. Instinctively de Gaulle resists all the bright organizers, all the "technocratic robots" who threaten to depersonalize international relations, just as he instinctively tends to return to the pre-1914 rules of the game, to classical diplomacy, classical alliances, national armaments and the gold standard. Political scientists may debate whether or not these notions are anachronisms in the modern world. But to try to make de Gaulle give in on any of them is to knock one's head against a wall. Those who have to deal with him had better discard in advance any such thoughts as far as France is concerned.

It is true, then, that Gaullist policy—or political style—is more easily defined by what it rejects in contemporary Western politics than by its concrete objectives or constructive proposals. To say "no" is one of the rare things that one can do all alone. Then, too, history is unforeseeable—"the future lasts a long time and anything can happen one day"—and the wise statesman keeps his hands free to deal with any eventuality; he does not commit himself to anything irrevocable. As long as the symbolic attributes of great-power status are preserved, no material catastrophe can engulf a country. It is the symbols that matter, not the facts: this is the summary of de Gaulle's wartime experience and the essence of his policy. Immediate goals, as well as the means to attain them, can be endlessly adjusted to "the changing nature of things."

When France was faced with the Algiers *putsch* in May 1958, and only de Gaulle's return seemed able to avert a civil war, did he know what he was going to do with the almost unlimited

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powers he had obtained as a condition for his return? In France, in Algeria and in the French possessions overseas, he called for a vote on a new constitution making him president of the "French Community," and he excommunicated the one territory which did not give him a majority, Guinea. He certainly did not envisage the demise of the Community within two years, without its institutions ever having functioned. Nor did he foresee the loss of Algeria after four years of tortuous manœuvres, riots, pronunciamentos and, finally, the exodus of the French population under the worst possible conditions. But he knew how to submit gallantly to what he could not prevent, and so to enhance France's prestige in the eyes of the Third World. Nor did he imagine that he would fall heir to the European policies of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Guy Mollet, on which he had always showered sarcasm; but he knew how to forge those policies into an instrument of *French* policy, reducing the Common Market to a technical organization from which his ministers were able to draw every advantage for the French economy, while chopping down the political hopes of its creators.

De Gaulle knew how to play every card and keep the public guessing. But in no domain, either domestic or European, has he created anything which is assured of surviving him. The constitution he has given France, with its "president-arbiter" and its "separation of powers," has never functioned and he has not hesitated to recast it or to disregard it when it got in his way, with the result that no one can say how France will be governed after he goes.

If "de-colonizer" de Gaulle retains a sort of moral presence in what was the French Community, it is because after the unhappy Guinea experience he consented to finance it on generous terms without ever testing its loyalty—just as he has consented to finance socialist Algeria without insisting on the Evian Agreements. But again, no one can say what Franco-Algerian and Franco-African relations will be like when de Gaulle has gone and France perhaps tires of the high cost of prestige. As for Europe, having blocked political integration in the name of national sovereignty and the admission of Britain in the name of political integration, and having attempted to impose a Franco-German directorate (which was bound in advance to fail), he has left the political construction of Europe in an impasse from which it will not emerge so long as he rules, if ever.

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The same is true of the Atlantic Alliance. It has been at loggerheads since September 1958 when de Gaulle, just returned to power, proposed a three-power directorate for the global strategy of the West. Implied, of course, was a request for allied support for France's still undefined policy in Africa and Algeria. All the vicissitudes since then have done nothing to reduce the stumbling-block created by ill-humor; but neither has the ill-humor been pushed to the point of rupture. The most obvious result, thus far, is that for the sake of status symbols, de Gaulle has reduced France's potentially great influence inside the Alliance to a mere sulky negativism which has simply to be discounted in advance by her partners. Still, in his eyes, the Alliance is necessary "for a long time to come" in order to maintain equilibrium in the world and in Europe and to cover his retreat while he explores the foggy perspectives of a "European Europe" equilibrated between Paris and Moscow.

In this Gaullist policy of simple ideas and complicated games, everything is provisional; and everything is based on his personal reign, which can last six more months or seven more years. The only certainty is that there will be no one to carry on. Whether the presidency will go to a Pompidou or a Defferre, or whether France will return to parliamentary government or whatever, his successors will have to search for another style and other ways. As with Bismarck, who was successful in everything except assuring the continuation of his work, de Gaulle's policies and personalized rule will end with him. France's partners can no more count on de Gaulle lasting forever than they can avoid living with him while he stays.

But is it really more difficult for France's allies to live with de Gaulle than it was to live with the Fourth Republic, from Bidault to Pflimlin, with its feeble central power, enormous world-wide responsibilities and torn conscience? When we make up a tentative balance-sheet for the first seven years of the Fifth Republic, at least one item is certain: with all its jolts and dramatic repudiations, the reign of General de Gaulle has succeeded in drawing France back within her natural boundaries, removing the burden of her imperial heritage which had become too heavy to carry, and making her a European nation, without world-wide involvement—political or strategic. It may not be what he wished, nor what was hoped for by those who carried him to power and who are today in prison, in exile or, in the case of those like Michel

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Debré who were most faithful to his person and myth, in melancholy retirement. The cost to France—and to Algeria—of the misunderstanding which it took four years to dispel may have been appalling, but the liquidation has been radical and has left nothing but a hangover of sterile rancors. It is futile to speculate whether, if the phenomenon of de Gaulle had never existed to confuse all the issues, the parliamentary republic would in the end have done better or worse in amputating its former North African province: this would be to suppose French history other than it has been since 1940, perhaps less colorful, perhaps more normal. However that may be, it is done; and miraculously de Gaulle has succeeded in transforming into a personal triumph what under any other régime would have appeared to be a catastrophe, and what perhaps no other régime could have survived. Never does the grand manner matter so much as in misfortune; the art of the glorious retreat is the most difficult in war or in politics. Thanks to de Gaulle, thanks to his majestic bearing in times of adversity and to the magic of his language, the régime which "sold out the empire" is in French minds the reign that reëstablished the ranking position of France and made the world sit up and take notice.

France's partners would be wrong to take offense. These manifestations of pride are often annoying, but it may be more important that for the first time in centuries, if not indeed since "France became France," her *amour-propre* can find satisfaction solely in prestige. Thanks to the second reign of General de Gaulle, France is without territorial claims, without grievances which menace world peace, and without strategic positions to defend outside France proper. (Djibouti, Martinique, Réunion and the New Hebrides are not strategic positions, but souvenirs and curiosities.) In fact, since 1962, France has had no dramatic problems on her horizons; and no decisions are rending or pressing her.

De Gaulle may make a triumphant tour of Latin America and embrace dreams of a "Latin world" opposed to the "Anglo-Saxon hegemony," but this does not affect the equilibrium or disequilibrium of that continent. He may raise his voice on the boiling issues of Southeast Asia, recognize China and cause his name to be applauded in Pnompenh on a par with those of Castro and Sukarno as the "champions of national independence," but he has no stake in the game. He can give his

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advice on the affairs of central Africa, condemn subversive plots and disapprove—with excellent reasons—the botched-up action recently led by the United Nations in the Congo; but he no longer has the means to prevent Brazzaville, the most insignificant of his clients, from serving as a relay station for the subversion of which he disapproves. One may regret that France, freed of her imperial burden and enjoying the fruits of European prosperity, applies these gains less to giving durable institutions to herself and to Europe than to throwing herself into vain competition for status symbols—from the *force de frappe* to supersonic jet transports and the recruiting of clients in the Third World. But if de Gaulle is often uncoöperative, in fact his behavior weighs less heavily on Western politics than, for example, the uncertainty of Germany or the confusion of Italy. And, in the last analysis, does not the West gain more than it loses by General de Gaulle's show of independence, by the demonstration to the world—the Third World as well as Eastern Europe—of the reality of the pluralism which it so proudly claims for itself? For whatever may be his sometimes disconcerting positions, no one can ever doubt that de Gaulle belongs to the West—or rather, as he would say with a slightly anti-American bias, to the most classical Occident.

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THE CHANGED SETTING OF THE ATLANTIC DEBATE

By Alastair Buchan

AT the end of 1964, a cycle of American-European argument which had opened some seven years earlier came to a close when President Johnson decided to abandon American pressure for an immediate resolution of the negotiations regarding a multilateral nuclear force. Since then the common assumption has been that there is to be a nine-month lull, until after the German elections in September, before the next phase of the dialogue on the future scope and nature of the Atlantic Alliance is resumed, even though any successful outcome to it may have to wait until the attitudes and policy of post-de Gaulle France are clear.

What form will the resumed discussion take? It is misleading to contrast the growing stability of the old East-West confrontation in Europe with the deteriorating security of Asia, or to suggest that limiting the political erosion of the underdeveloped world will now become the central task of a group of powers as rich and with as diverse interests as the NATO countries. For there are many important developments within Europe itself and in the relations between the two halves of Europe. It is probably more accurate to suggest that the particular difficulties in the strategic relationship between a great power and a number of middle and smaller allies, as exemplified during recent years in NATO, are now assuming a more universal character, while at the same time developments inside and outside the Atlantic world are beginning to interact more and more directly upon each other.

The era of European-American argument which closed last December had opened in 1957–58 with the occurrence within a short space of time of five largely unrelated developments. The first was the perfection of the I.C.B.M., which raised questions as to the viability of the American guarantee to Western Europe in light of the increasing vulnerability of American civilization. The second was the signature of the Treaty of Rome, which offered the promise of a political as well as an economic role for a unified Europe to replace the hegemonic position of the United States and to share its strategic burdens. The third was the conclusion, in 1958, of an agreement on the sharing of information on nuclear weapons between the United States and Britain. This

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gave a new impetus to the old wartime special relationship between the two countries, while the return of Charles de Gaulle to the Elysée in the same year made certain that France would not rest content with the leadership of the Anglo-Saxon powers. Finally, these were the years of the consolidation of Khrushchev's leadership within the Soviet system—the beginning of a period of greater sensitivity to the morale of Soviet society and to the risks of war with the capitalist world than to the solidarity of the Communist system.

Although the problems of the Atlantic relationship were bound to multiply as Europe's morale and wealth became restored, the fact that it was these events which set the argument in train tended to create the framework of discussion. The main characteristic of this phase of the debate has been, first, concentration on the role of nuclear weapons and the control of nuclear strategy; second, concern with nuclear proliferation primarily as a European phenomenon; third, a tendency to regard the Communist threat in its military aspect as potentially the most dangerous source of war through escalation or miscalculation; fourth, an assumption that the European-American strategic problem was largely *sui generis* and unrelated to other alliances or relationships. Finally, success or failure tended, especially in the later period, to be judged by reference to a theoretical model of partnership between the United States and a unified Europe, a relationship of units of roughly equal size and economic strength.

The agenda of debate was dominated by certain questions about the American nuclear guarantee to Europe, the connection between the virtual American hegemony in nuclear strategic power and its right to lay down and alter the strategy of the alliance, and the relations between this commanding position and its responsibility for the pursuit of a special American dialogue with the Soviet Union, even on questions that might affect the interests of the European powers. These points implied further questions about the rights of the European allies, the freedom of action which the larger powers in Europe may legitimately exercise without damaging the solidarity of the alliance: what control the most exposed non-nuclear power in Europe, Germany, can exercise over its own security and prospects of reunification; what influence a Europe that is politically still a plural group of middle and small sovereign states can exercise over the evolution of political and strategic plans whose implementation re-

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mains primarily an American responsibility. And, finally, whether that politically unified Europe which many important Americans and Europeans have always argued could have such influence can be brought into being in the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, during the latter stages of this argument, the opportunities for tackling these formidable questions in any broad context became gradually foreclosed by President de Gaulle's extremely narrow definition of the French national interest and by his preference for exploiting such nominal freedom of action as the strategic stalemate between the great powers permitted him; by the confusion of Britons about their relationship to Continental Europe; by German provincialism; and by a certain dogmatism in Washington about the solutions to be pursued. In consequence, the choices in terms of actual policy by 1964 had become narrowed down to one proposal, multilateral force to give the non-nuclear powers in Europe some physical sense of participation in the handling of strategic weapons and the planning for their control. And when this became blocked by French pressure on Germany, by the tabling of an alternative British proposal and by an American decision to withdraw temporarily from the argument, it was clear that the time had come to reformulate the whole agenda, though not all the problems had by any means been solved.

II

Only a very rash man would attempt to predict what form European-American arguments will take over the next five or seven years, let alone to what conclusion they may lead. But it is not too early to discuss the changes in the setting of the debate.

There seem to me to be three important changes of scene taking place during the entr'acte. The first is that questions of nuclear control in Europe are ceasing to reflect the real problems of the European-American relationship. The second is that the concept of European-American partnership is now being discussed in different terms, for there are new crosscurrents in Europe. The third is a natural corollary of the diversification of Communist pressure and of the rise of two competing centers of Communist power, namely that Asian developments are beginning to have an increasing effect upon the European-American relationship and vice versa: the time has passed, if it ever existed, when Atlantic problems could be isolated from more universal ones.

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No responsible person in the West would be prepared to argue that the increasing implausibility of a Soviet military attack on Western Europe is the result of any fundamental change of heart in Moscow, let alone the perfection of that flexible system of military options in Western Europe which military analysts have long regarded as desirable. The greater confidence in the stability of the East-West confrontation in Europe arises very largely from the stabilization of military technology, after 15 years of revolutionary advances from the first atom bomb to the solid-fuel missile, from the development of a large American superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic weapons, and from a growing understanding on both sides of the rules which have to govern a confrontation based on such weapons. The period when a new strategy was promulgated in Washington every three or four years is probably drawing to a close.

There is now very much less argument than there was even a year or so ago between Washington and the European capitals about the doctrine of NATO defense, even though the United States has not been able to gain support for as flexible a military posture in Europe as it would have liked. This change derives from a reappraisal of the likelihood of having to put the Western military stance to the test of war in Europe. It does not mean that there can be any significant reduction of NATO ground and air forces in Europe. It does not mean that there may not be recurrent Soviet pressure over Berlin or that a fully satisfactory response to such a contingency has yet been formulated. Perhaps the reassertion of the national interests of the East European countries, the gradual development of a more liberal political consciousness in some of them, or closer relations between countries of East and West Europe may lead to new forms of crisis to which too little contingent thought has been given. But it is clear that the validity and efficacy of the American strategic guarantee to Western Europe in the face of any serious Soviet pressure has emerged triumphant from the debates of the past seven years, as all Europeans, except that small minority which has a vested interest in denying this fact, would now acknowledge.

This has an important bearing upon the political significance, and perhaps upon the future, of the French and British nuclear forces. Much of the Atlantic debate of recent years has been governed by fear that the arguments that have been used to justify these two national efforts might lead to a German nuclear

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force, with serious consequences for international stability. Indeed, much of the argument for a multilateral force has been conducted in terms of averting such a danger. In my view, this fear has overlooked the very serious constraints—legal, political and strategic—that Germany would have to confront in taking any such decision. But there is no doubt that the British and French nuclear forces have had a generally divisive effect within NATO and in Europe itself.

The stabilization of the Soviet-American strategic relationship has been achieved only by making the apparatus of strategic deterrence a very much more complicated and costly affair for both parties. What is becoming apparent is that the maintenance of a credible system of strategic deterrence by middle powers against a superpower will become very much more costly over the years ahead, despite the stabilization of technology. The fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States now have the technical option of installing anti-air and anti-missile systems which would provide a high degree of protection against the weapons of a smaller nuclear power[1] (even though both would contemplate with the greatest reluctance the vast expense and the uncertainty of installing an anti-missile system that could provide protection against each other's forces) will tend to downgrade the serious military utility of the two European nuclear forces.

It is not likely that either the British or the French nuclear programs will be formally abandoned in the foreseeable future, partly because they have both been maintained primarily for reasons of national security. Moreover, the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other middle powers outside Europe somewhat strengthens the military justification for them, as long as Britain and France pursue global policies. But the new British government, in its proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, is now seeking to set its nuclear contribution more firmly in an alliance setting and to discount the more extreme arguments about prestige associated with the program—"a place at the top table"—used by its Conservative predecessors. While there

[1] "There is also the possibility in the 1970s of a small nuclear attack on the United States by a nation possessing only a primitive nuclear force. Accordingly, we have undertaken a number of studies in this area. Our preliminary conclusion is that a small, *balanced* defense program could, indeed, significantly reduce fatalities from such an attack. However, the lead time for additional nations to develop and deploy an effective ballistic-missile system capable of reaching the United States is greater than we require to deploy the defense."—Statement of Secretary McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee, February 18, 1965.

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is no sign of any change of policy or doctrine about the French nuclear force—the central French argument being that two or three coördinated centers of nuclear decision in an alliance provide a more effective form of deterrence than one—the increasing cost and complexity of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union may provide the material for a very fundamental reappraisal of the program by the successor to President de Gaulle. It is also becoming clear that the most important causes of tension between France and her allies now concern not so much her nuclear force as her unilateral approach to other aspects of allied military and political planning, as they affect both Europe and Asia.

There is another factor that may make for a less strained relationship within NATO on European questions in the immediate future, even though there may not be much comfort to draw from it over the longer term. The period when the Soviet Government felt free to ignore the ideological or national pressure of its own allies in terms of pursuing agreements with the capitalist powers has now been ended, largely as a result of the strengthened position of China. Though it may be prepared to negotiate one type of agreement, namely on non-proliferation, the prospects for a significant general dialogue between the two superpowers is now less bright than it was a year ago. This has its depressing aspects, but it does also have one redeeming feature. In default of a sounder system of joint policy-making within the Western alliances, there is less likelihood of that kind of superpower dialogue which began after the Berlin crisis in 1961, from which the European middle powers were excluded, and which gave rise to the kind of suspicious attitude of Germany to the United States which has formed the background to all discussion on allied control of strategy and policy in the last three years.

At the same time, the prospects for a unified Europe are advancing only slowly. Though the countries of the European Free Trade Association, including Britain, are becoming increasingly affected by the stronger competitive position of the countries of the European Economic Community, the prospects for an amalgamation of the two economic systems in the next few years are not bright. The threat of American dominance over the advanced industries in Europe—aircraft, electronics, computers—is leading to certain pragmatic forms of bilateral coöperation, and it might even lead to some functional European authority to make the

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best use of European scientific resources. But the idea of an operational European military authority or combined political authority must remain dim, not only until President de Gaulle has left the scene, but until the alternatives in terms of a new relationship with the United States have been carefully appraised by the new leaders in London and Bonn. Consequently any idea that a clear-cut relationship between the United States and a European partner of roughly equal status can form a working hypothesis about the immediate future is mistaken. All consideration of means of improving transatlantic coöperation and of increasing European responsibility outside Europe must be in terms of a plural alliance. The only development that could force a European system to life would be the least desirable one, namely a widespread loss of confidence in the United States.

III

If it is unlikely that the resumed European-American debate will center around the same agenda as in recent years, the new one will contain equally difficult questions. For, when the debate resumes, two things will, I think, be clear. The first is that developments outside Europe are going to have a much greater bearing on it than during the recent cycle of debate (which began only after Suez, the last great interallied crisis generated by developments outside Europe). The second is that the kind of politico-military relationship which the United States eventually succeeds in evolving with her 14 NATO allies may serve as a prototype for its relationship with many of its other 28 allies in the Pacific, Asia or even Latin America.

Clear consideration of the relationship between NATO and the security of Asia and Africa has been bedeviled in recent years by what has been called "the reversal of roles." The European sense of commitment to other areas has diminished through a process of decolonization for which the United States was one of the principal enthusiasts, while successive American Administrations have shown themselves willing to acquire an increasing range of commitments. To contemporary Americans, Europe often seems as provincial as the United States did to Europeans in the thirties. But what has unquestionably been a courageous American acceptance of the responsibilities of its new power has been accompanied in recent years by an American doctrine that the United States will pay attention only to those European allies who are

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prepared to make a material contribution to extra-European security. This attitude has had the effect of encouraging either European provincialism, manifest for instance in the refusal of the continental European powers to play any part in the solution of the Cyprus problem early in 1964, or such irresponsibility as French policy in Southeast Asia.

Of late there has been an attempt to reformulate the question. Mr. Dean Rusk has recently said:

> Europe and the North Atlantic Community cannot preserve their security merely by holding a line across Europe. Their common security is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia and the Western Pacific. They have a vital common interest in the defeat of active aggression by the infiltration of arms and trained fighting men across national frontiers. . . . The United States must be prepared to see Europe, reviving in strength and confidence, play a larger role in joint decisions in these ventures.[2]

These propositions command wide support in Britain. But to the ears of most Continental Europeans they are still no more than a series of assertions. For their truth has not hitherto been demonstrable to European governments whose views on the problems of Asian or Middle Eastern security have not been much solicited in Washington. As Henry Kissinger has recently said of his countrymen, "A decade and a half of hegemony have accustomed us to believe that our views represent the general interest."[3]

The new element in the situation which has been provided by the deepening crisis in Viet Nam is that Asian developments are beginning to have a discernible, though negative, influence upon European affairs. Recent American decisions about the conduct of the war in Viet Nam have been made entirely without consultation with her European partners, including Britain. Yet it is no longer possible to ignore the supposition that a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union over Viet Nam might create an internal necessity for renewed Soviet pressure in Europe. Viet Nam cannot fail to make the détente between the superpowers somewhat more fragile and this in turn limits both American and European freedom of action in Europe. The American dispute with France over policy toward Indochina has further embittered an Atlantic relationship whose repercussions are felt di-

[2] Address to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs, March 6, 1965.

[3] "The Troubled Partnership." New York: McGraw Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, p. 234.

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rectly in Europe itself. Not impossibly, conflict in Southeast Asia and in Latin America could rise to a level where it might affect the American contribution of tactical power to the defense of Europe. The domestic interests of the European powers could be affected by the actions in Asia of a NATO ally with whose development they have had the minimum of association.

Europe is not only being asked to support unilateral acts of American policy. Britain now has 50,000 men committed to the defense of Malaysia, a country on the wisdom of whose creation in its present form no European NATO ally was asked to comment. Yet this commitment has a clear influence on British views about the level of military resources that the alliance should maintain in Europe, as well as placing severe limits on her own contribution to them. In the long run neither the United States nor Britain can expect to maintain the support of their allies for Asian policies which may soon become still further extended to some general commitment in the Indian Ocean, unless they seek to involve them more closely in the diagnostic analysis on which such commitments are based.

This is by no means a hopeless task. As Chinese and Soviet strategy, each in their own manner, concentrate on eroding Western interests and positions in the underdeveloped countries, so it is probable that all the European countries will come to feel more closely involved in developments outside Europe. The connection between Germany's policy in the Middle East and Africa and the strength of her position in relation to East Germany, demonstrated earlier this year, is a case in point. What is certain, however, is that it will require new techniques of alliance management if this reawakening interest is to have any constructive outcome.

IV

The danger that may involve the whole Atlantic Alliance most directly in problems outside the Atlantic area is that of nuclear proliferation. Until recently this has been regarded as a primarily European problem, that nuclear weapons would spread from Britain to France and from France to Germany and Italy. But it is clear that the immediate danger of proliferation is outside Europe, in countries like India or Japan across whose lands the Chinese bomb already casts its shadow, or in countries such as Israel which may despair of maintaining their national integrity

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over the indefinite future by conventional defenses alone. As this decade closes, nine non-nuclear powers will be operating power reactors which will give them a substantial production of plutonium, and unless present policies are reversed this number will grow throughout the next decade.

The risks and costs of becoming the kind of nuclear power that can confront a sophisticated adversary like the Soviet Union are now well appreciated in Europe. But in countries in other areas, faced with adversaries who are less technologically advanced, the balance of incentives and disincentives may well be different, as the serious and growing Indian debate on this subject has already illustrated. While nation-states exist, national security must be given priority over international, and the danger of becoming a nuclear power is greatest in those countries that do not possess the protection of any form of alliance. As their technological resources increase, as the essential knowledge about nuclear weapons becomes more widely accessible, as means of delivery that are obsolescent for the great powers but still serviceable in less complex situations become available, so the danger increases that the number of nuclear powers, which has grown from zero to five in 20 years, could triple in the next 20. The problem is not a distinctively European one, and if, for instance, Germany or Italy should feel tempted to face up to the decision, it will most probably be because the contagion has passed from India and Israel to other non-aligned countries like Sweden and Switzerland or South Africa—in other words, through a process of "feedback" from outside Europe rather than from a directly European chain of events.

The hope that nuclear proliferation can be averted simply by a non-dissemination agreement among the existing nuclear powers is over-optimistic, even though it may be the one arms-control agreement in which the Soviet Union is likely to show interest in the near future. For one thing, it would require the adherence of China if it was to have any long-term validity. For another, it would require a non-acquisition agreement among the significant nuclear powers, and in present circumstances many of them might be unwilling to sign. Moreover, an international treaty, however wide its range of signatories, is not likely to endure unless strong sanctions against its abrogation can be created, or unless the fundamental causes that lead to it are also tackled.

In the long run only a world authority that has the backing of

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all the nuclear powers can provide either sanctions against, or an alleviation of, the incentives to proliferation. But in the shorter run what is required is anti-proliferation strategy, and the onus for developing this rests squarely on the Western powers. All but one of the countries (Czechoslovakia) which will soon have a nuclear-weapons potential lie outside the Communist bloc. And Western policy, with its assumption that so-called "atoms for peace" could be disseminated without leading to a series of military potentials, is very largely responsible for the present situation.

Such a strategy would require many different instruments, for the motives that lead different countries to consider becoming nuclear powers vary widely, from considerations primarily of status as in the case of India, to those primarily of military security as in the case of Israel. It would require a number of restrictive conventions: a non-dissemination agreement; an extension of the partial test ban to underground tests; a tightening of the controls over nuclear fuels; perhaps an inspected cutoff of the production of fissile material in the nuclear powers as the basis of an international ownership of diffusion and chemical separation plants; possibly the organization of a group of non-nuclear powers to inspect and control such a system of agreements.

But more than that, an anti-proliferation strategy implies the ability to offer potential nuclear powers alternative forms of status or means of security.

Here there is not an easy answer, for no method of "guarantee" will meet the case until such time as a more universal system of security can be brought into being. In the present state of affairs, proud non-aligned nations like India would find it hard to accept the sense of dependence implied in any formal guarantees, most particularly if they came only from the Western powers (even if the West were prepared to offer them). Countries that feel themselves confronted with a real military threat, like Israel, would perhaps accept a unilateral Western assurance or guarantee of her frontiers. But our successful experience over 15 years in guaranteeing the security of another exposed country, Germany, illustrates what an onerous degree of control the guarantor powers must exercise over the circumstances that would activate their guarantee, the degree of participation in local defense they must shoulder if their guarantee is to be credible, and the extent of commitment against the country's adversaries they must accept.

This means that different cases will have to be treated differ-

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ently though with equal delicacy. India's sense of frustration and loss of status in Asia can perhaps be met by the mixture of a stronger contingent Western presence in the Indian Ocean and closer consultation on the political and security problems of Southern Asia as a whole. Israel's problem may require the evolution of a firmer and more unified Western policy toward the Middle East coupled with the negotiation of a non-nuclear zone there, although this would involve some tacit agreement with the Soviet Union on the level of conventional arms to be supplied by East and West. In the case of those Pacific countries like Japan and Australia that are already within the American alliance system, the technique evolved in NATO of closer allied association with American planning will be required.

Two things are certain: the development of an anti-proliferation strategy involves the interests of the European powers as directly as those of the United States, France as much as Britain, Germany and Italy as much as France. Moreover, such a strategy could not be effectively pursued without their coöperation. Second, the difference between the kind of assurances that are required in the various American alliances, between say NATO and ANZUS, between the German-American and Japanese-American relationship, will diminish over the years ahead, especially when China becomes an operational nuclear power with the ability to threaten the population centers of Asia and Australasia, in the same way that the Soviet Union can threaten those of Western Europe. If the Atlantic Nuclear Force is the right solution for the European allies, a Pacific nuclear force may be required for the Pacific allies, reinforced by the kind of control over the guidelines of strategic policy which has already been worked out in NATO.

V

There is at this moment a discernible irritation in Washington with the restriction of alliances, a weariness with the responsibilities they impose in comparison to the accretion of strength they contribute to the pursuit of American objectives. But this could be Washington's golden moment of opportunity. The evidence suggests that artificial systems of military command and control such as the M.L.F. do not meet the problem of great-power middle-power relationships so successfully as the ability of the latter to participate in the formulation of policy before it solidifies into long-term plans. There is a clear need for a multilateral system of

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crisis management applicable not just to the more remote contingencies of direct nuclear war, but also to the many lesser or less clear-cut situations which a more diversified Communist strategy makes probable. The increased freedom of action of the middle powers is evident: European coöperation will for the time being remain functional and will not lead to a new center of power. There is a growing similarity in the problems of allies in different hemispheres. The special relationship with Britain is no longer any sort of obstacle to Western arrangements, while the need to enhance the political status and responsibility of Germany is clear. Washington itself is physically in the center of the European and Asian confrontations. Finally, the complexity of the American policy-making process, the openness of debate in the early phases of a new policy, the difficulty of modifying American decisions once reached, make it easier to multilateralize the process of coördination and consultation in Washington than in any distant center such as Paris or Bangkok. All these considerations point in one direction, to the conscious development of techniques of multilateral planning and the interpenetration of bureaucracies at the point where the greatest number of different interests bisect—namely, in the capital of the United States itself.

This is not a question of creating complex new institutions either in Washington or elsewhere, though the reform of the machinery of NATO itself cannot be delayed much longer if the alliance is to retain political vitality or if the strange divorce between political reality and military planning is to be ended. The real problem is one of American perspective and choice. On the one hand, the United States can continue to reserve the maximum freedom of action and accept the corollary that its alliances become sounding boards for its policy rather than systems of cooperation. On the other, it can exploit its central position to convert formal alliances or bilateral relationships into an entente—a common way of looking at problems that are increasingly shared in common—especially among those eight or ten middle powers on four continents on whose support and initiative a polycentric world makes the United States increasingly dependent. To develop an informal system of overlapping regional councils or long-term planning centers in Washington, making a large part of the alliance policy-making process synonymous with the American, would be an imaginative use of this central position and might relieve much of the malaise that both the United States and many of its allies now feel about each other.

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NEW DIRECTIONS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

By William C. Foster

THREE and a half years ago when John J. McCloy gave an accounting in this journal of where we stood in efforts for disarmament the picture which he presented was understandably somber.[1] In the previous September there had been some progress in the negotiation of a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles," an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on certain criteria that would have to be met if progress was to be made on substantive measures. But that one hopeful development had to be balanced against a record of discouragingly little progress in any other negotiations, growing difficulties over Berlin culminating in the erection of the Wall, and the termination, also in September 1961, of the understanding on the nuclear-test cessation.

Since then significant changes have occurred in Soviet-American relations and these have substantially affected the prospects for arms control and disarmament. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis appears to have been a major turning point in this difficult search. Since that time, the Soviet Union appears to have appreciated to a degree not apparent before that its long-term interests might best be served by increased emphasis on internal development and a relaxation of the cold war. In the field of arms control and disarmament, this has been reflected in increased interest in small steps which, though they lack some of the popular appeal of general and complete disarmament, are more realistically attainable in the foreseeable future. There has been some real progress: creation of the so-called hot line between Washington and Moscow; the United Nations resolution banning the placement in space of weapons of mass destruction; some evidence of progress through mutual example in the simultaneous announcement of cutbacks in planned production of fissionable materials and in apparent reductions in military budgets; and, most notably, the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests except underground.

[1] "Balance Sheet on Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1962.

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II

But as we consider the future, another change in attitudes is likely to be at least as significant as that in Soviet-American relations—namely, a greatly increased sense of urgency in dealing with the problem of proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities among nations. This is not, of course, a new interest—United States concern about control of the atom was reflected as early as in the Baruch plan of 1946—but it is a matter that has commanded far more attention lately. Three major factors probably have led to this reassessment of priorities: an increasingly realistic appreciation that agreement on general and complete disarmament will not be achieved early enough so that we can count on it to control the atom; a realization in the last few years that very significant quantities of plutonium were likely to be produced in nuclear power plants in many countries in the very near future; and, very importantly, and perhaps somewhat belatedly, an appreciation of the full implications of the Chinese nuclear tests.

It is clear that the Chinese tests have had an unsettling effect throughout much of Asia and particularly in India. The reaction there, and to a lesser degree in Japan, seems to have developed out of fear of the nascent military threat implicit in the tests and out of concern that Indian (and Japanese) prestige and influence would suffer. The degree of India's concern is due in part, of course, to the impression that she had been dealt a severe blow as a consequence of the Chinese attack in late 1962. Undoubtedly the test explosions have further enhanced Peking's prestige, particularly because they were the first nuclear tests by a non-white nation. However, the magnitude of the accomplishment has been exaggerated. The success of China's program is in large measure due to the very substantial assistance provided by the Soviet Union during the 1950s. In other respects the Indian program for exploitation of the atom is almost certainly more impressive than that of China; and so is Japan's. But despite the fact that the progress being made by these countries in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and in other areas, dwarfs in many respects the progress of the Chinese, in the contest for leadership among the Asian powers China's status has been enhanced as a result of its nuclear tests.

Fortunately, political leaders in India and Japan as well as in other countries such as Israel or Sweden appear to be convinced that it would be a mistake to engage in a nuclear-weapons pro-

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gram, despite pressure to do so. Whether they will be able to hold out against pressure to "go nuclear" will depend substantially on whether or not measures to prevent nuclear proliferation are negotiated in the months ahead, and whether or not there is other evidence that the great powers are really prepared to deal with the problem.

We continue, of course, to be concerned about the Soviet threat; and the Soviets are no doubt worried about what they must regard as a threat to them implicit in our large stock of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems. Both of us must regard it as important that we continue to seek ways to reduce the probability of a Soviet-American conflict, and also to mitigate the consequences should it occur. But whereas a few years ago these were our major concerns, it is no exaggeration to argue that we should now be at least as concerned about the problem of nuclear proliferation; and that in evaluating the implications of agreements which might affect the Soviet-American confrontation, we must give at least as much weight to the effect of such agreements on the proliferation problem as to their effect on the Soviet-American balance per se. In considering this reassessment of priorities, it is important to recognize that despite occasional backward steps (of which the present controversy over Viet Nam is a worrisome example) the trend in Soviet-American relations since the death of Stalin and particularly since the Cuban crisis has been in a generally favorable direction, whereas the trend in nuclear proliferation seems decidedly unfavorable. And there is a difference in the time scale for action in the two areas. For a decade and a half the Soviet Union has had nuclear weapons; hence the prospect of a delay of, say, a year or two in reducing the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States to damage each other may not seem terribly critical in itself. But a delay of a year or so, or perhaps even of months, in the implementation of measures bearing on the nuclear-proliferation problem could well mean the difference between failure and success.

III

Clearly implicit here is the view that further nuclear proliferation would have very undesirable effects on our security interests. Though this is the view of the U. S. Government, there is a contrary argument that might be made to the effect that in some selected instances the further spread of nuclear-weapons

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capabilities may actually be desirable. For example, it might be argued that, in the absence of any realistic possibility of inducing Communist China to give up her nuclear aspirations, it would be desirable that other selected countries in Asia have nuclear weapons to offset potential Chinese threats. In support of this, one might speculate that, if other Asian nations were to acquire nuclear capabilities, our burdens in defending the Asian periphery against China would be lessened, and that in the event of war there it might be less necessary for the United States to involve itself. This line might be further supported with the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons probably cannot be prevented anyway, or that if it can be, the political and other costs to the United States would be unacceptably great.

The case for "limited" proliferation seems to me to be based on two premises that are both implausible and inconsistent with the attitude we have taken with respect to Europe: first, that proliferation could be controlled as selectively as we might like; and second, that a country with the world-wide commitments of the United States could avoid involving itself in any conflict on a scale where nuclear capabilities would be significant.

That the first assumption is dubious becomes apparent when one considers what are almost certainly the most immediate cases in point, India and Israel. With the present unsettled state of affairs between Pakistan and India, it seems extremely improbable that either would be prepared to forego indefinitely the acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability once it had become apparent that the other had decided to obtain one. The same is true of Israel and the United Arab Republic—a point which it is to be hoped will be fully appreciated by all elements in these countries whenever the question of acquiring nuclear weapons arises. Having five nations with nuclear weapons is bad enough, and if the number is to be limited, the prospects are almost certainly better at five than at six or any higher number.

In the short run we might successfully avoid involvement in, say, an Asian conflict in which nuclear weapons had a role. But any such success would, I believe, be short-lived and bought at a price that would prove unacceptable in the long run. That price would be a renunciation of our commitments and involvement all over the world—an attempt to return to isolationism at a time when the world is shrinking so rapidly as to make any such policy at best wishful thinking and quite possibly a blueprint for disaster.

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Despite the gloomy prospects implicit in such a policy, it is highly likely that, in a world of many nuclear powers, considerable pressure would develop—and perhaps it would prove sufficient—to force the United States in just such an isolationist direction. This possibility must surely be considered a major argument for our attempting to stop the spread of nuclear capabilities. There are two others.

Very advanced nuclear capabilities are demanding in their requirements for scientific and technical manpower, as well as in material resources, but they are relatively cheap, and getting cheaper, in terms of the destructive power involved. With improvements in technology, the initial cost of nuclear weapons has been greatly reduced. Moreover, in many cases much of the development cost might be written off as chargeable to peaceful nuclear-power programs. Depending somewhat on whether or not defensive weapons are deployed, delivery systems may also become less costly. In our own case, the Minuteman systems are much less costly to build and particularly to operate and maintain than the B-52 and the first-generation I.C.B.M. All of which means that strategic nuclear-weapons systems could prove to be the great equalizer in international affairs that guns were in the case of individual combat. When we consider the costs to us of trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, we should not lose sight of the fact that widespread nuclear proliferation would mean a substantial erosion in the margin of power which our great wealth and industrial base have long given us relative to much of the rest of the world.

Finally, there is the simple fact that the probability of nuclear weapons being used will almost certainly increase as the number of fingers on the trigger increases. Moreover, the increase in probability will be more than proportional to the increase in numbers, particularly as, in a world of many nuclear powers, there may well be some who, unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, have relatively little to lose if nuclear weapons are used. Of course, the use of a few nuclear weapons by any power—even of one such weapon and even with an intent to localize the effect—might lead to their use in large numbers by other powers, with cataclysmic consequences.

In the light of such consequences of proliferation, we would seem justified in accepting rather large costs in an effort to prevent it. Of course, even our best efforts may not lead to success. Con-

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sidering the lateness of the hour, the incentives that presently exist for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the prospect that they may be acquired with increasing ease, one is forced to conclude that a really major effort involving many kinds of actions will be required if there is to be any reasonable prospect of stemming the tide. These must include actions both to make the acquisition of nuclear capabilities more difficult and to reduce the incentives to acquire them.

IV

One of the central facts with which we have to deal is the very great overlap between the technology for the peaceful exploitation of the atom and that needed for weapons programs. In the enthusiasm of the late 1940s and early 1950s we and others were perhaps oversold on the potentialities of the peaceful atom and in particular on its application to the production of power. In consequence, a number of countries have been enabled to acquire nuclear reactors and technically trained people perhaps somewhat more rapidly than economics and other considerations could have realistically justified, and certainly under controls that are in some instances less rigid than would be desirable. Actually, the American record with respect to controls has been very good. The Baruch proposals, our Atomic Energy Act of 1946, our efforts, particularly in recent years, to get applied to nuclear programs throughout the world safeguards of the type established by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and our willingness to go further than any of the other nuclear powers have done in opening our reactors to international inspection—all are evidence of this. One reason we must be as concerned as we are today about the possibility of certain nations deciding to "go nuclear" is partly because the U. S. example has not, unfortunately, been emulated as widely as we might have hoped.

We are of course now at the point where the use of nuclear power is becoming economically advantageous in many situations. As a result, we must expect that within the next few years a number of countries will each be producing enough by-product plutonium to sustain a modest weapons program. Hence it is increasingly important that there be a more widespread, and stricter, application of controls to the traffic in fissionable materials and to the technology which may be useful either for peaceful or military purposes. Particularly important are inter-

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national agreements on uniform standards to prevent critical materials and equipment from being offered for sale with inadequate controls, in order to realize economic or political advantage.

The most noteworthy direct efforts to make acquisition of nuclear weapons difficult has been, of course, the negotiation of a test-ban treaty which achieved at least partial success in 1963. Those efforts have been documented in great detail elsewhere. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the present test ban as an anti-proliferation measure and its value as a precedent, it may be useful to comment further here, particularly regarding the possible risks and advantages of the treaty.

Those supporting the treaty offered varying appraisals of the relative importance of the objectives: the prevention of fallout; the directly inhibiting effect on those governments which might otherwise wish to test but which, having been forced to accede to the treaty by public and world opinion, would be reluctant to violate its terms; and the indication to the world of a willingness on the part of the great powers at least to begin to bring the nuclear-arms race under control. The last point is perhaps as important as the second in inhibiting other nations from going ahead with nuclear-weapons programs.

The extent to which these objectives could be realized by the treaty was carefully weighed within the U. S. Government. The military advantages to us were balanced against such risks and disadvantages as there may be in the treaty, including, of course, consideration of the military advantages that the Soviet Union might realize. The possibility of faithful compliance with its terms had to be borne in mind no less than the possibility of evasion, with some small risk that this would go undetected.

As might have been expected, this balancing of risks and advantages proved to be exceedingly difficult, particularly since the effects on nuclear proliferation, on international relations generally, and on further progress in arms control and disarmament were not susceptible to technical analysis as were other elements in the problem. The latter included fallout, the probability of successful evasion, the implications for weapons technology and the consequent impact of the agreement on the Soviet-American military balance under various assumptions regarding compliance.

These latter elements of the problem were the ones to which greatest attention was paid during the debate, in part simply

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because they were susceptible to orderly technical analysis. But the emphasis accorded them was at least as much due to the fact that by coincidence they were also matters of great general concern at that time. There was seemingly a relative lack of concern about nuclear proliferation and the less predictable relationship of the test ban to international affairs in general.

As we consider other significant arms-control or disarmament agreements—or even unilateral policy decisions—we shall have to go through a comparably difficult analysis, forcing us to weigh risks that are relatively easy to define against nebulous advantages (and vice versa), and the probability (generally *not* the certainty) of long-range gains against short-term costs.

The question of balancing long-term against short-term consequences is worth stressing. We sometimes have great difficulty in getting the right perspective on the time factors involved, often seeming far too concerned about the immediate effects of suggested measures on international affairs. Similarly, but at the other extreme, we seem at times to be unduly concerned about long-term risks which, while admittedly real, may be quite overrated because we discount the probability that conditions will change; what might be risky today may not seem so in a different international environment some years hence. For example, we may do ourselves a disservice if we discount the possibility of changes in the international environment and give *too much* weight to such factors as whether or not the Soviet-American strategic balance might be upset 15 years hence by weapons systems that the Soviet Union might develop as a result of successful evasion of some agreement under consideration today. There are, of course, some changes of which we can be reasonably certain. We can be sure that technology will spread and advance at least as rapidly in the next decade as in the last, and we can probably state with confidence that there will be substantial political realignments. We can be reasonably sure that nuclear capabilities will spread unless we take action very promptly to stem the tide. Weighing the relative risks is extremely difficult; but we do not minimize the over-all risk to us if we take too myopic a view of particular risks rather than facing up to the totality of dangers in all their complexity.

We are of course continuing our efforts to extend the nuclear test-ban treaty to prohibit testing underground as well as in the other environments. In this we face a somewhat different prob-

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lem in balancing risks and advantages than when we contemplated a comprehensive test-ban agreement in 1962 or the partial test ban which we achieved in 1963. There is certainly less to be gained from extending the test ban to include underground explosions than there was when we had no agreement at all. Fallout is no longer an issue and much of the debate about military implications of weapons tests is not relevant; nor is there the possibility, for example, of very high-yield tests and of weapons-effects tests at high altitudes. Further, much of the possible inhibiting effect which a full test-ban treaty would have on nuclear proliferation has been achieved with the partial test ban. Nevertheless, extension of the treaty does seem desirable as an anti-proliferation measure. Though none of the nuclear powers began its weapons program with underground tests, it would not be difficult for others to do so while still complying with the treaty; and it does seem desirable to foreclose that possibility. Those elements, particularly in democratic states, which oppose their countries' acquiring nuclear weapons would be in a much stronger position if a treaty existed prohibiting all such tests than if the option of legitimate underground testing still remained open. Finally, extension of the treaty would be evidence of willingness on the part of the great powers to take further steps to control the arms race.

Fortunately, technical improvements may make it easier to discriminate between earthquakes and possible underground explosions. While all present scientific evidence indicates that a number of inspections continue to be necessary to provide verification, the United States continues to be willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of these recent and prospective developments in our capabilities for detection. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections from those previously discussed, the United States will certainly take those facts into account. Whether we can thus close the gap between the American and Soviet positions remains to be seen in further discussions.

There are other multilateral measures that may be of direct value as components of a program to stop the spread of nuclear capabilities; for example, agreements on nuclear-free zones and agreements restricting the sale or transfer of strategic aircraft and missiles, the means for delivering nuclear weapons.

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But probably most important would be negotiation of a non-proliferation agreement—that is, an agreement on the part of the nuclear powers not to transfer control of nuclear weapons to other countries and an agreement on the part of the non-nuclear powers not to acquire them. Such a measure seems so overwhelmingly in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States that it may seem surprising that they have been unable to reach agreement; but such is so far the case.

The principal problem appears to be the Soviet refusal to go along with an agreement permitting the NATO Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force (M.L.F. and A.N.F., respectively) and the Western refusal to renounce these projects. In part, of course, they sprang from the belief that any incipient desire for independent control of nuclear weapons by Europeans, particularly in Germany, could be most safely dealt with by giving them a role in a collective enterprise. But the Soviet Union has refused to concede that the M.L.F./A.N.F. idea may have value as an anti-proliferation measure, and indeed has argued the contrary. It insists that the implementation of such a concept would lead to control of nuclear capabilities by the German Federal Republic. To a certain extent this argument may reflect genuine concern, but it also seems clear that the Soviets have been using the M.L.F./A.N.F., and its connection with a non-proliferation agreement, for propaganda value and for whatever divisive effect it may have in NATO.

Whether we will be able to overcome this impasse will depend in large measure on the Soviet assessment of the relative advantages of actually getting a proliferation agreement or of continuing to use the M.L.F./A.N.F. issue for its political effect. In making this balance, the Soviets could assume that they could include in any non-proliferation agreement that might be negotiated a withdrawal clause similar to that found in the limited test-ban treaty.

For the near and medium term, the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons can undoubtedly be reduced, if not controlled, by adequate security assurances or guarantees—a point of particular importance since the Chinese nuclear test. The United States has already gone some distance toward assuring non-nuclear powers of our support in the event of nuclear attack, but we may have to go further if our assurances are to be considered truly adequate. This could mean either an increase or a decrease in the risks of our involvement in actual conflict, depend-

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ing on the appraisal of others as to our seriousness. In some cases, too, would-be nuclear powers may ask us to provide assurances against conventional attack. There is also the question of obtaining assurances from a number of nuclear powers—an arrangement that the Indians, for example, would feel was more adequate than a U. S. (or Soviet) assurance alone.

Whether any assurances or guarantees will be considered credible depends of course to a substantial degree on the relative strength of the powers involved. One of our difficulties in NATO—and in France in particular—has been the growing feeling, perhaps most clearly articulated by the Prime Minister of France, that our commitment to NATO was of diminishing credibility as Soviet capacity to damage the United States increased.[2] With the passage of time a similar erosion of confidence might occur with respect to any assurances designed to counter the Chinese threat. But we probably do have a number of years during which Chinese nuclear capabilities will be so small relative to those of the United States (or of the U.S.S.R.) that American (and/or Soviet) assurances would be entirely credible, assuming of course at least some degree of American (and/or Soviet) concern about the viability of the country in question.

In the longer term we must deal with the problems of the growing Chinese nuclear capability and of the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs. In a sense, all of the measures discussed above ought to be considered primarily as a means of buying time in which to get at these more fundamental problems.

Unless the non-nuclear powers are persuaded that their interests are best served by not acquiring nuclear weapons they will ultimately acquire them. A necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition for so persuading them is to offer clear evidence that the Soviet Union and the United States are prepared to exercise leadership in the world on a basis of strength other than that inherent in their nuclear capabilities. It is for this reason that agreements to freeze production and to start reductions in fissionable materials and in nuclear delivery systems are so important.

Such measures appear to be in our mutual interest, for they would effect substantial savings and would reduce both the probability of war and the damage incurred if war were not

[2] Speech on the French military program before the French National Assembly, December 2, 1964.

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avoided. One of the most hopeful signs is the growing appreciation of the fact that the kind of nuclear superiority which the United States enjoyed in the 1950s and to which the Soviets perhaps at one time aspired is a thing of the past. Secretary Robert McNamara made this especially clear in recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He pointed out that only a portion of our strategic capabilities would be required to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, but that the remainder, if used against Soviet offensive capabilities, would be effective only under the improbable contingency that the Soviets withheld the bulk of their force after the beginning of a thermonuclear exchange. Soviet forces in excess of what would be required to assure a high level of destruction against U. S. industry and population could be used even less effectively to reduce damage to the U.S.S.R. With these points in mind, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that we both would be well advised to stop the strategic nuclear-arms race and destroy some strategic capabilities on a reciprocal basis. It does not make good sense to continue the race in the hope that each *may* be able to use some of its capability to destroy the other's offensive strength, a task that is daily becoming more difficult.

In stressing that such measures as reductions in Soviet and American nuclear capabilities are important if we are to succeed in dealing with nuclear proliferation, it should be made clear that it is not a question of our setting a good example, a factor of regrettably little influence in international affairs, but rather the fact that we would, by negotiating such measures, be giving evidence of our determination to reverse the arms race and move toward a world order in which the role of nuclear weapons would be diminished. Lacking at least reasonable prospects of movement in this direction, it is hard to see how, in the long run, we can hope to put any limits on the membership in the nuclear club.

Actually, the perceived utility of nuclear weapons has diminished to some extent in recent years. This is particularly true in the United States. Ten years ago there was little interest in the Department of Defense in any weapons other than nuclear. The situation is drastically changed today. In part this has occurred because we have come to understand the limited role which nuclear weapons can play. Somewhat belatedly there is also a broader appreciation of the fact that in many combat situations nuclear weapons would not be useful—even apart from the haz-

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ards of escalation and retaliation. With each succeeding day that their use is avoided, it is possible that the likelihood of future use will further diminish. Thus, in this one respect time seems in our favor. The world would do well to bear this in mind as crises develop which might lead to their use.

If through short-term measures we can succeed in buying time, there is no place where the need to use it effectively is more urgent than in our confrontation with Communist China. Yet we can now make progress in arms control and disarmament without Chinese participation. A comprehensive test-ban treaty to which China did not accede would be better than none at all and should be acceptable to us. With or without a treaty, our testing program would not be contingent on what China might do in the next few years. Similarly, a non-proliferation agreement to which China did not accede would be better than none at all. And we could negotiate a freeze—even a substantial reduction—of strategic delivery systems without fear that we were compromising whatever nuclear capability was needed to deal with China.

But a few years hence, none of these things will be true unless we make progress in bringing China into arms-control and disarmament agreements. Nor will U. S. or Soviet or even joint guarantees for China's neighbors be very credible. Clearly, progress in dealing with China is as essential a long-term requirement for success in a non-proliferation effort as Soviet-American coöperation is in the near term.

Over the next decade or two we cannot expect major changes in China's objectives, which are in so many respects antithetical to ours. But with changes in Chinese leadership, which are inevitable soon, and with economic growth, which will give China more to lose through war, it is at least possible that the Chinese may conclude—as apparently have the Soviets—that they have much to gain by accepting the concept of peaceful coexistence. While this hope is based on the optimistic belief that time may bring restraint and wisdom to the Chinese leaders, the alternative is bleak indeed.

V

Having dealt at some length with means and possibilities of stopping nuclear proliferation, and with the consequences should we fail, we need to appraise the costs of effective agreement. It would be irresponsible to suggest that they will not be substantial.

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Some interference with the exploitation of the atom for peaceful purposes seems inevitable. A number of the newer nations, and the Soviet Union particularly, may view international controls as unacceptable infringements on sovereignty, though the voting record of the U.S.S.R. on the extension of controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency is encouraging in this respect. U. S. insistence on controls, and unwillingness to permit export of certain equipment and technology that might have application in weapons programs may be, as it has been, cause for some international friction. Fortunately, if nations and industry are willing to accept adequate controls, most socially and economically desirable applications of the atom, such as nuclear power and the use of radioisotopes for medical purposes, can go ahead with little actual impediment. This may not, however, be true in the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, of which the economics are, incidentally, still in doubt. Some such explosions are, of course, already precluded by the present test-ban treaty, but we may have to accept the cost of forgoing any such explosions. Alternatively, we might agree on provisions which permit them; none that has been so far considered, however, is without awkward features. For example, some people fear that information on weapons design might be compromised; others assert that the great powers might proceed with weapons development under the guise of peaceful explosions; and still others feel that it might be necessary to employ relatively primitive devices that would not be altogether suitable.

A heavier cost could be the erosion of alliances resulting from the high degree of U. S.–Soviet coöperation which will be required if a non-proliferation program is to be successful. Within NATO, there could be concern that the détente would lead to a weakening of our commitment to Western Europe. The problem will be particularly acute in Germany where there will be the added concern that the amelioration of the East-West confrontation could lead to an increased acceptance of the status quo in Central Europe. On the other side, it is to be expected that any move toward détente will lead to an exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet split and of the contest for influence within the Communist world. Finally, there is the simple fact that the strains inherent in any alliance are likely to become more prominent, and the cohesive forces less so, if the threat which was a major part of its rationale is perceived to be less worrisome. We should not be sur-

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prised if a move toward East-West détente leads to some changes in both the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. What would be troublesome is if there were a weakening of NATO which proceeded at a more rapid rate than the actual diminution in the threat justified.

But proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities could also be expected to have a highly divisive effect on NATO, the Warsaw Pact and other alliances, for the reasons outlined earlier. In France's relationship to NATO, we have already seen the divisive effects both of relaxation of tensions and of nuclear proliferation. While there are other factors involved, we can surmise that the independent attitude of France toward NATO is in large part a consequence of her perceiving the Soviet threat as less worrisome than a decade ago and in part a consequence of her acquisition of some nuclear capability. We must accept the fact, then, that either nuclear proliferation or its successful prevention is likely to weaken alliances.

I would suggest that, as regards NATO, the best we might hope, and strive for, would be movement toward a substantial measure of East–West détente—hopefully sufficient to enable us to hold the line on nuclear proliferation—with perhaps progress on European union offsetting at least in part the fact that the cement holding NATO together will weaken with any further erosion of the fear of attack.

Balancing the risks and costs of letting nuclear proliferation run its course against those that may be incurred in a determined effort to stop it is clearly one of the most difficult problems in international relations today—and far more complex than the one we faced in deciding upon the limited test-ban treaty. It is particularly trying because success in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons may elude us despite the best efforts and intentions of many nations.

But stopping nuclear proliferation is a problem from which the world cannot shrink, and one which requires very prompt action if there is to be any reasonable hope of success. May others conclude—as we have—that, all things considered, a most serious and urgent effort is justified!

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ATOMS FOR PEACE, OR WAR

By John A. Hall

FOR a decade, American foreign policy in the field of atomic energy has energetically supported the transfer of uranium, information, equipment and complete reactors to many countries abroad. Has this Atoms for Peace Program unwittingly contributed to the development of an atomic-weapon capability throughout the world and thereby encouraged nuclear proliferation? This basic question has been brought into focus by the Red Chinese nuclear explosions and by the realization that several countries now have the necessary knowledge, materials and technicians to make nuclear weapons if they want to.

Since 1946, American policy has been based on a recognition of the fact that atomic energy is capable of both peaceful and military uses and that certain of the processes used in its development are essentially the same regardless of the final application. Early in the postwar period, then, it became our avowed purpose to establish some international control of the development of atomic energy to assure its peaceful use and, in particular, to limit and perhaps ultimately eliminate any military use.

In its continuing effort to make the atom benign through international action, American policy has gone through two distinct phases in the past 20 years. The first phase was established and governed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which placed an embargo on the export of nuclear information and materials. In the same year the United States brought before the United Nations the proposals formulated by Bernard Baruch for international control of atomic energy. The principal thesis behind these early U. S. proposals was that atomic energy was so dangerous in terms of its potential military applications that international "ownership" and "supervision" were required. For example, the Acheson-Lilienthal report, which served as an important basis for the Baruch proposals, included the following statement: "We have concluded unanimously that there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons controlled only by a system

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which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods." The proposed solution to the political problem of control was supranational ownership and operation of atomic energy activities, and this was explicit in the United Nations majority plan.

Read in 1965, this conclusion is a bit startling. Disarmament plans and systems to assure the peaceful use of atomic energy both rest today in large part on the assumption that scientific inspection and verification will provide the necessary assurances of compliance. Why was the concept of international control thus limited or narrowed?

The Baruch Plan was, of course, rejected, and by 1953 the United States no longer had a monopoly of atomic technology. Despite the embargo imposed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, several countries, including the Soviet Union, were developing substantial atomic energy programs for both war and peace. The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had been abandoned and essentially merged into the Commission for Disarmament. No progress was being made in disarmament, the Soviet Union had entered a thermonuclear arms race with the United States, and discussions to bring about a reduction of tensions had reached a complete impasse. At the same time, the progress made by scientists exploring the peaceful uses of atomic energy had stimulated a growing interest in the benign uses of the atom both in the United States and overseas.

It appeared to the Administration in 1953 that the American people should be informed in frank and realistic terms of the ominous consequences of the impasse on disarmament. But at the same time it was thought desirable to place some new and constructive proposals before the world, preferably in the atomic field, with the aim of converting the then dismal climate to one of optimism. It was hoped that in the process a new channel of communication could be developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was the background of President Eisenhower's speech before the U.N. General Assembly in 1953.

The President there recognized the important and growing promise of atomic energy in contributing to human welfare and the eagerness of many nations to avail themselves of these benefits. His Administration had come to feel that these aspirations and developments could best be contained in peaceful channels by a program of positive international coöperation under safeguards rather than continued adherence to a policy of em-

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bargo. He was also aware that within the United States there was a growing interest in the peaceful side of nuclear technology and that greater progress, particularly in the field of power, might be achieved if U. S. industry were permitted to contribute.

II

Thus, the United States established a new atomic policy. It included a sharing of peaceful nuclear technology and a proposal to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), related to the United Nations. Domestically, it involved permitting the growth of a peaceful nuclear industry by authorizing such steps as the construction and operation, under license, of private reactors. In effect, a new Atomic Energy Act was created to give substance to what became known as the Atoms for Peace Program. The Senate report on the draft 1954 atomic energy legislation stated the rationale for the new approach:

> Today we are not alone in the drive to achieve peacetime atomic power. Eight years ago, besides the United States, only the United Kingdom, Canada, and—as we have recently come to find—the Soviet Union had major atomic energy projects in being. The possibility of coöperation with other nations to gain mutual advantage in the areas of peacetime power appeared far in the future. As against this, however, more than 20 countries now have vigorous atomic energy programs, and several of them are pressing toward the construction of atomic power plants to turn out useful amounts of electricity.
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> In 1946, our Nation earnestly hoped that worldwide agreement on international control of atomic energy might soon be secured. It was reasonable, therefore, that the original Act should prohibit an exchange of information on commercial uses of atomic energy with other nations until such time as the Congress declared that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been established.
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> But our hopes of 1946 have been thwarted by unremitting Soviet opposition to the United Nations' plan for the control of atomic energy. Although we would be morally derelict if we abandoned our hopes for the eventual effective international regulation of all armaments, legislative policy cannot now be founded on the expectation that the prospect of such control is either likely or imminent.

The 1954 policy was one of international coöperation based on a system of verification to assure that the uses in view were peaceful. While the Atomic Energy Act of that year does not specify that inspection and verification must be established as a condition for international coöperation, the Act does require that "an agreement of coöperation must include terms, conditions,

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duration, nature, and scope of the coöperation by the coöperating nation; that the security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agreement will be maintained; that any material transferred under the agreement will not be used for atomic weapons, research and development, or any other military purpose. . . ."

The elements of an effective system of safeguards and verification designed to assure peaceful use were subsequently developed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State. Safeguard rights, including rights of inspection, have been incorporated in our bilateral agreements and, after considerable negotiation, many of these conditions were included in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1956. The I.A.E.A. has the right and obligation to apply these safeguards when granting assistance to its members. It also is empowered to apply them to arrangements and facilities voluntarily placed under its control. In general, these procedures for bilateral and international inspection and verification are similar to those which the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the first report to the Security Council considered insufficient alone to provide fully adequate international control and security.

Before examining the safeguards we need to look first at the programs themselves. There have been four major programs under the new atomic policy: the exchange of technical information, the transfer of materials (uranium, plutonium, etc.), the transfer of equipment (including complete reactors), and finally, institutional coöperation through and with the I.A.E.A., Euratom, the European Nuclear Energy Agency and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, plus a more liberal policy on the part of the A.E.C., permitted a substantial declassification of information useful for the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy. The way was thus prepared for making the first United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva in 1955 an enormous success. Aided, too, by the warm glow which followed the Summit Meeting in May of that year, the conference saw more relevant information more broadly exchanged than ever before. Because of unified policies stemming from their wartime collaboration, the United States, Britain and Canada had declassified substantially the same type of information on their respective programs. And it became apparent at Geneva that the Soviet Union had declassi-

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fied a vast amount of information which for the first time disclosed that East and West were operating on basically the same principles of declassification.

The convening of the Geneva Conference of 1955 prompted the establishment in many countries of new and separate governmental organs to promote and administer peaceful atomic development, and many of the delegates were the new chairmen or administrators of these bodies. The statistics on the conference are impressive. There were 1,428 delegates present, of whom 485 were Americans. The Soviet delegation consisted of 67 members, the largest number of Soviet scientists ever to attend an international conference up to that time. The exchange of information that occurred through the presentation of papers and subsequent discussions in the various sessions of the conference was important and substantial. The majority of the scientists and administrators present were convinced that within a few years there would be a significant reduction in the cost of atomic power which would permit the construction of many nuclear generators throughout the world. This early optimism was not justified.

A second and even larger Geneva Conference was held in 1958. The commercial and governmental exhibits were huge and gave the impression of a three-ring circus. But reactor technology had not developed at the pace expected in 1955, and despite the many papers given at the conference and the further declassification of information by many countries, there was very little of significance to add to what had been known and revealed in 1955. Except in the area of plasma physics, which held long-range promise of great developments, a spirit of pessimism characterized the 1958 conference. However, by the time of the third Geneva Conference in September 1964, important progress had been made in the field of atomic power. This conference demonstrated that nuclear technology had come of age and that nuclear activity was becoming more conventional and could be discussed in more conventional terms. Clearly, we were on the threshold of competitive atomic power.

It can be argued that the massive release of information which took place at the three Geneva Conferences and through U. S. coöperative activities with other countries has contributed in some degree to a better understanding of certain military applications of atomic energy. As noted at the outset, this is an inherent problem of nuclear technology. But in order to put the issue in

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perspective, two points need to be emphasized. First, as we have seen, it became evident at an early stage that even by adhering to a policy of strictest secrecy the United States could not prevent other countries from using the brains of their own scientists to identify and perfect the fundamentals of producing special nuclear materials for weapons development. Indeed, it was apparent that this basic knowledge became generally available at a very early date. Second, it cannot be stressed too strongly that the overwhelming bulk of the information that has been declassified has had very little bearing on military programs, but has been exceedingly useful in promoting peaceful uses. For example, the very great portion of the information that has been released in the field of nuclear power has concerned reactors designed primarily for the production of power rather than plutonium. The United States has retained, in secrecy, information on weapons design and sensitive production processes such as the gaseous diffusion technology in use at Oak Ridge and other A.E.C. facilities.

III

The second aspect of the new atomic policy provided for the transfer of uranium and other materials under statutory agreements for coöperation. The transfer of fissile material from the United States to another country was quite impossible before the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In fact, the unique quality of uranium and, particularly, of uranium in its isotopic form of U-235, goes to the core of our problem of the potentially dual use of atomic energy for war and peace. Uranium-235 in a research reactor produces neutrons for research; uranium in a large reactor produces not only heat but also plutonium, which is potentially useful in atomic weapons.

The new Act permitted special nuclear material to be distributed to foreign countries in accordance with the scope and terms of each specific agreement. To assure a careful, judicious review of these transfers by the appropriate arms of the Government, the Act required that each agreement had to be submitted to the President for review and approval and then placed before the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee for 30 days before coming into force. The new legal framework, therefore, liberalized the opportunities for such transfers but under conditions which provided for the most careful consideration of each arrangement.

In 1955, the President authorized the first bilateral agreements

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for coöperation with Brazil, Turkey and Colombia. They provided for the transfer of small quantities of enriched uranium to the coöperating country for use in a research reactor. At the start, most countries decided to acquire research reactors which were useful for a variety of purposes, and our initial agreements were designed to be responsive to these needs. These early agreements provided for the transfer of up to six kilograms of U-235 contained in enriched uranium, but with the proviso that the U-235 not exceed 20 percent of the total by weight. Subsequently, as foreign programs expanded, this six-kilogram limit was increased in certain instances and, when technical or economic considerations warranted, coöperating countries were permitted to receive material of higher enrichment in the isotope U-235—up to 90 or 93 percent. However, as previous limits were removed or increased, more comprehensive and stringent safeguards were provided in the bilateral agreements.

In the late 1950s a few countries decided to construct nuclear power plants. In contrast to the small quantities of uranium needed in research reactors, power reactors require hundreds of kilograms. They are potentially dangerous, as we have noted, in that they produce sizeable quantities of plutonium. Accordingly, the uranium transferred for power reactors has been subject to the most comprehensive and careful safeguard procedures.

The policy of assisting countries in this manner under bilateral agreements was announced to the United Nations General Assembly by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on November 5, 1954. The United States regarded its bilateral procedure in part as an interim measure pending the establishment and effective operation of the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. It hoped that at an early stage the I.A.E.A. could assume the responsibility for administering the safeguards and control arrangements which had been created.

Under the terms of these bilateral agreements, 225,440 kilograms of natural uranium and 169,410 kilograms of enriched uranium containing 6,210 kilograms of U-235 have thus far been sent abroad. In addition, some 26 kilograms of plutonium and more than 650 tons of heavy water have been transferred under these agreements. One of the largest recipients of enriched uranium has been the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Additional arrangements were concluded in 1964 for the transfer of between 400 and 500 kilograms of plutonium for joint research

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on fast reactors to be done in Euratom laboratories in France and Germany, and subject to Euratom safeguards.

A third feature of the new atomic policy was to send abroad equipment, including reactors—again under statutory agreements. In the early stages, the reactors were small and the possibility of their misuse to develop plutonium for military purposes was insignificant. In the late 1950s, we sold about 25 research reactors abroad, and the Soviet Union also made reactors available to several countries including Ghana, Egypt, Jugoslavia and many of the East European countries. As an incentive, we contributed up to $350,000, but not more than half the cost of the reactor project, as an outright grant to qualifying countries. While this program is now completed, it was one of the more controversial aspects of the Atoms for Peace Program. There has been criticism that this financial incentive might have stimulated some countries to procure a reactor earlier than could reasonably be justified. Also, many developing countries did not have trained personnel or clear-cut research programs. On the other hand, a research reactor is a very useful instrument not only for basic research and the production of radioisotopes but for training and education. In the long run, therefore, these facilities could make important contributions.

It should be emphasized that the decision to purchase a reactor, including the timing of acquisition, has in all cases been made by the receiving countries. In some countries, to be sure, reactors were built primarily as status symbols designed to indicate scientific achievement. In most others, while the element of prestige may have had a bearing, they have been regarded as they should be—as tools designed to accomplish a specific research program. While a few countries have clearly gone too far too soon, let us never assume that the capability for imaginative research and scientific development is limited to a few developed countries in the West. As a case in point, one can cite the impressive research facilities at Trombay in India, which have been very productively used. India has distinguished itself by its ability within a few years to muster a large research establishment that is highly competitive in a wide variety of fields. It is significant that, in spite of the provocation of the Chinese bomb, India has reiterated its intention to devote itself to peaceful rather than military programs. Perhaps, in the last analysis, the best restraint against proliferation is found in such self-imposed limitations.

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IV

The fourth aspect of the new atomic policy has been to support actively those international organizations which have as their main purpose the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Two are of particular importance—the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. I.A.E.A. was an American idea. One of the original purposes of the Agency was to accumulate and distribute fuel for reactors under safeguards. This purpose has never been fully realized. The availability of uranium in large quantities and the ease with which it can be procured under bilateral arrangements has made it unnecessary for the Agency to become a major distributor of nuclear fuel, although it remains an important source of supply for nations that prefer to receive their fuel from a multilateral group. On the more positive side, the development of East-West technical contacts and discussions has been effective, and in Vienna (the Agency's headquarters) the recent support for safeguards brightens the Agency's prospects for useful service.

The I.A.E.A. looks upon itself as a technical bridge between East and West. There are 91 member states, and 45 nationalities are represented in a secretariat of about 600. The executive policy body, the Board of Governors, consisting of 25 member states, meets several times a year to review budgets and program proposals made by the chief executive, the Director General. The atomic powers have permanent seats on the Board. The Agency's ability to disseminate information and equipment is modest because its budget is one of the smallest in the United Nations family. However, in the past two years the importance of the safeguard and inspection responsibility of the Agency has increased significantly. In 1963 the Board of Governors, with the affirmative vote of the Soviet Union and the United States, extended the system which had previously been applicable to small facilities to cover reactors greater than 100 thermal megawatts in size.

In February 1965, the system was revised and clarified, and received the unanimous support of the Board (Switzerland and South Africa abstaining). For the first time in postwar negotiations, we have at last seen strong East-West adherence to an international inspection system, limited though it is. In addition, the Agency is assuming a greater number of the safeguard respon-

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sibilities contained in bilateral agreements. For example, 20 countries receiving assistance from the United States have agreed to submit these arrangements to I.A.E.A. safeguards. The increasing burden on the Agency has already led to serious discussions as to whether it should bear all costs of inspection.

In the late 1950s when the United States was negotiating bilateral agreements, the I.A.E.A. was in existence but as yet no agreed system of safeguards had been established. There were many critics then—and perhaps are still—who felt that the United States undermined its international position in Vienna by continuing bilateral arrangements. It was said that instead we should channel all information, fuel and safeguards through the International Agency. While this view had merit, it did not come to grips with the fact that between 1957 and 1963 many countries wanted to continue coöperation on a bilateral basis, until the International Agency proved it was viable and equipped to apply effective safeguards under agreed procedures. As long as the bilateral arrangements contained specific provisions for safeguards, inspections and verification, there was no substantive contradiction in policy.

The experience of the last few years indicates that it was sound policy to treat the Agency as a small but growing and potentially important organization rather than to give it a major responsibility from the beginning. It has, among other things, allowed time for the needs of the international community and the principal purposes of the Agency to become clear. These have grown out of a recognition that atomic energy has implications which transcend national boundaries, that the controls and regulations required range from the prevention of diversion to military use to the development of standards for the protection of the populace, including those engaged in international commerce, from the harmful effects of radioactivity.

The European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom—was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It was designed to coördinate and ultimately to integrate the national programs of its member states—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—and to take on selected functions that the member states felt could be performed more effectively by a joint effort. An important political purpose behind Euratom was to accelerate the integration of Europe.

The first United States-Euratom agreement, concluded in

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1958, provided for a joint reactor program as well as a joint program of research and development. For a number of reasons, including the unanticipated decline in the cost of fossil fuels, the reactor program fell short of its initial goal of installing 1000 megawatts of nuclear capacity by 1965.

At the time our agreement with Euratom was negotiated, the United States had bilateral agreements with the countries who were members of the Community. It was expected that when the bilateral agreements expired they would not be renewed and the supply function would be performed solely through Euratom, which would also take over the safeguard responsibilities. In light of the guarantees provided in the American agreement with Euratom, the United States feels that this arrangement provided adequate assurances, but it has led to some criticism. As long as Euratom is made an exception, it is argued that other regional groups or large states should be given similar responsibility. Again, the answer is that the arrangements with Euratom were concluded before the I.A.E.A. had an operative system. Moreover, Euratom is unique; and the system of safeguards applied is such that the six nations of the Community are in effect inspecting each other. Therefore, the United States has felt that Euratom provides exceptional guarantees. Nevertheless, as a general matter of policy, we have favored the more broadly based international system of safeguards administered by the I.A.E.A.

The efficacy of any safeguards system depends on access and the availability of measurement techniques to verify that all of the materials involved are in fact being put to peaceful use. This is not easily accomplished. However, over the past 20 years, a greater appreciation of the need for strict internal accountability of fissile material has helped to develop techniques which can be adapted to international verification. These increasingly sophisticated methods have both reduced the possibility of deliberate diversion or misuse of equipment and material, and also developed a psychology of deterrence which has made the possibility of diversion very remote.

Despite a variety of techniques for taking material inventory (piece counting, sampling, weighing, chemical analysis, radioactivity checks), verification by direct means is not always feasible. For example, the amount of nuclear material contained in an operating reactor or in a highly radioactive fuel element cannot be measured directly. In some cases, indirect assurance can

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be gained by a continuing review of an installation's operations and records, and direct assurance is finally obtained from data which becomes available when the fuel is submitted for chemical reprocessing and the amount of plutonium produced can be determined by chemical analysis.

Inspection is no longer a hypothetical or academic matter. The United States has been engaged in inspection in this field since 1955. In 1964 the A.E.C.'s safeguards staff inspected 98 facilities in 14 countries. Six of the 14 countries and 23 of the installations were inspected twice during this period, in accordance with regulations applying to larger facilities with larger quantities of material. The International Agency in 1963–64 inspected 23 facilities in seven countries.

There is no doubt that, had the United States been able to control all the variables and successfully secure adoption of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposals, we might have realized a more sure and comprehensive control over the subsequent development of atomic energy. This would have been accomplished by an international authority which itself owned and controlled a large proportion of the world's nuclear installations and research activity. However, the Baruch proposals did not find universal support, and by the mid-1950s the West was confronted with the prospect of uncontrolled traffic in atomic fuels and materials. As technology developed it also became apparent that ownership and control of atomic energy were really two discrete functions and that effective control did not necessarily depend on ownership per se. Moreover, the concept of centralized international ownership of anything as vast and complex as atomic energy was proven impracticable. The application of safeguards by on-site inspection was therefore accepted by most countries as a preferred alternative. This acceptance widened until in 1963 the Soviet Union and the United States agreed in the International Atomic Energy Agency that the safeguards system should be supported. Having reached an understanding on the procedures to be followed, the next step is to apply them as widely as possible throughout the world.

V

What, then, are the answers to the basic questions we have posed?

There is no doubt that our atomic policy of the past ten years

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has contributed substantially to the spread of knowledge of nuclear energy throughout the world, and that some of this information may have contributed to an understanding of its military applications. However, it is extremely difficult to argue that the program has contributed to the earlier proliferation of nuclear weapons, since the United States has safeguarded its weapons information and, even without American involvement, many nations would have been able to proceed with either peaceful or military programs on their own. Both the Soviet Union and France developed weapons programs without any assistance. Indeed, a persuasive case can be made that the program has in fact retarded proliferation, since it has satisfied the aspirations of most nations and discouraged military programs while at the same time extending the application of safeguards. Further, it has created a general atmosphere of openness which has made it less likely that nations avowedly committed to peaceful programs might clandestinely pursue military purposes.

On balance, the United States has felt it more desirable to coöperate under safeguards than not to coöperate at all. As Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, recently stated in an address in Los Angeles:

> The story of how nuclear safeguards came about is the story of careful foresight in the establishment of the U. S. Atoms for Peace Program and of the continuing conscientious efforts of many scientists, administrators and diplomats, both in this country and abroad, over a period of several years. The Atoms for Peace program began with the fundamental thesis that the plentiful benefits of the peaceful atom must be shared with all mankind if we are to live up to our belief in an open community of nations free from the specter of poverty. . . .
>
> There were many who felt in those early days, as some feel today, that we could somehow hold back the hands of time—arrest scientific progress—and not coöperate with other countries in providing this nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes. Science cannot for long be kept under lock and key. We knew that other countries could independently achieve a nuclear capability. We also knew that many countries of the world had their own supplies of natural uranium and, perhaps more importantly, their own scientists. We also considered that if we did not coöperate in sharing our peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear materials, there would be other countries—not all of which necessarily would agree to the need for safeguards—other countries which might be willing to provide nuclear materials and technology without a firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful end use. We also recognized that a multilateral control system would be more efficient and objective than bilateral safeguards and that it would contribute in the long run to the evolution of a broader system of arms limitation or disarma-

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ment. It was these simple facts that led us, at an early date, to see the urgent need for a system of international safeguards and for the United States to take a major role in its evolution.

Looking to the future, the aim should therefore be not so much to stop further international assistance and commerce in this area, but rather to place all of this growing traffic under effective international safeguards. Efforts also should be made to apply safeguards increasingly to national programs that are not dependent on outside assistance. This is the big gap in the present security system and the area in which weapons development and proliferation can be foreseen. Fortunately, there is a workable solution at hand—namely, the International Agency's existing safeguards system—which has the political support of East and West.

Twenty years ago atomic activity was limited to the United States, Britain, Canada and the Soviet Union. In 1965, there are approximately 300 research reactors and 45 power reactors throughout the world. Ten years ago the United States was the principal supplier of uranium, equipment and reactors. In 1965, there are many suppliers, actual and potential. One important step to limit proliferation is to urge all suppliers of atomic materials to subject their bilateral traffic to the accepted safeguards of the I.A.E.A., as the United States has done.

A further measure, more drastic in its effect, would be to urge all countries with peaceful atomic-energy programs voluntarily to place their installations under Agency safeguards. The United States took a symbolic step in this direction last year by asking the I.A.E.A. to assume responsibility for the safeguards at the large Yankee Atomic Power Plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. Other nuclear powers ought to follow suit.

These two measures—placing international traffic as well as national programs under effective safeguards—can help control the problem of weapons proliferation and permit us to realize with growing confidence the full advantages of the peaceful atom. They obviously are not, however, panaceas for the world's security problem, nor should they be confused with more fundamental measures such as arms control. They do represent important steps that should provide useful experience for greater progress to follow.

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CHINA'S BOMB: EXPLOITATION AND REACTIONS

By Ralph L. Powell

WHEN the Chinese People's Republic exploded an atomic bomb last October, it opened a new and dangerous phase in the atomic era. It is true that this original test —like the one that followed in May—had no immediate military significance, but it had considerable political and psychological impact—though less than had been expected. It is as a portent of the future that the mushroom cloud over West China has crucial importance for the peace and security of the world. All previous atomic testing has been carried out by industrial powers of the Occident; Communist China is non-Western, non-white and only semi-industrialized. The government in Peking is, by its own declarations, more revolutionary than that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party is strongly nationalistic and ambitious. To support its foreign policy objectives, Communist China already possesses the largest, though certainly not the best equipped, conventional armed forces in the world. Now it is placing the highest priority on the development of a nuclear capability.

That the long delayed explosion had less effect than specialists had anticipated was due in part to foreign "discounting" and to a growing understanding of the vital difference between initial nuclear tests and a developed atomic capability. The United States and other nations warned of the approaching test and it proved to be poorly timed from a propaganda standpoint. Peking probably hoped to set off its first explosion on October 1, to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the régime; if so, the plan was frustrated by weather or technical difficulties. When Peking finally broadcast the momentous news on October 16, the announcement was forced to share headlines with the unexpected purge of Khrushchev, as well as with the British elections, the U. S. political campaign and even the Olympic Games. Finally, the fact that radioactive fallout was not sufficient seriously to endanger human health abroad may have moderated foreign reactions.

The second test explosion, which came on May 14, had been

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expected for more than two months. What caused the delay—whether the reasons were technical or political—still is not clear. The official announcement from Peking was deliberately vague in saying that China's second atomic bomb was exploded "over its western areas." This led to speculation that the bomb was air-dropped, implying a delivery capability, and there was even a Japanese report, later withdrawn, that the bomb had been launched by a missile. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission called the report "implausible."

II

The Chinese Communists have strenuously applied their skills as propagandists to exploiting their nuclear achievement to increase China's political, technological and military prestige and influence. Second, their propaganda has sought to placate international resentment, to justify Peking's actions and, if possible, to win additional support for its atomic policies. Increasingly, too, it has sought to cast all blame for nuclear proliferation on the United States. Third, in contradiction to its own protestations of self-defense and the support of peace, Peking has again demonstrated a strong sense of revolutionary mission. It has attempted to use its atomic explosions to raise the morale and militancy of revolutionary forces throughout the world, and to convince them of China's continuing determination and increased ability to support their revolutionary activities. Combined with all of this has been the advocacy of nuclear disarmament, but on terms which would alter the world balance of power in Communist China's favor.

The original proclamations of October 16 and 17, by which Peking heralded its first nuclear test, established the official policy line and created most of the propaganda themes that have since been exploited and used as guidelines for Peking's supporters abroad. Serious and comparatively restrained, they were designed to be persuasive and to portray the image of a progressive, responsible power that had been forced by "nuclear threats and blackmail" to develop its own defensive weapons. The first test was described as a "major contribution" to world peace on the grounds that by breaking the nuclear monopoly of the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, and by decreasing the effectiveness of "atomic blackmail," the possibility of complete nuclear disarmament would actually increase. China de-

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clared that nuclear war could be avoided if "all peace-loving countries and people" coöperated in the struggle, and it promised "never at any time nor under any circumstances to be the first to use nuclear weapons." It is interesting to note that in the reference to nuclear powers France was omitted, either by neglect or indulgence. However, within a week the names of the Soviet Union and Great Britain had been dropped from the list of monopolists and the United States alone was accused of using the test ban to restrict the freedom of other states, including those that have atomic weapons.

Finally, the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.) released the following statement, which was sent to the heads of all governments:

> The Chinese Government hereby formally proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as a first step, the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other.

However, Peking warned that until total nuclear disarmanent was achieved it would follow its own path of "firmly and unswervingly" strengthening its national defense and "safeguarding world peace." Further nuclear testing was a "sovereign right" and no outsiders could "interfere."

Peking's disarmament proposal was aimed primarily at the neutrals and was meant to sound "fair and reasonable." It made a special appeal to the many small states which naturally desire some say in the vital question of nuclear disarmament. It also sought to put pressure on the nuclear powers. Yet the Chinese proposal obviously neglected most of the critical issues that have been involved in the world's attempts to achieve disarmament. It omitted a number of important points contained in the 1963 statement in which the C.P.R. refused to sign the test-ban treaty. For example, the proposal of October 1964 failed even to mention general disarmament and made no reference to an earlier suggestion to prohibit importing, exporting, manufacturing or stockpiling atomic arms. There was no longer a call for the destruction of atomic delivery systems and of installations involved in "the research, testing and manufacture" of nuclear weapons. Suggested initial steps such as the removal of foreign bases, the

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cessation of all nuclear testing and the creation of widespread nuclear-free zones were dropped. Neither proposal had any provisions regarding the crucial issue of control and inspection. Both plans ignored the major question of conventional disarmament, which Peking has referred to as an "illusion." Obviously, total nuclear disarmament, without conventional disarmament, would be highly advantageous to the C.P.R. If the nuclear powers could be pressured into destroying their atomic weapons, leaving China with its vast manpower and massive conventional forces, the balance of power would be fundamentally altered. Moreover, in the same proclamations that argued self-defense, the preservation of peace and atomic disarmament, there were contradictory themes that sounded less "peace-loving." It was stated that the "Chinese Government is loyal to Marxism-Leninism" and that the Chinese people firmly support "struggles for liberation," which can mean not only liberation from the remnants of Western colonialism, but also from the "yoke" of any government that is not friendly to Peking.

Thus far, the successful testing has not been permitted to alter Mao Tse-tung's concept of the superiority of men and politics over weapons. On October 16, Peking repeated Mao's famous slogan that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger." A week later, the Party's official *People's Daily* maintained that China's security did not depend on nuclear weapons. It was alleged that the "ever-victorious thinking" of Mao and the leadership of the "glorious" Communist Party, plus the unity and political consciousness of the Chinese people, with their "superior socialist system," were "more powerful than the atom bomb." Later it stated, "the Chinese people have very strong nerves."

Another aspect of Peking's propaganda was the allegation that there was world-wide acclaim for China's achievement, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and a bland disregard of the extensive criticisms of its nuclear testing. It also picked up the claims of supporters and the loose comments of non-Communists that the C.P.R. was a "nuclear power." Within a week Peking was casually referring to its "nuclear weapons," as if one test made it a full-fledged atomic power. This trend reached preposterous proportions in late December when Radio Peking declared that China had refrained from taking nuclear arms "to the doorsteps" of the United States when Washington sent Polaris submarines to the Far East.

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The C.P.R. has not so far reported the characteristics of the first two atomic devices exploded, doubtless on the theory that they would seem more credible if they were described by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and other qualified foreign sources. These did in fact report that the first device was indeed more sophisticated than had been expected, since the fissionable material employed was enriched uranium (U-235), rather than the more common plutonium. The A.E.C. described the second bomb as also using enriched uranium. This dispelled speculation that the fuel for China's first bomb might have been acquired from an outside source. Greater credence was given to reports that China had developed its own gaseous diffusion plant for separating the U-235 isotope from U-238. Hence, even after the first test, Premier Chou En-lai was able to announce to the National People's Congress with some accuracy that, "Foreign atomic scientists had to admit that our nuclear test surpassed those initially conducted by the United States, Britain or France." There was no mention of the Soviet Union.

After the initial statement, much of Peking's propaganda became more polemic and vitriolic—milder comments being reserved for "neutrals," the most violent for the United States. On October 22 the *People's Daily* bitterly attacked President Johnson's statement that China's development of nuclear weapons was a "tragedy" which could only increase the "sense of insecurity" of the Chinese people and which utilized scarce resources that might have been used for their well-being. These charges struck a sore point. In replying to them, the party paper accused the United States of "acting the tyrant," using "gangster language," carrying out a "mad nuclear arms drive" and attempting to reduce the Chinese to "slavery." Allegations of U. S. "imperialism," "nuclear blackmail" and "preparations for atomic war" have been endlessly repeated.

In late November the *People's Daily* made clear that China refused to take part in the 18-nation disarmament discussions. Now that the C.P.R. "has nuclear weapons," it said, the United States seeks "to drag" China into the affairs of the United Nations. But it is the "absolutely unalterable" policy of the C.P.R. to have "nothing to do" with the U.N. until it is represented and Nationalist China is ousted. Peking also refused to accept Secretary-General U Thant's proposal for five-power negotiations, saying that this would be a "nuclear club" in disguise.

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The Chinese would not attend, even if a "sedan chair" were sent to bring them. Again it was asserted that all nations, large or small, should have equal say in nuclear disarmament. Peking claimed that it had no intention of using nuclear weapons to "manipulate international affairs," but later said that in case of an atomic war Japan would inevitably "bear the brunt" of a "nuclear holocaust."

When China exploded its second atomic device in May, the official communiqué was similar in theme and tone to that of October, though somewhat more moderate. The statement attacked the United States, but there was no reference to paper tigers, and the defensive nature of China's nuclear program was emphasized. On this occasion no specific encouragement was given to fraternal revolutionary movements, but few doubted that Peking would use its second successful test to strengthen Hanoi's will to resist and to bring pressure on Moscow to support North Viet Nam or lose further influence. And in fact one of the first messages of congratulations to be published by Peking was that from Hanoi, saying that China's progress in nuclear technology was "an extremely important factor in curbing United States imperialist schemes of war and aggression."

III

It is too early to evaluate the full range of reactions to China's second atomic test, but again there was no panic in Asia and the free world's reaction was in general more prompt and effective than it had been in October. Strongly worded protests came from India and Japan—even from Japanese leftists. In general, the reactions to the May explosion could hardly be very dissimilar to those of last autumn, which covered a wide spectrum of human and political response. At that time, Albania, North Korea and North Viet Nam, plus Cambodia, officially applauded the atomic blast. So did individual officials of some other friendly, "non-aligned" states, notably Indonesia. Most of the other congratulatory messages that could be assembled by Peking came from Communist parties, splinter groups, front organizations or individuals who are pro-Peking. The Chinese Communists must have been rather disappointed, for in truth the list was not impressive.

Nevertheless, the statements of friends and allies helped to propagate the Peking line on every continent and provided some

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appearance of widespread public support. They emphasized the prestige factor and stressed the technical and scientific aspects of China's achievement. It represents, said a typical comment, "a victory for all Asian, African and Latin American peoples . . ." and is an "honor" to the Afro-Asian world. It "dispels the myth that Western countries are the only ones capable of developing atomic weapons." A distinct racist element was noticeable in the comments, but they were not necessarily Communist-inspired.

Reactions to the October test also demonstrated the frictions and cleavages that exist in the Communist movement. Jugoslavia was caustically critical. Originally the Soviet press carried only a brief announcement, and two days later Moscow called on the world to strive for a ban on all nuclear testing. Most of Moscow's Eastern European allies followed its lead. The Hungarian radio described the test explosion as "unfortunate," and East Germany accused Peking of "brusquely disregarding popular opposition." Czechoslovakia called the explosion "the worst possible attack on the test-ban treaty" and "a disservice to peace." The leading Communist newspapers of Western Europe condemned Peking's actions. At first the Cuban press and radio gave only factual reports, but stories of greetings and congratulations from Cuba were distributed by the Chinese Communist news agency.

Considering the vociferous opposition to earlier atmospheric testing, it is surprising that there was not more immediate and forceful condemnation of Peking's action in the non-Communist world. A number of "non-aligned" nations remained silent, despite the fact that they had recently signed the Cairo Declaration urging all states to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Organized protests or rallies were rare. In most countries there was recognition that one atomic test did not constitute a nuclear capability, yet fear existed that in time Peking's actions would destroy the strategic balance of power and increase the possibility of nuclear war. Especially, there was widespread concern that China's testing would encourage or force other nations to develop nuclear weapons, thus destroying what limited progress has been made in restricting atomic armaments.

A major concern was how to deal with Communist China in the future. Some hoped that after observing the effects of their own atomic explosion the Chinese leaders would assume a more responsible attitude. Others were very skeptical. Many officials

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and editorials in Europe, Africa and Asia urged that the C.P.R. be given greater participation in world councils, especially in disarmament negotiations, but also in the United Nations. This led one senior American official to comment that if the United States tested in the atmosphere there would be cries to expel it from the United Nations, but when Communist China did so there were demands to bring it in.

In Asia, where China's "bomb" has the greatest significance, there was no panic and no rush to seek an accommodation with the C.P.R. Some remarked favorably on President Johnson's reaffirmation of U. S. defense commitments in Asia and his pledge that the United States would give "strong support" to nations threatened by atomic blackmail. In Japan and India, with the exception of radical pro-Peking fringes, the various parties and most newspapers denounced Peking's actions. Both Japan and India have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, but both governments have reaffirmed their decision not to do so. Especially in India, however, there were signs of increasing pressure on the government to change its policy.

As was to be expected, the governments of Nationalist China, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Viet Nam condemned China, but in some cases there was less official and press reaction than might have been expected. In Pakistan there was no immediate official comment, but some favorable or non-critical press statements appeared. In Ceylon the press tended to use the occasion to criticize the China policy of the United States.

The slight majority of countries that do not recognize Communist China did not, of course, reply officially to its proposal for an all-nation summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. Apparently about one-quarter of those that do recognize Peking did not respond either. Most of those that answered opposed the plan or maintained various reservations and suggestions. These results were probably not surprising to Peking, which sought to serve its interests, not to achieve universal approval. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that its small Communist allies and Cambodia fully supported the proposal; that Indonesia, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali concurred; and that Algeria, Mauritania, Tanzania and the Yemen accepted the proposal in principle. Various reservations were expressed by Burundi, Kuwait and Pakistan. A number of replies were non-

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committal or politely negative, including France's. Burma showed a considerable independence of views and Ceylon was politely critical. Several replies were as sharp as diplomatic terminology permits. Great Britain's answer was negative and well argued. The Netherlands defended the United States against "unwarranted accusations." The Indian reply was sharply critical and presented the best refutation of Chinese claims.

The Soviet bloc gave some outward appearances of closing ranks and supporting Peking, but their replies contained camouflaged differences. Premier Kosygin expressed "full agreement," noting that the Chinese proposal reflected the Soviet line. Independent Peking could hardly consider this to be a compliment. Also, Radio Moscow's summary contained no direct criticism of the United States and, at least in Peking's version of the full text, the Soviet note sounded almost condescending. On the previous day Radio Moscow had announced that the Soviet Government supported the convening of a world disarmament conference, "as suggested at the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries." Then it added, almost as an afterthought: "Favorable attention is also merited by the proposal of the C.P.R. Government. . . ." Communist China gained little more solace from the replies of the Soviet "satellites." All but Rumania and Hungary specifically mentioned their support for the Soviet disarmament proposals. All but one claimed that they advocated general and complete disarmament. Bulgaria and Mongolia specifically mentioned the Moscow test-ban treaty, which of course is anathema to Communist China.

Since the United States does not recognize the C.P.R., Washington's response to Premier Chou's note was informal. Secretary of State Rusk called it a "smoke screen," adding that it was apparently designed to curry favor with the neutral states and others who were concerned over Peking's atomic testing. President Johnson said that Communist China "fools no one when it offers to trade away its first small accumulation of nuclear power against the mighty arsenals of those who limit Communist Chinese ambitions."

Regarding the May blast, the State Department merely expressed its deep regret that Communist China had for a second time shown "total disregard of the test-ban treaty." The President did not issue any statement. There was no early reaction by the French Government to the second explosion. The

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French press as a whole expressed disquiet over the event. *Le Monde,* for example, said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons seemed to hold more dangerous potentialities than ever and that the Chinese success would harden the Chinese position and encourage the Viet Cong to hold firm until the rainy season brought them propitious conditions for a heavy attack on the South Viet Nam régime.

IV

Following China's first test explosion, there was a tendency among specialists to reduce their estimates of the time required for the C.P.R. to create a dangerous atomic capability. Ten years used to be frequently mentioned; now many competent analysts believe that within this decade China may have medium-range ballistic missiles and the nuclear warheads to go with them. Several nuclear scientists have warned that, given the nature of the first explosions, the Chinese are probably capable of developing a hydrogen bomb within a few years.

Until China can produce a credible delivery capability, Peking is unlikely to adopt a high-risk policy that would invite the use of nuclear weapons against it. Although it cannot match the increasingly sophisticated thermonuclear might of the United States or the Soviet Union, it may be satisfied in the short run to obtain a deterrent based on the threat of retaliation against its neighbors. This could permit China to pursue its ambitions more aggressively, holding the peripheral states as hostages. The United States can perhaps find consolation in the fact that under roughly comparable circumstances in the early 1950s, the Soviet Union failed to make major gains in Western Europe. Yet, events to come will surely test both the intestinal fortitude of the free Asian peoples and the continuing credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. More than Europe of a decade ago, Asia suffers from poverty, communal conflicts and political instabilities which will provide the Chinese Communists with opportunities to use direct or indirect nuclear blackmail in the service of revolution and insurrection.

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REALITY AND VISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

An Israeli View

By Abba Eban

SINCE early March the Arab world has been shaken by an angry clash of views about its relations with Israel. Arab thinking on this subject had long been governed by what Whitehead once called "inert ideas"—that is to say, ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized or tested or thrown into fresh combinations. This inertia was suddenly broken by two closely related events. The Federal Republic of Germany sought the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, in conscious rejection of Arab pressure. And the President of Tunisia challenged the official Arab dogma about Israel's place in the Middle East. In statements which had a broad international resonance, Mr. Bourguiba indicated that Israel was a solid and entrenched reality with which the Arab nations would have to come to terms. To dream of sweeping Israel away in a torrent of violence was, in his view, sheer delusion.

The German initiative and the Tunisian pronouncements are, of course, important events. But they do not in themselves explain the volcanic emotion which spread from Cairo across the Arab world. Germany, after all, is not the first but the 95th government to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. In none of the 94 previous occasions did Arab governments go beyond a routine expression of grievance. And President Bourguiba's calm but reluctant vision of Israel as a "reality" is less heretical than Cairo spokesmen would have us believe. Indeed, President Nasser himself often gives eminent visitors the impression that his belief in Israel's disappearance is far from immaculate. The leading Egyptian publicist, Hassanein Heikal, recently told his readers that the modern world was no longer congenial to decisive local wars. An Arab-Israel conflict would, in his judgment, be followed by international intervention; and the forces opposed to Israel's liquidation were not confined to Israel alone. These sober words were written more than a year ago. Why, then, do President Nasser and Mr. Heikal now react to cautious statements about Israel's permanence like medieval theologians confronted for the

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first time by the suggestion that the earth may, however regrettably, turn out to be round?

If world opinion finds it hard to probe such anomalies it is because the official Arab attitude toward Israel has no point of reference in other international conflicts. In all other political tensions today the adversaries face each other from a basis of mutual recognition. Each may seek to impose its views or interests on the other. But none seeks victory in terms of the other's disappearance. The Indonesian claim to eliminate Malaysia may be an exception to this rule. But it is instructive that Indonesia finds it impossible to advocate the disappearance of a sovereign state while herself remaining within the political and conceptual framework of the United Nations system. The Arab governments which advocate Israel's disappearance find no such difficulty.

It is customary to describe the idea of Israel's liquidation as a whim of Arab emotion. Nobody, least of all in Israel, should ignore the intense rancor with which the Arab mind has been trained to react to Israel's very existence. But it is not a matter of emotion alone. The dream of Israel's submergence is nourished by a certain rationality capable of being exposed to the analysis of reason. To do this is no mere academic exercise. It is a deep therapeutic necessity. If we can explain why Arabs have believed that Israel would disappear, and why for 17 years this has not even begun to happen, we may open the way to a new Arab understanding of the present and future power-balance in the Middle East.

II

The Arab refusal to acknowledge Israel's permanence is nourished by a constant appeal to the Middle Eastern map. Here the power relationship between the two parties seems to be marked by a vast disparity. Arab independence stretches through 13 sovereign states across 4,000,000 square miles with a total population of 100,000,000. Israel is a single sovereignty established in a small area of 8,000 square miles with a population of only $2\frac{1}{2}$ million. The Arab preponderance is thus reflected in territory, population, mineral wealth, strategic importance and a formidable capacity for diplomatic manœuvre, especially in international organizations where numbers count. From this multiple advantage many Arab leaders draw the simple logic that Israel's survival depends on Arab consent, while the Arab nation stands in no corresponding need of peace with Israel. The appeal to geog-

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raphy is sometimes reinforced by a reference to the laws of history. Writing in these pages 13 years ago, Dr. Charles Malik affirmed that "history has not known an instance of a nation at permanent enmity with its immediate world. . . . I do not know of a single other instance in the world where there is such radical existential discontinuity across national frontiers." More recently Arab radicalism has taken heart from its successes in other fields. "Only yesterday," writes Muhammad Jamil Baihum, "we thought it difficult . . . to expel France by force from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria . . . or to expel Great Britain from Egypt. . . . But what was difficult became easy when the will was there and the circumstances were propitious."

This theme recurs constantly both in the propaganda and in the self-persuasion of Arab nationalism. A wave of history is destined to sweep all non-Arab elements out of the Middle East, restoring the region to its "existential continuity."

To those who see the scales of geography and history in these terms, the experience of the past 17 years can yield nothing but astonishment and frustration. The plain truth is that Arab nationalism emerges from nearly two decades of uncompromising anti-Israel struggle in total strategic defeat. The map, with its "self-evident" picture of Israeli impotence, has somehow failed to assert itself. Arab policy, directed from Cairo, has pursued a series of clearly defined objectives: to prevent Israel's physical existence; to reduce her territory; to flood her with a wave of hostile refugees; to uproot Jerusalem from her midst; to thwart the development of her diplomatic relations; to bar her from international organizations; to prevent her growth as a trading unit with access to world markets; to frustrate her irrigation projects; to discredit her in world opinion; and, above all, to banish her from affirmative contact with the new world of liberated Africa and Asia.

Not one of these aims has been attained. None of them is even remotely in sight. Israel exists in growing strength and numbers. Her territory as defined in the 1949 Arab-Israel agreement is intact. She has not been swamped by Arab refugees. Jerusalem is an integral part of her national structure. She has a broader network of diplomatic relations than is usual for so small a state. Her flag flies in all the institutions which express the growth of world community. The Arab boycott has won some tactical successes, but has not prevented Israel from establishing commercial

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links with a hundred states or from expanding her exports by more than 1,000 percent in 17 years. The Huleh marshes have been drained and the waters of Lake Kinneret are irrigating southern fields. World opinion overwhelmingly supports Israel's rights to her independence and integrity which are, indeed, sanctioned by the law of nations and by specific commitments of friendly powers. And the majority of the emerging states maintain strong and intimate ties with her. These links go beyond diplomatic courtesies. They touch the central interests of the awakening countries in their quest for accelerated development.

Something appears to have gone wrong with the superficial testimony of the map. Nobody in Israel should assume that past success is a guarantee of future victory. But nor will Arab leaders approach self-understanding until they come face to face with the lesson of these years. There are manifestly forces at work in the history of our times and in the life of our region which balance, and even outweigh, the factors on which Arab nationalism has relied in its dream of Israel's eclipse. If the forces which have determined Israel's consolidation for the past 17 years can be presumed to endure for the next 17 years—and beyond—then Arab leaders can hardly evade the sort of intellectual adjustment which one of them, at least, has begun to undergo. T. S. Eliot once wrote that "Human kind cannot bear very much reality." But surely there is also a limit to the allegiance which men will give to unreal assumptions which fail, year after year, to vindicate themselves in any perceptible degree.

I now come to define the factors which refute the myth of inevitable Arab victory. The first of these is Israel's capacity to deter and contain the regional hostility by maintaining a balance of military strength. The commitment of two million Israelis to their own defense is more absolute and far more passionate than is the commitment of 100,000,000 Arabs to Israel's destruction. For Israel, survival is a necessity. For the Arab nation, with its own survival assured on an almost imperial scale, Israel's submergence is, at best, optional. To this crucial issue of morale we must add the reinforcement of technology. In modern strategy the value of numbers tends to decline in comparison with the value of technical and scientific skills. As military technology develops, the quantitative element loses its decisive importance. The possibility of a small community holding its own against heavy demographic odds becomes increasingly tangible. This is not to say that it is

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preferable to be small. But it is at least a tolerable destiny. In Israel's national memory David's victory over Goliath was a result not of his smallness but of his compensating agility and talent for improvisation. Whatever has enabled Israel to succeed in deterrence and containment during the past decade seems certain to be operative for the next decade and beyond.

Moreover, the maintenance of a local equilibrium of security in the Middle East responds to broad international interests. The crises of our times usually have their origin in small nations which lack either internal stability or a local equilibrium of strength. Viet Nam, the Congo, Cyprus, Yemen and the Dominican Republic illustrate this truth. In each case a vacuum or imbalance of security in a small country draws the world community into perilous involvement. A local tension becomes an international peril. This experience helps to explain why there is more overt and effective support today than formerly for the maintenance of a prudent security equilibrium in the Arab-Israel area.

The Arab summit conferences, it is true, have shown a certain military inventiveness on the tactical level. They have produced the Joint Arab Command and the "Palestine Liberation Organization." These, together with the threat to violate Israel's water rights as defined in the compromise Unified Plan of 1955, represent a tangible increase of tension and peril. But they do not testify to any serious thought about the strategic utility of the war which is evidently being planned. Would such a war really change the map? Nobody can doubt the fearful havoc and bereavement which it would inflict. But when it ended—probably in a short time—the loss, the ravage and the eruption of armies beyond the present frontiers would not have been on one side alone. It is not absurd to imagine Arab leaders ardently urging "a return to the frontier of 1966 or 1967," just as they now urge a return to the frontier of 1947 which they once set aside by force. Wars have always been inhuman. They are now, in addition, highly ineffective. The idea that any conceivable war in the Middle East would substantially change the political or territorial structure deserves a more critical scrutiny by Arab minds.

The political factor in Israel's stability is no less cogent than the military prospect. The international scene is today commanded by respect for the existing territorial structure. The United Nations Charter is based on the political independence and territorial integrity of member states. The great powers have

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reached a doctrine of territorial conservatism out of their experience with the nuclear weapon. Even territorial arrangements originally regarded as temporary improvisations now seem preferable to any attempt to change them without consent. The exchange of notes between Moscow and Washington early in 1964 established a broad consensus in favor of maintaining existing frontiers. And the small nations which form the bulk of the international community have a manifest interest in the principle of sovereignty and the integrity of existing territorial agreements. With 98 percent of the human race now living under sovereign flags the doctrines of territorial irredentism have lost their appeal.

Beyond local military deterrence and international respect for the existing territorial structure, there is a theme of world opinion which makes the cry for Israel's liquidation discordant. This is not an age of crusades. Together with the multiplication of nations there goes a new ecumenical spirit nourished by revulsion from war. Most people and governments find the present "existential discontinuity" in the Middle East preferable to its correction by war. Arab opinion would also do well to give heavier weight to the special associations which Israel evokes in the world conscience as a result of the Nazi holocaust. History is not a web woven by innocent hands. It would be rash to predict an end to organized inhumanity. But when a world which has seen six million Jews thrown into the furnace is now invited to see the central bulwark of Jewish survival "thrown into the sea," a shudder runs through whatever exists or remains of historic decency. The point is that the more bellicose Arab slogans about Israel affront the conscience as well as the higher interests of contemporary mankind.

Even less likely than Israel's liquidation by war is her elimination by the weight of regional solitude. The effects of Israel's isolation from the Arab environment are regrettable and serious. But they touch the atmosphere of her life rather than her prospect of survival. In the new age of swift communications, nations are less dependent on their regional context than in former times. Israel's markets, friendships, scientific contacts, intellectual links and international vocation can, if necessary, be found in Europe, the Atlantic community and amongst the developing states beyond the Arab fence. The modern world is assuming the character of a close-knit urban society whose several parts are mutually accessible. Affinity is now more important than vicinity as the

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driving force of international relationships. Moreover, Israel since the dawn of history has received and exercised her major influences across the Mediterranean world, in which she is far from isolated.

We may now summarize the elements on the credit side of Israel's stability which counteract the physical evidence of the regional map: a proven capacity for deterrence and containment; technical and moral factors which offset numerical inferiority; the dominant international respect for the established territorial structure of states; specific commitments by friendly powers to Israel's independence and integrity; opposition of world opinion to warlike solutions; a special revulsion of world conscience against further outrage to Jewish survival; the unfeasibility of a prolonged and one-sided Arab assault capable of altering the political map; Israel's special place in the trust and confidence of the developing world; and her proved capacity to transcend her regional isolation by self-reliance and by a world-wide economic and diplomatic initiative.

Not all these factors can be graphically portrayed on a map. But in the example and performance of 17 years they have shown their weight. It is not likely that they will soon lose their force.

III

The question is whether and how a defensive stalemate can be transformed into a more affirmative relationship. The answer lies in the capacity of Arab minds to grasp the existential truth about the Near East as a region which can never be comprehended in Arab terms alone. The destination of this region lies not in an exclusive Arab unity, but in a creative diversity and pluralism. Three central issues must be resolved in Arab and Israeli thought before a new era can dawn: first, the image which the Arab world and Israel reflect each to the other; second, the tension between the idea of Arab unity and the more creative idea of Mediterranean coöperation; third, the idea of peace as a mutual necessity for both nations, and not as a gift of grace to be accorded by the Arabs to Israel.

The Arab obsession with an Israeli "threat" runs against all rational evidence. If the Arab nation were responsive to the truth of its recent history it would now be going forward in a thrust of hopeful energy. It has won its independence in 4,463,000 square miles. It is farfetched to believe that it cannot flourish without

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8,000 more. Arab freedom in a subcontinent has been qualified, in a small area, by the liberation of another people which had centuries of Middle Eastern history behind it before the Arabic language or the Moslem faith saw the light of day. It has never been possible to convince world opinion that it is right for the Arab world to possess an empire—and wrong for Israel to exercise the peaceful possession of its tiny but cherished home.

There is no greater fallacy than to regard Israel as a "colonial" phenomenon. No state in the world expresses the concept of nationhood more intensely than Israel. It is the only state which bears the same name, speaks the same tongue, upholds the same faith, inhabits the same land as it did 3,000 years ago. Recently a group of young Israelis near the Dead Sea came across some parchment scrolls written 1900 years ago. They are entirely intelligible to a young citizen of Israel today. Israel is not alien to the Middle East, but an organic part of its texture and memory. The long separation has had less effect on the region's history than the original birth and the modern renewal. Take Israel and all that has emanated from Israel out of Middle Eastern history—and you evacuate that history of its central experiences. Arab political and intellectual leaders have never made a serious effort to understand, even in reluctant mood, the tenacity, depth and authenticity of Israel as a national reality with deep roots in the Middle East. They would do well to ponder Ernest Renan's definition of nationhood: "A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. To share a common glory in the past, a common will in the present: to have done great things together; to wish to do them again—these are the essential conditions of being a nation."

There are so many common features in Arab and Israeli nationalism, both caught up in the tension between past memory and future hope, that their reciprocal alienation today has the mark of authentic tragedy. It is not enough for Arab leaders to recognize Israel as an unpleasant "fact." They cannot long avoid asking themselves why Israel's restoration is, in the eyes of most of mankind, an event which, despite all imperfections, has an inner splendor and nobility. At any rate, the Arab portrayal of Israel as a dark conspiracy or as a rapacious colonial adventure is regarded by the opinion of mankind as an unacceptable caricature. A decisive phase will have been reached when Arab intellectuals begin to study Israeli nationalism in anything like a clinical, objective spirit.

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I am aware that the Arab-Israel dialogue is not distorted on one side alone. Hostility usually evokes an attitude in its own image. The Israeli vision of Arab life and culture has been eroded by years of separation. Israel must try, above the conflict, to see her neighbor as she has been in her greater moments—the heir and author of a rich culture, the bearer of a tongue whose echoes will always fill our region and without which a man is cut off from an inner comprehension of the Middle East.

Whether the Arab nations and Israel can reach an understanding of each other depends on how they conceive the nature and destination of the Middle East. For President Nasser and the main body of Arab nationalism, the dominant theme of the region's destiny is Arab unity. Much of Arab history is concerned with the tension between unity and regionalism. Union has been the exception, not the rule. There is, of course, a unifying energy in the Arab world which draws all men of Arab tongue together in a common identity. But there is also a strong tendency of Arab states to maintain their separate sovereignties against a claim to centralized hegemony from Cairo. Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and the North African states have never voluntarily acknowledged the political ukase of the Nile Valley.

For 12 years the efforts of Nasserism to impose a uniform control on the restless, varied stream of Arab life has led to uninterrupted crisis. Nothing has divided the Arab world more than the effort to unite it. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and now Yemen have been successive arenas in which Nasserism has come to grips with the desire of Arab states to be independent—not only of foreign control but of each other. Today diversity, pluralism and polycentrism are everywhere undermining the pretensions of monolithic blocs—from the Atlantic world to the Communist system, as well as across Africa and Latin America. It is doubtful if the Arab world with its deep-rooted diversities will tolerate a centralized control.

A Middle East in which separate Arab states could pursue their separate destiny, in a mood of tolerant variety, could more easily accommodate an Arab-Israel understanding than a homogenized Middle East convulsed by an Egyptian bid for centralized control. The Middle East is not an exclusive Arab domain. Its destiny lies in a pluralistic interaction of Asia, Europe and Africa. There are nearly as many non-Arabs as Arabs in the Middle East (the combined population of Israel, Iran, Ethiopia, Somalia,

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Turkey and Cyprus is 80,000,000); and the dream of a united Arab domain from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf offends the region's essential diversity.

There is a lesson to be learned from experiments in regional coöperation in other continents. In Western Europe the unity movement began from common interests, proceeding from coal and steel toward broader economic integration and free communications. Existing sovereignties are respected and the sensitive issue of political coördination is left until economic mutuality has been longer at work.

In the American republics the continental organization avoids racial or linguistic exclusiveness. It comprises every sovereignty within the defined region. Similarly, the new Organization of African Unity avoids centralization and hegemony. Neither in Europe, Latin America nor Africa has the federal principle yet won any notable victory. The formula is one of growing integration and harmony in relations between separate sovereign states.

The Arab union movement directed from Cairo seems to involve every difficulty which other union movements avoid. It emphasizes political structures, such as federations and leagues, before the basis of economic interest is secured. It is ethnically and linguistically exclusive, inspired more by reaction to "foes" than by a positive impulse of self-realization. And it is frankly disruptive of existing sovereignties and anchored in a concept of centralized hegemony.

The world has generously come to terms with Arab nationalism. The question is whether Arab nationalism can now come to terms with regional and international concepts broader than itself.

The most fruitful and natural regional concept is that of Mediterranean coöperation. The Mediterranean spirit, with the currents of thought and action which it has generated or evoked, lies at the origin of the technical and cultural transformation which has largely determined the cultural history of mankind. Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are Mediterranean nations, while Jordan is oriented by trade and history toward the Mediterranean world. The Hellenic and Latin worlds, Turkey and the island republics of Cyprus and Malta are washed by the same waters. Every point in this littoral is swiftly accessible to every other. Three continents, Europe, Africa and Asia, look out upon it with all their diversity of fate and outlook. Five great civilizations were born here—Judaism,

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Christianity, Hellenism, Rome and Islam. It is a central compact world, congenial to the free interaction of commerce and ideas and alien to exclusiveness. In no other part of the globe does a similar variety of conditions exist in such close proximity or in such intensity of mutual influence. It is here that man first considered himself in the light of eternity. It is here that science broke loose from empiricism in search of broad unifying explanations of the natural order. And it is here, amidst all the conditions for a new emergence of human vitality, that we find statesmanship held down in implacable conflict.

The issue is whether the Arab and Jewish nations, which have been primary agents in the Mediterranean adventure, can transcend their conflict in dedication to a new Mediterranean future, in concert with a renascent Europe and an emerging Africa. A new impulse of thought, similar to that which inaugurated the European Community 15 years ago, could open this prospect to early view.

IV

Israeli leaders are often asked what Israel could contribute to a Middle Eastern settlement in return for what she would gain from the lifting of the siege. Although peace is not a condition of Israel's existence it clearly represents her highest interest. She is desperately hard pressed for territory. She is under no juridical obligation to reduce her area below the meager 8,000 square miles which she commands under the 1949 Agreements; these were concluded under United Nations auspices and cannot be modified without the consent of the signatory governments. For the first time since the dawn of history, large Jewish communities no longer exist in the Nile and Euphrates valleys, in the Arabian Peninsula and parts of North Africa. These half-million refugees have been absorbed in Israel and not thrown onto the charity of the world community as have the Palestinian Arabs who underwent a shorter and less drastic migration, for the most part from one part of Palestine to the other—from what is now Israel to the Palestine territory embodied in the Arab states of Jordan and Egypt. It is in the regional interest that Arab and Jewish populations should be integrated in environments akin to them in language, ethnic affinity and national sentiment. All refugee problems since the Second World War, in Asia and Europe, have been solved by this principle.

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In the Israeli conception the guiding motive of a peace settlement is not to change the character or structure of existing states, but to institute a dramatic and revolutionary change in the relations between them. The revolution of which I speak can best be expressed in terms of an Open Region. Israel's land is small but wonderfully central. It is a nodal point of communication. In peaceful conditions we could imagine railway and road communications running from Haifa to Beirut, Damascus and Istanbul in the North; to Amman and beyond in the East; and to Cairo in the South. The opening of these blocked arteries would stimulate the life, thought and commerce of the region beyond any level otherwise conceivable. Across the Southern Negev communication between the Nile Valley and the Fertile Crescent could be resumed without any change of political jurisdiction. What is now often described as a wedge between Arab lands would become a bridge. The Kingdom of Jordan, now cut off from its natural maritime outlet, could freely import and export its goods on the Israeli coast. On the Red Sea, coöperative action could expedite the port developments at Elath and Aqaba which give Israel and Jordan their contact with a reviving East Africa and a developing Asia.

The Middle East, lying athwart three continents, could become a busy center of air communications, which are now impeded by boycotts and the necessity to take circuitous routes. Radio, telephone and postal communications which now end abruptly in mid-air would unite a divided region. The Middle East with its historic monuments and scenic beauty could attract a vast movement of tourists and pilgrims if existing impediments were removed. Resources which lie across national frontiers—the minerals of the Dead Sea and the phosphates of the Negev and the Araba—could be developed in mutual interchange of technical knowledge.

Economic coöperation in agricultural and industrial development could lead to supranational arrangements like those which mark the European Community. The United Nations could establish an Economic Commission for the Middle East, similar to the Commissions now at work in Europe, Latin America and the Far East. The specialized agencies could intensify their support of health and educational development with greater efficiency if a regional harmony were attained. The development of arid zones, the desalination of water and the conquest of tropical

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disease are common interests of the entire region, congenial to a sharing of knowledge and experience.

The programs of technical coöperation maintained by Israel in 50 countries in America, Africa and Asia, and the flow to Israel of over 1,500 young trainees from the developing countries every year, are an augury of what could be achieved by technical interchange between the Arab States and Israel. Israel could contribute to a solution of refugee problems by accepting the burden of international loans to finance her compensation undertaking. The payment of compensation would advance the resettlement of the refugees in areas of the Arab world. Regional water development would become a focus of coöperation, instead of a source of conflict. A detailed review of the position on the frontiers with a view to minor and mutual adjustment could remove anomalies and ambiguities which provoke tension.

In the institutions of scientific research and higher education on both sides of the frontier, young Israelis and Arabs could join in a mutual discourse of learning. The old prejudices could be replaced by a new comprehension and respect, born of a reciprocal dialogue in the intellectual domain. In such a Middle East, military budgets would spontaneously find a less exacting point of equilibrium. Excessive sums devoted to security could be partly diverted to development projects.

Thus, in full respect of existing sovereignties and of the region's creative diversity, an entirely new story, never known or told before, would unfold across the eastern Mediterranean. For the first time in history no Mediterranean nation is in subjection. All are endowed with sovereign freedom. The problem is how to translate freedom into creative growth.

It may seem utopian to project such a vision in the summer of 1965, when the urgent concern is to reinforce the deterrents against armed conflict and to avoid a mischievous violation of water rights. But there is such a thing in physics as fusion at high temperatures. In political experience, too, the consciousness of peril often brings about a thaw in frozen situations. In the long run, nations can survive only by recognizing what their common interest demands. "Great ideas," wrote Albert Camus, "come into the world as gently as doves. Perhaps then, if we listen closely, we shall hear amid the roar of empires and nations, a faint flutter of wings, the gentle stirring of life and hope."

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VIEW FROM CARACAS

By Raúl Leoni

MARIANO Picón Salas, the great Venezuelan writer, once said that Venezuela did not enter the twentieth century until the death of the iron-fisted dictator Juan Vicente Gómez in December 1935. Until then, ours was a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country still living in the nineteenth century. Thus, it was only after a delay of three and a half decades that Venezuela entered into the century of the most unforeseen changes and most radical revolutions.

The death of General Gómez shook the country to its foundations and set it on the road to the attainment of social rights and needs which had been denied by a backward social structure rooted in Spanish colonial tradition. It was in awareness of this that the newly born political parties and their leaders met the challenge of the times and started on a long and difficult journey that, in spite of some splendid successes, has not yet fully satisfied the just and reasonable aspirations of the Venezuelan people.

My close connection with the Venezuelan labor movement dates from those years, and in the intervening three decades of continuous and unflagging struggle the movement has succeeded in creating the powerful Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (C.T.V.), with nearly 4,000 unions representing over 1,500,000 rural and urban workers. The C.T.V. has always been a bulwark of constitutional government in Venezuela, in part at least because the three-year democratic régime of 1945–48 and the régimes since 1959 have considered the material and cultural well-being of the working masses a central objective and the basic reason for the democratic revolution which our country is at present undergoing.

Unfortunately, just as Venezuela arrived late to the twentieth century in a social sense, she was also tardy in joining the current of modern economic development which today offers such immense possibilities.

Venezuela has been prodigiously blessed by nature. Her petroleum, so essential to the industrialized countries of the Western world, in peace as well as in war, gives the country strategic importance as the producer of a vitally important raw material. This explains to some extent why Venezuela, while trying to combine democratic freedoms with social change in order to improve the

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people's standard of living and reconcile the interests of workers and employers, is being attacked from the outside. It explains why, as we eagerly search for our own road to political and economic development, conspiracies of obvious foreign origin try to prevent the consolidation of a democratic system and try to destroy a legitimate government which will not allow international totalitarianism to gain its objectives.

There are various reasons why our adversaries consider Venezuela of first strategic importance. From a geographical point of view, it is the doorway to South America and easily accessible; its coastline of over 1,300 miles makes the Caribbean a Venezuelan sea. From a political and economic standpoint (considered together because they complement each other), it is important because we are carrying out a revolution—the Venezuelan Revolution—whose successes cannot be acknowledged by certain people without admitting their own mistakes in choosing the violent and destructive path of totalitarianism. The Venezuelan Revolution is a revolution of free men; our entire educational system is devoted to teaching the more than two million children and young people attending our schools to act as free citizens of a democratic country and not as fanatics of a dogma that dehumanizes and destroys.

Venezuela has responded and will respond with courage and decisiveness against the international Communist conspiracy, because her sovereignty and her future as a developing country are at stake. However, in the effort to counteract this international conspiracy, we are spending much energy and many resources which under normal conditions should be devoted to the direct benefit of the unjustly treated masses. Our political history does not differ greatly from that of any other Latin American country; instability characterized our society for many years. Only one democratically elected president, my predecessor and old comrade of many battles, Rómulo Betancourt, has been able to complete his term in office. This means that the danger of the traditional *golpe* is still evident, because its promoters, though weakened by repeated failure, still dream of revenge. This danger would have been eliminated by now had not the Communist threat arisen—basically the same, but with a new dress. And totalitarianism of both right and left is giving ample proof of having undertaken a war against the democratic stability of Venezuela and the stability of Latin America as a whole.

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The first duty of the democratic revolution being conducted by free Venezuelans is to survive and consolidate its position, while still trying to meet the people's demand for dynamism and speed. This necessarily means that much effort and treasure are diverted to maintaining stability, without which the process of change will be endangered. In terms of foreign policy, this explains the insistence of our government that the Organization of American States effectively strengthen and protect representative government. We know from our own costly experience the meaning of totalitarian dictatorships of one type or another. We are convinced that Latin America will not attain integrated economic development nor achieve social stability unless it increases the direct participation of its people in the solution of national problems. The totalitarian menace is not directed against just one country because of its political and economic situation, but against all countries.

The Venezuelan Government asked the O.A.S. to condemn the Cuban Government for unprovoked aggression against my country and its institutions, and to impose sanctions. At our request the Ninth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations met and approved various resolutions, with important results for the continent. The aggressive régime of Fidel Castro was punished by economic, diplomatic and commercial sanctions for endangering the peace of the entire hemisphere. If, instead of exporting conspiracies and war, Cuba would respect the rights of others (which according to Juarez's maxim is the basis of peace) and did not systematically violate the principle of nonintervention, then continental friendship, coöperation and solidarity could work effectively toward the solution of the hemisphere's complex problems.

Our absolute rejection of unilateral intervention in any form or for any purpose explains our position on the Dominican issue. On April 28, before the U.S. Marines landed, I addressed a communication to the Latin American heads of state proposing "an urgent meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States in order to examine the grave situation existing in the Dominican Republic, with a view to finding ways to put an end to the bloodshed in the sister nation" and "to impede the establishment of a dictatorship of any kind that could bring even greater misfortune and suffering to the martyred Dominican people." I had no sooner sent this communication than armed forces of the United States landed in Dominican territory, and I again addressed myself to the

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same heads of states and to President Johnson, denouncing the landings as "a violation of the principle of nonintervention as embodied in the Charter of the Organization of American States," and asking support for the convening of "an urgent consultative meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs to examine the situation and to apply the measures deemed necessary in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States and inter-American treaties."

Such actions as the one in the Dominican Republic tend to revive the era of unilateral intervention, which one supposed had been left far behind by the evolution of international life. They place in serious jeopardy the principles and essential norms that constitute the legal basis of the O.A.S. As a result of our request, the O.A.S. is taking action as these lines are written, but so slowly and in so leisurely a fashion that its prestige and authority are suffering considerably. Venezuela, I repeat, will not countenance unilateral intervention. We favor multilateral or collective action when necessary to guarantee or reëstablish the democratic basis of member states, or to oppose subversive activities from abroad that threaten the security and independence of any American state. Such was the case when the Soviet Union established missiles on Cuban territory, clearly threatening the peace and security of the hemisphere. And today we adhere to the same attitude regarding the situation in the Dominican Republic. It is a constructive attitude, because with a high sense of responsibility and of continental solidarity we are earnestly looking for the best solution that will be in the interest of the Dominican Republic and of the Organization of American States. Each member, and indeed the inter-American system as a whole, faces a hard and decisive test.

II

Our foreign policy is not limited to the inter-American field. We believe in international coöperation and attach particular importance to the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.), since the defense of world prices of our primary export product is so intimately linked with our development.

I want to emphasize that Venezuela has never been opposed to protection of an industry as vital as that of oil. What Venezuela objects to is the way in which protection has been applied by the United States; it just does not seem to us consistent with the pro-

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claimed principle of hemispheric solidarity. In contrast to the products of other nations in the hemisphere, Venezuela's main export is discriminated against by a quota system imposed by the United States to subsidize its domestic oil industry. As a result, we have suffered considerable economic losses at the same time that we have had to fight a decline in prices. Since the quota system was put into effect, we have lost hundreds of millions of dollars which are indispensable for the economic and social development of the country in such critical fields as housing, education and youth and infant care.

We attach so much importance to petroleum because it is our principal source of wealth and the basic support of our development. It is wealth that belongs as much to future generations as to the present, yet because it is a non-renewable resource, its real value will be measured by the degree to which it allows us to create a modern industrial-agricultural economy. In 1964, petroleum production increased by nearly 5 percent, but the decline in prices continued, falling by nearly 3 percent, so that the net gain was minimal.

Frankly, loans and credits are not as desirable as fair prices. Discrimination by the United States and the unjustified deterioration in prices for our petroleum led us to take a strong position at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva last year. We firmly believe that in international trade, nations in a position similar to that of Venezuela are victims of injustice. In view of the bonds of friendship that link the United States and Venezuela, it is hard for our people to understand how a country as powerful as the United States can ignore our just demands. Venezuela is pressing these demands in a friendly and persistent manner because of our determination to solve the acute problems of economic development. Happily, there are indications that the U.S. Government is becoming more receptive, and that this one black mark in our otherwise cordial relations may soon be removed.

President Kennedy once described Latin America as "the most critical area in the world." In these days, attitudes of indifference or discrimination do not meet the gravity of the situation in our continent, where the systematic deterioration of prices of our basic raw materials has contributed to the impoverishment of Latin America and has been an obstruction to its development—all of which plays into the hands of our adversaries.

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III

Venezuela is a rich country. No one will deny it. But our needs for change are so great that their fulfillment requires a vast outlay. The Venezuela of today does not resemble in any way the feudal country which Juan Vicente Gómez left at his death in 1935. The very extent of our wealth increases the impact of its unequal distribution. While it is true that our income per capita is the highest in Latin America, this does not mean that the current, regular resources of the state are sufficient in themselves for the task of repairing injustices and inequalities. If our social problems are not solved, they will provoke a crisis of incalculable consequences.

Associated with these social or structural problems is the population explosion. A tolerable rate of population increase is between 1½ and 2 percent annually; Venezuela's is between 3½ and 4 percent. Today, more than half of all Venezuelans are under the age of 20. Their demands for a place in schools and universities, industry and society, have the force of an avalanche. Industrial development, agrarian reform and mass education are therefore necessities that cannot be postponed.

Agrarian reform, for example, is one of the most serious problems and one in which the experience of others does not help much. The lack of technicians and the haste with which solutions must be found sometimes result in failures. Nevertheless, since 1959, the National Agrarian Institute has distributed 1,465,000 hectares to nearly 80,000 peasant families. This land was taken either from the public domain or from private owners, with compensation. Many mistakes committed at the beginning have by now been overcome. The dispersion of settlements, for instance, has been avoided and whenever possible they are integrated in large simple projects. At the end of last year, the government turned over to the National Agrarian Institute all the idle lands in the public domain in those states where large investments in infrastructure—highways, aqueducts, hospitals and schools—made distribution of this land feasible. Moreover, it is fertile land, good for all kinds of cultivation. This measure has vastly speeded up the process of agrarian reform and has brought about a substantial modification of the structure of land tenure in Venezuela.

But land by itself will not solve the problem of the peasants, nor bring them into the national economy. Therefore, land reform

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is complemented by financial and technical assistance and the construction of permanent irrigation systems. With these measures the government hopes to realize an integrated agrarian reform that will also include housing, education, health, feeder roads, marketing systems and guaranteed minimum prices for agricultural produce. This year, the sum of 195,000,000 bolivars (about $42,500,000) has been set aside for agricultural credits and 14 irrigation systems are under construction. When completed, the area under permanent irrigation will amount to 200,000 hectares. Another 150,000 peasant families are to be relocated on their own land. Once this is accomplished, we will have come close to a definite solution of Venezuela's agrarian problem.

While pushing agrarian reform, we have started an ambitious and vast industrialization plan designed, as I have said, to transform an oil economy into a modern diversified economy. To reduce our high rate of unemployment, 400,000 new jobs must be created in the next four years, most of them to provide a living for the 80,000 workers that annually join the labor market. One of the paradoxes of our economy is that the petroleum industry, which produces over 70 percent of the government's income and contributes approximately one-fifth of the gross national product, employs scarcely 1.3 percent of the working population because of the advanced technology in this field. Although petroleum will continue to be the pivot of the country's economy during the remaining four years of my constitutional term as President, we shall continue to see the agricultural and industrial sectors develop their own capacity to generate wealth. This obviously will have a multiplier effect on the entire Venezuelan economy. Meanwhile, the high purchasing power of our currency and the lack of restrictions against the importation of capital have caused a concentration of capital in nonproductive activities, which aggravates the employment problem. Because of all this, the creation of new sources of work is, and will continue to be, a central objective of my government.

It is a happy coincidence for me that I come from Bolivar State, the prodigious Venezuelan Guiana, and that I am the President of the Republic precisely at the time when that area is being envisaged as the most important industrial center of Latin America. This eastern region around the mouth of the Orinoco has not only vast wealth in such basic resources as iron, but also an inexhaustible potential for electric energy. In 1967, we will

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complete the first stage of the Guri Dam on the Caroni River with an initial capacity of 650,000 kilowatts. This can be increased to 1,750,000 kilowatts as industrial demand mounts, and with further development of the Guri Dam system the capacity can be raised to 6,000,000 kilowatts.

Besides the expansion and integration of the Orinoco Steel Mill and the Venezuelan Petrochemical Institute, both owned by the state, the government contemplates the promotion of vast programs related to the chemical, petrochemical and metal industries, which will provide employment for thousands of laborers and require an investment of hundreds of millions of bolivars. At least two-thirds of the over-all plan should be carried out by private capital, both domestic and foreign. Already a number of projects are in various stages of development and their location has been in accordance with the principle of industrial decentralization. Venezuela offers great opportunities in the metallurgical and petrochemical industries and we hope to develop large markets for them, particularly in Latin America. This will be facilitated by our joining the Latin American Free Trade Association.

State participation in the country's economic development does not imply a disregard for the importance of private enterprise, and even less does it mean a desire to compete with it. The government values and respects private industry, and is seeking only a better distribution of income and national wealth. The need for this is obvious, particularly in view of the imbalance in the sources of our wealth. We believe that the public and the private sectors constitute a single unit concerned with the rapid and harmonious growth of our economy.

We are thus building the foundations of a democracy which is conscious of its social mission. We place emphasis on the social content of our régime because without it all efforts to achieve dynamic change would be in vain. And in spite of the threats posed and the aggression to which we are subjected, all Venezuelans—civilian or military, entrepreneur or worker, university student or technician—are, without loss of liberty, realizing the fruits of revolutionary change. Though we may have made a late entrance into the twentieth century, we now live in the serene conviction that we will arrive on time at the threshold of the twenty-first.

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MASS MIGRATION, THEN AND NOW

By C. P. Kindleberger

THE cliché runs that history repeats itself. The late Per Jacobsson was fond of stating that those who are ignorant of history are doomed to repeat it. This can be disproved in two ways: (1) By finding people with a vivid memory of history who none the less slip into repetitive behavior. An example might be the French who pulled down sterling in 1930 with dire consequences for the world, and now seem interested in undermining the dollar. Or (2), by uncovering an historical analogy which has escaped general notice, and seeing if the same story unfolds itself later. The second path is the one followed here. The mass migration now taking place from Southern to Northern and Western Europe—from Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey to Switzerland, France, Germany and Belgium—can be measured against the movement from Southern and Eastern Europe to the United States between 1880 and 1913 for similarities and differences. It is particularly instructive to observe whether previous pitfalls have been avoided, and if so, whether by accident, by circumstances or because of the increased social consciousness of the human race.

The economic, social and political importance of the two movements is difficult to overstate. In both cases, cheap labor fed economic growth by holding down wages, relatively at least, and maintaining high rates of profit, investment and expansion. The migrants constituted the "reserve armies of the unemployed" which Marx believed were necessary for capitalism to feed on. The Marxist model is by no means the only road to the growth of income—over-all, but also, be it noted, per head as well. In some situations it is possible for economic growth to be stimulated by mass emigration: clearing up redundant labor, or disguised unemployment, stimulates the economy by increasing the return to efficient utilization of resources, and in particular encourages the adoption of machinery which saves total resources as well as labor. Just as Ireland benefited from emigration in the nineteenth century, so Southern Italy, Spain and Greece enjoy high rates of economic growth today while their citizens contribute to growth in the North.

The evident similarities of the two mass movements go beyond

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their contribution to growth. Immigration in the United States in the last century was disjointed; Europe's is today. In the United States, the first wave came from England, Germany, Scandinavia and Ireland, reaching a peak in 1882. Thereafter the source shifted to Southern and Eastern Europe—especially Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Up to 1961, the immigration in Europe came largely from politically affiliated sources—from East to West Germany, from Algeria to France and from the West Indies, Pakistan and Malta to Britain. This immigration has been cut off, whether by the Wall between East and West Germany, or by regulation in the British and French cases, and new immigration has come from the Mediterranean countries. Some new immigrants moved into the slums previously occupied by the old. In New York, as the Irish and the Germans moved to Brooklyn or the Bronx, the Italians and Jews took over their tenements on the lower East Side. In Champigny-sur-Marne, Portuguese have flooded into a *bidonville* abandoned by returning Algerians.

The first migrants went into agriculture to replace natives who had moved on—out to the frontier in the United States, and into industry or trade in Europe. The succeeding wave went into "dirty jobs": mining, construction and heavy metal work like blast furnaces for men; textiles and domestic service for women. Unskilled work was turned over almost entirely to the immigrant, so much so that all Swiss now hold down skilled or semiskilled jobs. This echoes the statement of Isaac Hourwich in 1910 that immigration has brought "elevation of the English-speaking workman to the status of an aristocracy of labor, while the immigrants have been employed to perform the rough work of all industries."

A final similarity is only now emerging in the fact that the capacity of a country to absorb immigrants is limited, and that after a time it will make efforts to call a halt to inward movement. These limits are reached sooner for immigrants of different races than people of similar stock. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 parallels the de facto restrictions of North Africans and colored races by France and Britain. German employment of Moroccans and South Koreans in mining is an exception explained by the Hallstein doctrine, under which West Germany is especially friendly to countries which refuse to recognize East Germany. After the initial restrictions on Chinese and Japanese in the United States came qualitative restriction—prohibitions against

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the sick, paupers and, under the Foran Act of 1885, against contract labor. (The Foran Act illustrates the complications and misunderstandings in the field. It was led by skilled window-glass workers, though the immigrants were virtually entirely unskilled; and it failed to reduce immigration since almost none of it was based on contracts made abroad.) Subsequent attempts to restrict immigration in a period of rising nativism, with violent outbreaks like Haymarket, New Orleans lynching of Italians in 1891 and anti-Jewish riots, failed to overthrow the presumption in favor of America as an asylum for Europeans until the restrictions of 1919, 1921 and 1924. Some countries of Europe—Britain, Austria, the Netherlands and Scandinavia—do not as a rule admit Southern Europeans, but the country which has the most —Switzerland—is now experiencing a revulsion on social and political grounds which has given rise to executive restriction, a refusal to ratify an agreement with Italy for increased rights for immigrants, and even a petition for a constitutional amendment restricting foreign-born residents to 10 percent of the native population.

That immigrants are still accorded a warm welcome in Belgium, France and Germany may be attributed to their limited numbers, as compared with those who came to the United States. Here the foreign-born constituted about 20 percent of the labor force in 1890 and 1900, as compared with 4 percent in Germany, about 9 percent in France, 10 percent in Belgium and 30 percent in Switzerland currently. The relationship between immigrants and growth may be a constant one in economics, but that between immigrants and social cohesion has an inflection point. It is possible to test girders for stress experimentally, and even perhaps camels' backs with straw. The Swiss action in resisting more immigration at 30 percent whereas the United States reacted at nearer 20, may constitute a difference, but the experiment is inconclusive. Differences in size, tradition, initial conditioning and prospects—if we recall that the interruption of immigration by war produced a potential flood in subsequent years—affect the comparison. The German welcome for foreigners, who are called "guest workers" or workers from abroad rather than foreign workers, stems in part from the remnants of guilt toward the displaced persons or foreign workers (*fremden Arbeiter*) of World War II.

Scale, then, is an important difference for all but Switzerland.

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Another apparent difference is that the migrant to America turned his back on the old world and sought a new life, whereas the European migrant today is a transient, who seeks his fortune abroad for a few years and then plans to return home. Whether he actually does go home, time alone will tell.

But the statement that immigrants to America turned their backs on the old country is not substantiated. Many of the Italians and Greeks who came to the United States were seasonal workers, *golodrinos,* or swallows, who came in the spring and returned as winter approached. Close to 60 percent of the immigrants into the United States were males, which implies that 40 percent were females, and that many families arrived in the United States as a whole, when the sources of immigration were Ireland, Germany, England and Scandinavia. By 1910 the proportion of males had risen to more than 70 percent, with the figure for the Italians at 79 percent and for the Southeastern Europeans 95 percent. Some men sent for their women—wives or fiancées, some of whom were arranged for. But many went back. Departures from the United States between 1897 and 1918 were almost half as many as arrivals (47 percent). The longer they stayed the less was the likelihood of return. Of some two million returning after 1908 who answered a government questionnaire, 77 percent had been in the United States less than five years.

But if more returned from the United States than is generally believed, the opposite is true in Europe. It is still too early after 1961 to know what proportions will stay abroad, but early postwar experience as investigated in studies sponsored by UNESCO makes clear what the answer depends on. Young men who come abroad will return—unless they marry a local girl. Older men or those already married will return—unless they bring their wives and stay long enough for their children to go to the local school, form friendships with the natives and push roots into the local soil. Major conditioning factors are whether they live in a ghetto or intermingle with local populace, how quickly they learn the native language, how frequently they return home on leave.

This open question is fraught with considerable significance for Europe. France wants the immigrants to settle permanently and fill the demographic void left by the low birth rates prior to 1946 and the war losses. Greece, on the other hand, is fearful that her national existence is threatened by the effusion of her best people —since foreign employers take mainly the healthy, the young, the

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politically innocent and the skilled. Italy favors freedom of individual choice. Germany has not yet begun to think about the long-run impact. Spain is fearful that returning workers who have breathed freedom beyond the Pyrenees will find the domestic political air suffocating.

Moreover, the Swiss have found that the economic benefits of immigration change with time and permanent settlement. In the short run, with excess capacity of plant but full employment of labor, immigration pays off. Wages are held down, profits are maintained; it is the best of all possible economic worlds. In time, however, high profits stimulate plant expansion, which makes it not only desirable, but now imperative to have foreign workers. And as the foreign workers stay on they require capital expansion for themselves: housing, schools, hospitals. One in every fifth child born in Switzerland today has foreigners as parents; in Zurich hospital corridors and wards on Sunday afternoons, it is said, one can hear mainly Italian spoken, and with more animation than Swiss sobriety considers seemly. Foreign funds in Switzerland are no longer held liquid or reinvested abroad, but are increasingly needed to construct industrial and social capital to go with the foreign workers. With foreign capital and foreign labor, the Swiss are supplying only the real estate and the management, and feel themselves in a precarious position. They are economically damned if the foreign workers leave, and politically and socially altered beyond all recognition if they stay. But as each year goes by, the chances of their staying increase.

The pattern of migration and the chances of staying are strongly affected by cultural forces. Spanish women emigrate by themselves to take jobs as domestics in France, Belgium, Switzerland and even Italy. Italian women lead much more sheltered lives and go abroad only to join their husbands. Many more Spanish than Italian women will remain abroad through marrying local men. The Greeks are particularly skilled at languages, which increases their chances of settling in Germany; the Turks, on the other hand, are illiterate in greater proportions than any other national group, and learn foreign languages and especially German—beyond the minimum phrases necessary for the job—with great difficulty. They will therefore go home. Italians can settle easily in Switzerland, France or Walloon Belgium, but feel unhappy in Flemish Belgium and the Netherlands. One view is that the Swiss predilection for noodles helps, though most authori-

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ties believe that *teigwaren* are a poor substitute for *pasta*. But an Italian-speaking person in Switzerland could be a citizen of Ticino. Germany is not a Latin country, but Southern Germany—Frankfurt and Stuttgart—has ready access to Italy when it comes time to take leave; Cologne has a tradition as an international city, but the Ruhr has the jobs.

There may then be a difference in the permanence of immigration, but it is too early to be certain. Other differences are surely present. In the United States, the foreign worker was used as a strikebreaker. In Europe, if he comes in at all, the unions welcome him. It is true that labor unions in Britain, Holland and the Scandinavian countries account in large part for the policy of exclusion followed by these countries. In Sweden, it has gone so far that the government has yielded sovereignty on the question to the unions. Employer requests for foreign workers are referred by the government to the union, and if the latter objects, the request is refused.

In France, Germany and Belgium, the labor unions, at least officially, welcome foreign labor. This is true not only of the *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* (C.F.T.C.) but also of the Socialist *Force Ouvrière*. Even the Communist *Confédération Générale de Travail* is unwilling to take the Communist line that employment of foreign labor is peculiarly exploitative but contents itself with agitation in favor of raising and improving living conditions for Algerians in France. It is not clear whether the sympathy of these unions for foreign workers is based on social attitudes of the brotherhood of man, in spite of economic competition, or on the sophisticated economic view that there is no real competition, since the native worker moves up to semi-skilled jobs when foreign unskilled labor keeps economic growth going. It seems unlikely that there is much economic sophistication in the attitude, since in all countries labor unions seem to fall into the vulgar economic error that if foreign workers are paid the same wage as domestic workers, their presence does not affect the wage level. (But wages would have risen, given the expansion of demand, if supply had not increased *pari passu*. The immigrants may not lower wages absolutely, under the union condition of equal pay for equal work, but they lower them relatively where they take the same sorts of jobs as native workers.)

Not only are the foreign workers not strikebreakers in Europe today; they may be the strike makers. The strike in the Asturias

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coal mines was supported by contributions from Spanish miners in the Ruhr. Foreign workers drop their tools when unions call strikes. Where the workers are admitted, solidarity reigns. But the difference must not be exaggerated. Immigrants were strike-breakers in the United States only through ignorance. Strenuous efforts were made to keep the involuntary scabs from contact with the regular workers. Where this screen was penetrated, the foreign workers left the plant too, on numerous occasions. And in Europe today it is very hard to get the southern worker with his weak union tradition to pay high dues, attend meetings or participate in routine union life.

One might look for a difference in the records of foreigners in disease, crime and immorality. But it is hard to know which way it would go. Rising nativism brings accusations of high rates in these evils of modern living, but closer examination substitutes questions for answers. In the United States, higher rates for crime among the foreign born than the native population did not stand up when the latter were corrected for age distribution and residence. Foreign adult workers in the city had the same crime rate as native adult workers in the city. And the German authorities claim that the crime rate among the Italian workers is no higher than among the German born.

II

The major difference between nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Europe lies in the correction, or at least the attempt at correction, of the abuses of exploitation which such mass movements can lead to. In Germany and France, for example, the recruiting is done by government as well as by employer. The contract system so vehemently denounced in the United States and prohibited in 1885 is the established means of operation, run by the governments of both countries in collaboration. Runners, padrones and boss interpreters lurk at the fringes of the system, but are systematically repressed. There is a substantial private movement of workers from Italy into Germany and France as tourists. Under the regulations of the European Economic Community, citizens of one country have rights to work almost equal to those of natives. Portuguese padrones smuggle peasants into France, jammed into ships and moving clandestinely at night, but this survives only because of ignorance, since a governmental agreement in 1964 made the movement

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legal. Some Germans object that the foreign worker with a one-year contract has more protection than the native-born employee who is without a contract. This applies only to the last in. Those who have worked for more than a year are on an equal footing. It is evident that no country in Europe will dare to force the weight of recession exclusively on the foreign worker; international public opinion will not allow a country to repeat the French action of the 1930s in canceling the visas of Poles and Italians, loading them on trains and shipping them home.

The recruitment and allocation of workers have thus been taken into government hands for the most part. Working conditions are supervised. Living varies from country to country. Company towns exist in many places, especially in Germany, where many of the larger companies, but not all, have constructed barracks for single workers. These are typically organized along national lines with a kitchen to enable the foreign workers to cook their native fare. In France, however, and to a lesser degree in Switzerland, housing conditions more closely resemble the notorious boardinghouses, usually run by a compatriot, which provide minimal comfort and nutrition at substantial prices. Last summer the French authorities closed down a so-called "merchant of sleep" in Lyon who had 50 beds, occupied three times daily, in a normal house. Equally insalubrious are the so-called Paris hotels where congregate the African migrants from the *Communauté* largely from a single migrant tribe, the Saraholes, whose land lies in Senegal, Mali and Mauritania.

Housing is a serious problem from many points of view. It is short for the native population throughout Europe. The foreign worker with a family at home is anxious to spend as little abroad as he can. To require him to have comfortable housing and to pay its market value is to force him to accumulate capital at a slower rate than he wants, against his return when he wants to buy a farm or a business, or pay off old debts. He seeks overtime work, hangs around the station on the weekend to avoid spending money at the café, and crowds together in inexpensive barracks to save. Swiss citizens are disturbed at the rash of signs for rented rooms, saying "No foreigners need apply," but the landlord's defense is a legitimate one: a room rented to one Italian often is used by ten, with serious consequences for the property in dilapidation. Compare John R. Commons' remark in "Races and Immigrants in America" that the competition of races is the competition of

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standards of living: "The reason the Chinaman or the Italian can save three days' wages is because wages have been previously fixed by the greater necessities of the more advanced races."

In every country, moreover, the state intervenes when it comes to dependents. No house, no wife; and the house must pass muster. Southern Belgium has the advantage of available housing, somewhat run down, to be sure, but available. Some German firms are building housing for their married workers, and allocate it through a workers' committee. On normal standards, which assign a high score to seniority, no foreigner could qualify. But the workers' committees are asked by management to take care of the good foreign workers and compassionate cases on some equitable basis which breaks the strict queueing order. Housing is a critical item. France is currently losing foreign workers to Germany at the termination of their contracts because better housing is available there. Some of the apartments are built for foreign workers by the German Employment Service (and Unemployment Insurance Agency), which is rich because of heavy receipts of unemployment insurance premiums and no payments for unemployment. In these, a special effort is made to avoid segregation. Barracks for single men may be located near the plant to minimize transport costs (and a different cost of social seclusion), but married housing for foreign workers is deliberately spotted about in a random fashion to encourage integration.

The enlarged role of the state is not to make up for lack of private interest. The benevolent societies organized on religious and national lines in the United States in the nineteenth century are matched in Europe today. *Caritas,* the Catholic welfare agency in Germany, provides meeting places, like settlement houses, for the workers from Portugal, Spain and Italy. Lacking immigrants from a Protestant country, the Evangelical Church has underwritten the welfare work among the Orthodox Greeks. The Moslem Turks had no religious group to look out for them, a vacuum which the agnostic trade-union movement undertook to fill. Germany today has three mosques for Moslem worship, one in Frankfurt, one in Cologne and one mounted on a flatcar with a tower which folds down for passage under bridges and through tunnels, which accompanies the large railroad construction crews from Turkey.

Here, then, is a wide difference: the enormous movement of population is not left to laissez-faire but attracts the efforts of

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government at all stages. In the United States, the states regulated abuses (as early as 1847 in New York), but the Federal Government operated only to slow down the movement and ultimately to turn it off. In Europe it is under continuous government surveillance and control.

The development of the welfare state on divergent lines in separate European countries poses complex problems for bureaucracy at national and international levels in coping with today's migrants. The European Economic Community has a special Social Directorate which concerns itself with the guarantee of rights by each member to citizens of the others. Treaties of association with other countries, which provide most of the migrants, guarantee virtually identical rights. And outside the Community separate arrangements between countries of immigration and emigration assure the worker his rights to a job, his social security benefits, family allowances, etc. There are stories of a Turk with four wives and 24 children, who draws gargantuan family allowances in Germany which are paid out in Anatolia, and of clever Italians who have it all figured out that they will work, say, nine years in Switzerland, seven years in Germany and eleven years in Italy and draw social security benefits from all three countries. The suggestion is even made that in calculating the international indebtedness of Switzerland one should bear in mind that its social security reserves should be regarded as foreign debt, owed ultimately to people who will probably spend their retirement years outside of Switzerland and along the Mediterranean.

International movement with equal treatment of foreign workers puts pressure on Europe for harmonization of employment regulations and social security systems as well as of wages and salaries. A country like Austria which gets out of line and has a very large proportion of real wages in social security benefits and low rents is unable to attract foreign workers, who want more cash. Expatriates are reluctant to return homeward until the social security and other benefits are brought up to the level to which they have become accustomed abroad. Mobility makes for harmonization because of the high costs of dealing with disparities, and the possibility of sharp operators taking advantage of them.

But (to move from the economic and social to the political), there is one more difference in which the United States does not

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come off too badly: citizenship. When a man did stay five years, and learned the language, he was eligible to become an American citizen and to vote on a par with the native born. This was the expectation. In Europe it is the exception.

Rapid access to citizenship in the United States is of course explicable in terms of the transatlantic backgrounds of the first citizens. Its consequences were untoward in some particulars, however, particularly the "Irish conquest of the cities," the emergence of urban political bosses responsive to practical needs rather than higher principles of political progress, and the development of minority blocs which sought to modify the national interest to allow for some vestigial attitude. German Americans and Irish Americans did not prevent the United States from going to war against Germany at the side of the British in World War I, much less a quarter-century later, but the existence of ethnic groups colors attitudes on many questions from the Palestine Mandate to the Oder-Neisse line and the responsibility of the S.S. troops for the Malmedy massacre.

It is possible for a foreign immigrant to become a citizen in Europe, but difficult. What Italians and Spanish in Switzerland focus on is not citizenship but the right to stay permanently, won after only three years' residence, although the proposed treaty with Italy would reduce the time to 18 months. The Algerians, and members of the *Communauté* who have citizenship, have lost the free right of entry, but the members of the Common Market who have free right of entry have no easy road to citizenship. This waits on economic integration going so far that it leads to social and ultimately political integration.

This is the European dilemma, which time must resolve. If the Mediterranean immigrants stay in the North and West for economic reasons, they must have social and political equality. If they go home, the question is what will become of them.

The agricultural worker from, say, Norway, who went into farming in America and later returned, was a changed man—experimental, innovating, discontented with the routine methods in his native land. But the Italian peasant who went into industry in the United States found it hard to fit in when he came home. He had money which he loaned out rather than invested in a new business of his own; but he had acquired no agricultural and few industrial skills. America had changed his clothes and his appearance, but his goals remained what they had been when he left—

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to get off the farm and into the city. Many Turks returning from Germany these days bring back large American second-hand cars and set themselves up in *dolmus* businesses—half-taxi, half-bus—in Ankara or Istanbul. Some Italian firms have recruited back Italian workers in German cities, giving us the curious phenomenon that Germany, recruiting workers in Southern Italy and losing them to Northern, is providing mobility to the Italian labor force which the country had difficulty in achieving for itself. But even if they go back to their own country, it is not clear that they can readily be absorbed.

This, then, is the danger—that the mass migrant of today will become a man without a country, one who has left one life and finds that he cannot stay where he is and cannot go home again. The problem of belonging is difficult enough within one's own borders. Unless Europe achieves a social and political identity, it may develop a problem of "flying Mediterraneans," restless spirits with no home.

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MALAYSIA: KEY AREA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Tunku Abdul Rahman

IF one studies the map of Southeast Asia it is clear at once that Malaysia is the natural focus of the whole region. It is the only country that is both part of mainland Asia and at the same time part of the vast archipelago stretching westward from the Philippines and New Guinea to Sumatra. Thus Malaysia is not only a bridge between continental and island Asia but also the gateway between the China Sea and the Indian Ocean. By virtue of this position Malaysia is of vital importance to both Southeast Asia and the world. Add to this the fact that although Malaysia is a small nation of only 10,000,000 people, its economic significance is out of all proportion to its size and population. It is the world's leading producer of both natural rubber and tin. For this reason, if none other, the peace and prosperity, security and stability of Malaysia are of key concern both regionally and internationally.

To understand the evolution of Malaysia as a free nation and the spirit of national unity that inspires and guides the ideals and outlook of this country of many races, creeds and cultures, we must glance briefly at postwar history. The peoples of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo endured in common privation and suffering during the Japanese Occupation. When the war ended the nine states of mainland Malaya and Sarawak were British Protectorates; the islands of Singapore and Penang and the Malacca area were Crown Colonies; and North Borneo (as Sabah was then known) was the domain of a chartered company. Constitutional changes were inevitable, especially in view of the rising wave of liberation which began to sweep across Asia. Within three years the nine Malay states together with Penang and Malacca merged into the Federation of Malaya but still under the British rule. This was the first time in the history of the Malay peninsula that all these states had achieved a common central government. In the meantime, both Sabah and Sarawak became Crown Colonies, and Singapore began to take its first step towards internal self-government.

The Federation of Malaya Agreement was signed in February 1948 in Kuala Lumpur. Within four months the Malayan Communist Party launched an armed revolt to secure power. Com-

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munist terrorism erupted all over Malaya; the country came under a state of national Emergency, which was destined to last for another 12 years. Communist terrorism reached its climax in 1951 with the assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer who succeeded him managed to make considerable inroads into the Communist strength. Much, however, remained to be done, the situation being so dangerous that it seemed the Communists would be able to hold out indefinitely.

With the growth of nationalism the desire for independence had already developed in Malaya to such a pitch that unless this fervor was released and expressed in terms of democracy, Communism, with its strong anticolonial overtone, would triumph and all hopes for freedom and independence would be lost.

The British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox Boyd, visited Kuala Lumpur in 1955. As leader of the Alliance Party, I had talks with him and informed him that no amount of British arms would by itself ever rid Malaya of the menace of Communism. The solution could not come about by military means alone; it was essential to win the minds and hearts of the people, to satisfy their aspirations, and thus draw them away from the enticements of Communism, which uses freedom and independence as its battle cry. The people of Malaya, I said, wanted independence for their own country; if this could be achieved, they would be responsible for the fight against Communism, and they would win. Any delay in achieving independence could only benefit the Communists, as Communism thrived and flourished on colonialism.

In order to test the genuineness of the people's aspirations for independence, I said, we must have national elections on the issue; and if the Alliance Party won, immediate negotiations would be carried out with the British Government for Malaya's independence. We swept to victory, winning 51 out of 52 seats contested, and I became the Chief Minister and Minister for Home Affairs.

The first important thing I did was to arrange a talk with the Communist leader, Chin Peng, which was held on December 28, 1955. The result of that talk showed clearly that the intention of the Communists was not to liberate Malaya but to subject it completely to Communist domination. Therefore I did not hesitate to tell the people that independence could be achieved only by them and through democratic means.

It is worthy of note that from the time negotiations for inde-

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pendence for Malaya were initiated, the support given by elements of the civilian population to the Communist terrorists rapidly began to decrease, with the result that the police and the security forces found their tasks of subduing the Communists made much easier. What had seemed to be overwhelmingly difficult for the British, the people of Malaya, inspired and encouraged by the prospect of independence, and later by its actual achievement, were able to accomplish. On July 31, 1960, the Emergency was declared over and ended. The Malayan people had now a free hand to concentrate their energies and resources on the task of nation-building.

While the Malayan people grew prosperous and happy with their nationhood, the fact could not be ignored that Communism remained the prime menace to the peace of Asia. We had successfully overcome the internal threat of Communism in Malaya, but we were only too well aware of its insidious growth in neighboring areas. I noticed particularly, with growing and grave concern, the increasing influence of Communism in the British territories of Singapore, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak. The same pattern of Communist exploitation of anticolonial feelings that we had experienced in Malaya was taking place in those areas. I felt that time was running out, and that the Communist menace had to be swiftly met, otherwise free Malaya would once again be in danger. Therefore, in May 1961 I first announced my hope that the formation of Malaysia would enable the peoples of these states to achieve the independence they desired and at the same time put an end to colonialism in their part of the world.

The announcement had electrifying results. For the next two years the prospect of Malaysia was a daily subject of debate and discussion, and during this time negotiations took place among leaders of all the states concerned and with the British. With the exception of Brunei, all the states of Malaya joined Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in a conviction that Malaysia was their future destiny. The achievement of union in September 1963 was an outstanding testimony to the will and wish of the peoples of the new nation to stand united, to achieve progress and prosperity, and to resist together the Communist bid for power.

II

In the past two years of Malaysian independence we have maintained and upheld the practice and principles of democracy. All

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Malaysians have come to feel they have a part to play and a responsibility to share in the national well-being. The reasons for our success can be found in the Malaysian Constitution, in which all the fundamental freedoms—such as equality, freedom of speech and freedom of association—are protected. One typical section of the Constitution reads, "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law." Another states, "There shall be no discrimination against citizens on the grounds only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law." Although Islam is the official religion of Malaysia, every Malaysian has the right to practice the creed of his own choice.

The Constitution also provides for parity among the various racial groups. It was obviously necessary in the general interest to do away with economic and educational handicaps affecting the Malays and other indigenous peoples. By common consent, scholarships and opportunities were made more readily available to the indigenous peoples, the least advanced group economically, to provide an incentive for personal achievement. They were also given easier access into government service. Our aim to establish a system of parity, not only politically but economically, would leave no one out or unable to compete in the forward march of the new Malaysia. The omissions of the past have to be rectified in the cause of future progress.

An American magazine recently stated that Malaysia was a democracy in all respects save one, meaning the "special privileges for the Malays." I must point out that although the Constitution provides for a special position for the indigenous peoples at present, it also provides for periodic review of the position when necessary. Ultimately the time will come when it will be possible by legislative action to amend the Constitution because this special position will no longer be needed.

There are still some persons, however, who wish to upset this carefully planned system of ensuring that all races have a fair share in economic progress. They are out of touch with general feeling and reveal a sorry lack of understanding of the importance of good will and coöperation in a multiracial nation. It would be foolish, however, to hasten the day of revision of these constitutional rights prematurely; to do so would defeat the whole purpose of this particular aspect of our economic planning.

Any nation which is an association of states with a federal structure has problems between the central and state governments.

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One has only to look at the United States or Canada or Australia to realize that even after years of federation such problems do arise. Fortunately for Malaysia, our Constitution has drawn on the experience of other federated nations, and in addition the eleven states of the former Federation of Malaya had had six successful years of working under the federal system.

The Alliance Party is in power in all the states of Malaysia except Kelantan and Singapore. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party is in control in Kelantan, and has been since 1959. For four years they showed reluctance to coöperate with the Federal Government, but in the past year or so they have come to realize that their state was falling behind in the general march of progress. Today they are coöperating closely with the Alliance Government and the results are already becoming evident.

The state of Singapore is under the control of another opposition group, the People's Action Party, led by its Premier, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore has had no previous experience of working in a federal nation, and due to the fact of being the "New York" of Malaysia it probably feels that its position is far more important than that of the rest of Malaysia. Some of the state's leaders do not realize the great benefit Singapore is already enjoying as a result of being part of Malaysia, and are rather inclined to attribute the successes to themselves. They are quick to criticize the central government at every opportunity, principally because their own state government is run by an opposition party. This seems to arouse undue apprehension in the minds of some foreign observers, who shake their heads and talk pessimistically about the future of Malaysia. Oddly enough, some of these critics come from federal nations themselves. I myself have no doubt that as Singapore continues to make further progress in Malaysia and adapts itself more readily through experience and understanding of the coöperation necessary in a federal structure, these pangs of local pride and wishes for dominance will slowly pass away. Federation cannot work on the basis of only taking but not giving. The national interest must be the prime over-all concern. The progress of Singapore is important to Malaysia, but by the same token, the progress of Malaysia is equally vital to Singapore. I am confident that whatever little differences exist at present between the central government and the state government will work out satisfactorily.

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Every developing nation has its problems, but few have tackled them more constructively than has Malaysia. Great developments have occurred in the rural sector of our economy. Industrialization is making rapid progress. New construction can be seen everywhere—roads, dams, schools, hospitals, universities, office buildings, national institutions, housing, mosques, churches and temples, and, most strikingly, new industrial estates. Development of electric power already exceeds requirements, with practical plans already being made for years ahead. New wharves are going up in the ports, new airports are being completed. Malaysia possesses one of the finest systems of telecommunications this side of Europe. In every field—industrial, commercial, agricultural, educational, social—striking progress is visible.

Malaysia has the second highest standard of living in the East, following only that of Japan. Its economy is sound and stable. Its foreign exchange and reserves total $1 billion. New investment, both local and foreign, is pouring in. Hardly a day goes by without the opening of some new factory or the announcement of some new company. The total volume of trade expands with every passing year. All these achievements are due to a healthy spirit of free enterprise and the successful working of our democracy owing to the tolerance, good will and efforts of our people of many racial origins.

III

However, Malaysia is not an introspective country. We have opened our doors and windows wide to observe and share in the affairs of the world. In fact, Malaysia was one of the first states in Southeast Asia to do so. Having experienced the menace of international Communism and overcome it, we are particularly sensitive to its threats elsewhere and have never hesitated to take a positive stand when necessary.

Malaya was among the first to condemn Communist China's blatant invasion of Tibet and the subjugation of that ill-fated nation. Again, when the Communist Chinese pressed on further and treacherously attacked their sympathetic neighbor, India, I was the first to condemn their aggression unreservedly, as I happened to arrive in Calcutta the day it began; and during my tour of India in that month of October 1962, I exposed the Chinese motives behind aggression. On my return to Singapore in November, I stated that in the event of a declaration of war between

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India and China, Malaya would give India "all-out support." Soon afterwards I launched a public campaign, the "Save Democracy Fund," which raised more than one million dollars to help India defend herself against Chinese aggression.

Malaysia has been a member of the United Nations since 1957, and in all that time a major plank of her foreign policy platform has been, and is still, unwavering support for the world body. We place great value on the spirit of the Charter and understand that acceptance of it entails both duties and responsibilities. Our armed forces were among the first to reach the Congo, and their conduct there won high praise for the United Nations as well as the lasting friendship of the people of the area.

Malaysia has also made constructive efforts in regional cooperation. Although we did not participate in the Bandung Conference, as we were not then independent, we have expressed the spirit of Bandung in the conduct of our foreign policy. We are very conscious of brotherhood with the Afro-Asian nations. We feel at one with them in campaigning against colonialism, apartheid, disease, hunger and human misery. As far as apartheid is concerned, I have actively condemned this evil violation of human rights. Like our brothers in Afro-Asia we have always stressed the imperative need for a world where laws prevail against racial or religious discrimination. We also championed Algeria's right to freedom. We expressed our belief that Southern Rhodesia should be independent only when African peoples have the unrestricted right to vote and we have deplored Portuguese colonialism in both Africa and Asia.

Our special interest in economic progress and development of the region of Southeast Asia is particularly illustrated by the founding of the Association of Southeast Asia (A.S.A.) which I first projected in Manila in 1960. The founder members—the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya—established A.S.A. in 1961 to promote economic, social and cultural coöperation. Indonesia was invited also but rejected A.S.A. as being a tool of American imperialism, ignoring the fact that all the work, effort, ideas and goals of A.S.A. had sprung entirely from the energies and beliefs of the three countries concerned. In declining to join, Indonesia broke the solemn undertaking given at the Bandung Conference to create an organization for intraregional economic coöperation. Nevertheless, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaya went right ahead, meeting in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur and Manila in

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1961, 1962 and 1963, laying the groundwork for A.S.A. However, with the unfortunate decision of the Philippines to defer recognition of Malaysia after its formation in 1963, A.S.A. suffered a temporary setback. We nevertheless have strong hopes that A.S.A. will be revived, as its secretariats still survive. Our faith in A.S.A. reflects our belief that we can come to terms with the Philippines, which we have always regarded as a country that has done much for the cause of democracy in this part of the world. I feel that the present impasse between the Philippines and Malaysia can be resolved. Although we have no formal diplomatic relations at present, it is our objective to hasten the day when the friendly ties we still feel for one another can be resumed and enhanced.

Malaysia is a practical working democracy, and as such its very existence and success are a positive challenge to any further progress by Communism in Southeast Asia. The Communists consider us an obstacle to be reckoned with in their grand design to subject all Asia to their influence. Obviously Malaysia from their point of view has to be "crushed." The Communists were quick to seize the opportunity to implement this "crushing" vicariously through Indonesia, a country with which we had always felt close fraternity and whose own bid for independence earned our sympathy and support.

Unfortunately, neither President Sukarno nor the Indonesian Army, the only two forces capable of asserting themselves against the Communists, did anything effective to check the rapid expansion of Communism in Indonesia. In fact, President Sukarno seems to have encouraged the dramatic growth of Communism there, and this has been augmented by the widespread starvation, corruption and administrative incompetence, combining to create a mood of cynicism and despair. Meanwhile, the Communists champion causes which they can represent to the people as nationalist and revolutionary. Each day brings evidence of their further entrenchment, as their leaders assume leading positions and their policies are allowed free expression. We cannot ignore the fact that the Indonesian Communist Party is the third largest in the world and closely collaborates with Peking. We in Malaysia have been made well aware by actual aggression, infiltration, subversion and sabotage of the Communist determination to bring about the extinction of our country. However, with the help of our allies and the sympathy and support of nations

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which deplore aggression and espouse peace, we are confident of our ability to contain this threat to our existence which emanates from Indonesia.

We look northward in Asia with equal anxiety. We see the unscrupulous advantage the Communists have taken of small and weak states, most of whom have shaken off the burden of colonialism only to fall under the spell of Communism. Viet Nam, in particular, has caused us great concern, as we have watched the familiar Communist pattern being re-enacted by the Hanoi Government, using the usual methods of infiltration, subversion and open aggression against South Viet Nam, making a mockery of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. I recall that the very first foreign country I visited after becoming Prime Minister of newly independent Malaya was South Viet Nam in January 1958. I declared then that the Communist aggression taking place both in Malaya and in South Viet Nam was rightly the concern of the whole free world, and that our two countries were fighting in the front line of the battle for freedom. In 1960, I did what I could to help South Viet Nam in its struggle against Communism. All the guns and ammunition and vehicles which had become surplus to us as the result of the ending of our own emergency I had shipped to Saigon. We started our own aid program, quietly and without publicity, to train some thousands of Vietnamese in either jungle warfare or police administration; and we are continuing to do so today.

The long history of aggressive action by North Viet Nam and its intensifications of hostilities in recent months more than justify the firm stand taken by the United States. We in Malaysia fully support Washington's actions. Past experience has clearly shown that the Communists will back down whenever they are faced with determined and definite opposition. Cuba, the Berlin Blockade and the incidents in the Tongkin Gulf, each of which Malaysia completely supported at the time, are testimony to this. We cannot, however, ignore the fear felt by many nations that the war in Viet Nam may escalate into such proportions that an ultimate peaceful solution becomes impossible. We therefore welcome President Johnson's statement that the United States is ready to negotiate without any precondition. His proposal for a massive aid program to Southeast Asia clearly shows that the United States is seeking neither political nor military conquest, but desires only an honorable settlement of the Vietnamese problem.

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From our own experience it is our belief, however, that the final answer in Viet Nam does not lie in either arms or economic aid but in the hearts and minds of the people. The present state of affairs in South Viet Nam is due to a lack of ideological response to an ideological challenge. Political instability in Saigon has drawn attention away from the basic principles of freedom for which South Viet Nam has been fighting. The Republic of Viet Nam must be given time to reconsolidate itself on these principles and its people must have an opportunity to understand that democracy is worth fighting and dying for. In the long run, the present military involvement by the United States can only be temporary; but it will provide that essential time. In our view it is imperative that the United States does not retire from the scene; such action would create an ideological vacuum which only the Communists would exploit.

To me the United States does not represent merely a power as such, even though she is undoubtedly the most powerful nation in the world. Rather the United States represents the living ideal of democracy. I remember that Madame Pandit, who was then President of the U.N. General Assembly, said during a visit to Singapore that what the free world most needed were thousands and thousands of people willing to preach and practice democracy with fervor and faith and when necessary to fight for it. In other words, democracy must be an ideology. It is worth noting that the Communist states never represent themselves so much as powers but as proponents of an ideology, although it is true that the current dispute between the Soviet Union and China has done much to dispel this image.

The whole history of our years of independence, leading into the creation of Malaysia, is living evidence that democracy can succeed in molding an Asian nation along lines of economic achievement and stability. It is true that we have been forced to ensure our security against Indonesia's present hostility by an alliance with such friendly nations as the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. That alliance is made of our own choice. All free nations have the sovereign right to choose their friends and to enter into any agreement which they feel may be necessary for their security. Further, our defense agreement with the United Kingdom which dates back to 1957 has enabled us to make far more rapid progress in every field of development because we have not had to spend vast sums on our armed forces.

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Communist-inspired propaganda from Indonesia cries out hysterically that our defense agreement represents neo-colonialism. Any nation which has suffered the threat of aggression knows that protection is a matter of necessity and that immediate help is welcome from whichever quarter it comes. We in Malaysia have always had faith in our friends; and now that our need is critical they have rallied to our side as true friends should. In spite of Indonesia's endeavors to obscure the truth with a screen of groundless accusations, Afro-Asia has come to understand that we in Malaysia have no choice but to turn to the friends we trust to help us when we are being not only threatened but actually invaded by a neighbor nation possessing armed forces 20 times the size of ours. To ask us to give up the British bases is tantamount to asking us to disarm in the face of a strong enemy buildup. It would be sheer folly for us to give up the bases. To do so would be to commit suicide. Needless to say, we shall welcome defense assistance from African, Asian or other countries.

It is with some satisfaction that we can say that except for one minor attack, every Indonesian assault against us has been defeated. We have seen to it that the complete record of Indonesian incursions is in the hands of the Security Council. The whole world knows that Indonesia is guilty of aggression and that Malayasia has not fired one bullet outside its borders.

Malaysia is in a unique position in many ways, belonging as it does to the brotherhood of Afro-Asian nations as well as being a member of the Commonwealth. As a mainly Muslim country we have intimate links and understanding with the Arab world. We are friends with all nations in Asia, Indonesia and the Communist countries excepted. Last but not least, we have proven that the principles of democracy have valid application to the problems that face developing countries. We cannot and do not aspire to rely on the might of arms to promote our future hopes, preferring to live in peace and friendship with all, especially our neighbors. We have not received or requested any part of the vast quantities of aid which the United States has so freely and generously given to most of the free world. We have always preferred to pay our own way, and we continue to do so. We believe that by making a success of our own democracy, relying on our own efforts, combined with the advantages of our strategic position and economic importance, we are able to exercise influence, even as a small nation, that is far-reaching and effective.

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China's emergence as a powerful military force, expressing the most militant form of Communism, has made the problem of survival for all the countries of Southeast Asia extremely acute. So far, pro-Peking forces are militarily active only in Viet Nam, Laos and Indonesia; but knowing the nature of Communism, we can expect further aggression to take place. In this situation we have no time for philosophical resignation, nor do we have any respect for attitudes of despair shown by some countries that it is only a matter of time before this region of Southeast Asia becomes enveloped in the embrace of Red China. Our role, we feel, is not only to dispel unwarranted pessimism but to reaffirm by our own example and policy that democracy is a better answer to the social and economic problems of this vital region than Communism can ever be.

In Russia, the most advanced nation in the Communist world, economic well-being has provoked a search for the liberties which had been lost because the leaders believed them to be incompatible with rapid development. Why should Asian nations allow themselves to be attracted to the alluring prospects of economic advancement claimed by Communists when it means the unnecessary surrender of their liberties? Asian nations can see for themselves the remarkable resurgence of Japan through the spirit of free enterprise and democracy. Even a small country like ours has been able, under the aegis of democracy, to achieve success without the sacrifices which Communism demands. By comparison, North Viet Nam and North Korea expose the myth of supposing that Communism is a guaranteed solution to the problems presented by economic immaturity.

The achievement of Asian unity is a challenge. If affairs continue to deteriorate as at present we face the specter of another world war. Europe has been the source of past world wars; I hope Asia will never have this hateful privilege. Obviously all the Asian countries cannot come together now, but those which are sincere Asians at heart can respond to proper leadership when it appears. I feel that such leadership may well be provided by Japan.

We in Malaysia see our role as one of contributing to the stability of Southeast Asia through social and economic progress, by carrying out a policy of good will and coöperation and by firmly adhering to the free world and strongly supporting the United Nations. We shall continue doing everything we can to promote the cause of democracy and the achievement of peace.

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GERMANY'S ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS

By Karl Schiller

THE conviction is widely held in German political circles today that a phase of postwar development is ending and that the Federal Republic is approaching a new era of political, social and economic challenge. The reconstruction achieved in the years after the war led to a remarkable economic upsurge. But that success cannot make us overlook the continuing failure to solve our most outstanding political problem—that of reunification. A great deal of German energy and much-touted German industriousness has spent itself in the market place, while—for whatever reason—our number-one political problem has hardened in its status quo. The oft-cited "German phoenix" which rose out of the ashes has actually been paralyzed in one wing.

But if the Germans are not to find themselves some day in circumstances of acute political frustration, a new Federal Government must find ways and means to make progress in solving the problem. This will not, nor can it, happen overnight; on the contrary, a long, stony path may lie ahead. But the goal must not be lost sight of. Certainly its attainment can be approached only in careful steps, and just as certainly the fruits of economic progress must figure as tools. Indeed, economics is already playing a role (albeit a very limited one), for example, in the Federal Republic's aid to West Berlin and in interzonal trade.

Aid to Berlin consists of financial contributions to its budget and favorable tax treatment. In recent years this aid has made it possible for the city to pursue an expansionist economic policy —in spite of the erection of the Wall in 1961. In 1964, Berlin's gross product, industrial output and investments were each 11 percent above 1961 levels (in constant prices). This policy has enabled Berlin to come to grips with its labor shortage: since 1963 the city has shown a net gain from migratory movements to and from West Germany which more than compensates for the high urban death rate. Once again the population is growing. And finally, in combination with the guarantees of the three Western allies, the policy of assistance has greatly contributed to West Berlin's position as the focal point of the German question—a living reminder that that question must not be dropped from the international agenda.

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Trade between the two zones of Germany is also a significant political factor. Since the Jessup-Malik Agreement of 1949 ending the Berlin Blockade, all interzonal trade agreements have been concluded between "the currency zone of the Deutsche Mark-West" and "the currency zone of the Deutsche Mark-East." This commerce is all that is left of a once great bond integrating the German economy—even though it is high as compared to trade between the Zone and the principal Western powers. Last year the total volume was DM 2.2 billion, compared to DM 100 million for trade with the United States and DM 170, 150 and 110 million for trade with Great Britain, France and Italy respectively. It should be emphasized, however, that we do not consider our trade with the Zone in any way similar to the commerce of other countries, for it is simply a remnant of the earlier single domestic market—and even today no tariffs are levied. Thus, in one important respect the economic division of Germany remains incomplete. From a purely commercial point of view, interzonal trade is of no great significance to West German industry; in fact, we have some trouble disposing of the goods we get from the Zone. But it is of great political significance for free West Berlin. Although free access to the city is based on the original right of the Western allies, we are convinced that trade is a weight which we can toss onto the scales. For "the other side" has a very real interest in obtaining goods from us.

These examples indicate the extent to which the economic achievement of the Federal Republic has already had a bearing on the German question. The harassment of West Berlin during the week of April 5–10, 1965, when the German Bundestag was meeting there, threw a glaring spotlight on this situation and the ambiguities surrounding it. The special conditions of West Berlin's existence were once again made clear, showing that preferential treatment and aid to Berlin make good sense. But it also shows that the Allied guarantees and the fact that interzonal trade can be stopped at any time are effective instruments of policy only after harassment has reached a certain level of intensity. Up to that point, the Eastern authorities can arbitrarily mobilize and expand disturbances along the routes to Berlin—and thereby reveal the latent dangers of the present desolate circumstances in which the German question has been left.

There are countless signs that no spectacular act will succeed in solving the German problem, but only an extremely difficult

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process of gradual change. At some point along the way we may have to take on considerable new economic burdens. We must arm ourselves for this eventuality through the steady growth of our national product. And the government must better prepare the people for it than it has so far done.

II

It is not only the unsettled aspects of the German question which give the new phase of our development its distinctive quality. Economic and social evolution has raised new problems which can no longer be solved with the patterns of thought and action of 1948–1949, when the market economy was reintroduced in Germany. The *élan vital* of competition will continue to be an indispensable component of our free society—but that *élan* alone is not enough. We must not remain bound to a model which has devolved into an inadequate cliché, when actual developments have progressed far beyond it. What is sorely needed is a modern concept, which is forward looking and geared to the mixed economy in which we live.

The Federal Republic is an expanding industrial society, a prosperous society. It may even be argued that we are on the threshold of the Affluent Society. In any case, it is also characterized by "private wealth and public poverty." As early as 1960, at the S.P.D. Party Day in Hannover, Willy Brandt put the fulfillment of important community tasks at the center of his program: basic improvements in public and individual health, public transportation, urban development and land use shaped to the needs of tomorrow, and more strenuous effort in the areas of education and vocational training. It is indeed a fact that increased social investment and the building up of our infrastructure are prerequisites for further economic growth and continuing social stability. Ludwig Erhard himself recently took up this cry when he proclaimed a new program of "community action" at the 1965 C.D.U. Party Day in Düsseldorf. Nothing could more conclusively demonstrate the universal recognition that we are entering a new phase of social and economic development.

Some parts of the private sector of the economy, too, have encountered difficult structural problems which will require more elaborate economic policies than in the past. Since 1958 a crisis has existed in the German coal-mining industry, and the present problems of competition between coal and oil cannot be

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solved by a laissez-faire policy. To deal with this matter, we should establish a forward-looking energy policy, which would work toward equalizing the competitive opportunities of the various basic energy industries, actively fight against any abuse of economic power in the oligopolistic markets for new products, and which would promote the adaptation and rationalization of the coal industry. If shutdowns and decreases in production are inevitable, the transfer to new occupations must be facilitated.

Another area badly in need of a purposeful policy is agriculture, which has been floundering for years in the very difficult process of accommodating both to the conditions and effects of technical progress and industrial expansion and to the requirements of the Common Market. General subsidies are not enough; a specific, comprehensive program for change and adjustment is needed. Agricultural production and marketing arrangements must be modernized, farming operations brought to optimal size, farmers assisted in moving into new occupations. Education in rural areas must be tremendously improved, and the social security of those involved in farming must be made comparable to that of industrial workers.

These are only a few of the defective spots in our economy which must be removed through measures directed specifically to that purpose. It is evident from these examples that the magic words "market economy" are not sufficient to accomplish what is needed. Similar tasks are at hand for small-business policy, land-use and regional policies, and in the housing and ship-building industries.

Apart from these problems in particular sectors of the economy, it must be our goal to achieve a more satisfactory distribution of income and property. It is characteristic of economic policy discussions in Germany that the nationalization of industry is never proposed. Modern plans relating to the question of ownership are concerned exclusively with increasing *private* ownership in the hands of the workers. At the S.P.D. Party Day in Karlsruhe in 1964, the party expanded the conventional "magic triangle" of economic objectives (full employment, stable prices and foreign economic equilibrium) into a quadrangle by adding the fair distribution of income and property as a fourth objective. Within this "magic quadrangle," all goals must be pursued as efficiently as possible; economic policy should not concern itself with any one at the cost of the others. Proposed measures for property

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distribution are not designed to correct the existing order but to achieve wider distribution of future capital accumulation. One such measure would be the creation of investment funds for public benefit. Another would be to make it possible, through wage agreements, for employees to have a share in the new wealth created by private enterprise.

These examples show that S.P.D. does not question the free economic order, but in fact affirms it. What we do criticize is the "cultural lag" in official policy, which has not kept up with actual conditions. The fact that the C.D.U. is finally proposing to take account of "the new realities," as Rainer Barzel suggested at the last Party Day, only proves again the need for a new approach.

As mentioned before, there are no plans for nationalization in the Federal Republic; the evidence of what is happening in the Zone is too frightening for that. Next to the distribution of property, our social critics are most concerned with the need for improvements in the organization of enterprise. How can the democratic organization and the public-mindedness of Big Business be improved? Hasn't the system applied in the German coal and steel industries since 1951—giving the workers a share in management decision—had a favorable effect on labor relations? Can that system be extended to large enterprises in other fields? These are questions that will grow in importance in the near future.

The answers will be politically significant, not only for the Federal Republic, but for East-West relations as well. Our system has again and again proven itself superior to the Eastern system in both freedom and material productivity. But in the future more than ever we must demonstrate that we are devising a new social order—one which can no longer be understood in the old capitalist terms but which forges a new synthesis between the market economy and the welfare state. In this way, the creative energies of private enterprise and the guiding social function of the state will support one another. Such a social model can be effective far beyond the limits of our Western world.

III

Before getting involved in a discussion of the necessary strategies and instruments of German economic policy, let me renounce any intention of renewing the old debate over the possibility of reconciling competition and planning. Representatives of conservative economic doctrines are still disposed to see the matter

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in terms of sharp alternatives, when actually developments have gone far beyond that stage. Government influence on the levels of employment, investment, foreign trade, etc., is entirely compatible with individual competition in the market.

In the future, the goal of optimal growth with full employment will be given high priority. Steady expansion is essential to today's modern industrial society; structural changes are much more easily managed in a growing economy than in a stagnant one. It is easier, too, to undertake new tasks when the economic cake is growing than when the means for undertaking them can be found only by cutting into existing claims. In summary, we need economic growth to accomplish the great common tasks before us, to compete in international markets, to make our contribution to the developing countries, to hold our own in the international contest for rapid rates of growth, and, finally, to be prepared when the day comes to settle the reunification question.

Hence this plank in the 1964 economic platform of the S.P.D.: "We shall promote the driving strength of the market economy, its achievements, the investment activity of entrepreneurs and its dynamic, technological progress." In dealing with an economy which has enjoyed full employment for ten years, such a policy must embrace a whole range of coördinated measures. The protection of particular industries is not the main goal; the central issue is to increase productivity and adaptability. And labor policy must promote increased mobility of the labor force. Above all, business competition must be preserved and any restrictive practices fought. The line established by the first German anti-cartel law of 1957 must be strongly pushed.

Through such a policy of incentive and higher flexibility, the economy should move continuously upward. But at the same time, progress must be combined with stability; expansion must not degenerate into inflation. For this purpose, the global instruments of fiscal and monetary policy must be used to give over-all guidance to the economy. The objective is not to apply detailed measures regulating each enterprise and its activities, but to alter the market conditions for all enterprises so as to produce the desired results. General guidance is a forward-looking economic policy; it is not *planification en détail*. In French practice, the state makes recommendations for private investment policy, and so may depart from the system in which the entrepreneur's drive adapts itself to the market and its opportunities.

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The Federal Republic needs to develop its system of national economic accounts. With this we could set up a quantitative framework for all the government's economic, social and financial policies. This over-all accounting should also give both businessmen and unions a clear idea of possible developments in the medium term, and, above all, offer a factual basis for wage negotiations. This is important because, while the parties to the negotiations are of course autonomous, wages must be kept in step with over-all economic growth. On the necessity of a growth-oriented and anti-cyclical fiscal policy there is general agreement today. The recently published first report of the "Board of Experts on the Appraisal of General Economic Development," which was created by law in 1963, has provided enough information on this point—although the advice was not altogether well-received by the government because of the Board's support for flexible exchange rates. However, in the future such institutions as the Board of Experts will play a far more significant role.

A steadily growing economy is associated with high profits for the entrepreneur: profits are the prizes given for progress. At the same time, other members of society must share the fruits of progress. Therefore a welfare program is the third central component of modern economic policy. This requires, in the first place, expenditures for social security, which are a form of internal redistribution of income. A welfare program makes a decisive contribution to the preservation of social stability in periods of rapid economic growth. Without the support of welfare programs—however imperfect they may have been—our present social prosperity would not have been attained. The economic success of the Federal Republic up to now is by no means due solely to the impetus of the market economy, but equally to our country's strong tradition of social welfare, which goes back to the time of Bismarck. Without the housing program and pension reforms, the market economy would long since have collapsed. A dynamic market economy and the "social state" are each requirements for the well-being of the other.

In summary, the combination of the market economy, monetary and financial guidance and welfare policy is the only solution for our times. These are the technical building materials of a socially balanced, growth-oriented society—a society which can be described as "the humane society" or "the great society."

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IV

As a world trader the Federal Republic today stands second only to the United States. Moreover, exports account for 20 percent of our G.N.P., almost four times as much as the corresponding figure for the United States (5.3 percent). Thus the Federal Republic has a great effect on the world economy, but at the same time is heavily dependent on it. For that reason we must continue to pursue liberal foreign trade policies; in the future, there will be even less of a case for protectionism than in the past. For only by keeping in step with the international division of labor and world price levels can a nation find new reserves of productivity, and with them opportunities for economic progress.

The Federal Republic is interested in an international currency system which encourages economic growth and the free movement of goods and capital. The gold-exchange standard now in effect has survived because it made possible a powerful postwar expansion of trade and production in the free world. Especially in recent years, however, the demand for liquidity has been met largely through the balance-of-payments deficits of the two reserve-currency countries, Britain and the United States. Even though prices remained remarkably stable in the United States, one effect of this has been "imported inflation" elsewhere. Returning to the gold standard would be no solution, since it would be accompanied either by a catastrophic deflation throughout the world or by a jump in the price of gold that would produce a complete upheaval among the nations involved in world trade. If, however, both Britain and the United States should successfully manage to solve their balance-of-payments problem, the system would then be put to a real test. What is needed is to develop the gold-exchange standard further in such a way that through the International Monetary Fund liquidity could be adequately increased in harmony with the needs of a growing world economy.

Closely connected with the debate over the American deficit is the question of American capital investment in Europe, which is often criticized. The economic principles presented above mean that Europe must not be a closed society in respect to foreign investment. Investment is an important contribution to economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic and an excellent vehicle for the international spread of scientific and technical progress.

In the Common Market, the Federal Republic must promptly

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bring its weight to bear in favor of an emphatically "open" policy. In the long run the least possible discrimination against third countries will produce optimal growth. We must also recognize our key role in intensifying economic coöperation across the Atlantic. The Grand Design of President Kennedy, the Atlantic Partnership, is a legacy for all of us. The Kennedy Round is a test of Europe's desire to coöperate in the economic realm. It is up to us as Europeans—and as Germans—to see that the Common Market does not become a "gigantic discrimination" (Röpke), but minimizes the discriminatory effects of regional union by a general expansion of international trade.

Another important question for German foreign economic policy is the problem of bringing together the two large European regional organizations, the Common Market and EFTA. In the long run, prosperity for Western Europe can be achieved only by a fully interdependent development of the countries now grouped in the two organizations. The division now existing is not yet too painful, since trade between the two organizations has developed relatively well because of a high level of world economic activity. But the further integration proceeds within the Common Market and the greater the regional preferences within EFTA become, the more the tariffs between them will be felt, and the stronger the vested interests will become in enterprises which flourish under protection and which will be determined to keep it. Time here works not with us but against us. The moment is coming when we must once again undertake a great effort to come closer together: the date for the complete abolition of internal tariffs in both groupings is fast approaching. The year 1967 will be crucial if a common road to a unified Europe is to be found.

Because of its industrial structure, the Federal Republic has the strongest interest in trade with the EFTA countries and must therefore lead the way in building this bridge. Several years ago, a German, Alwin Münchmeyer, proposed a bridging measure which, with certain modifications, might be worthy of consideration again today. His idea was that the Common Market as a whole should join EFTA—a proposal so striking in its simplicity that it was like Columbus' egg. The Common Market, as the "eighth" member, could then look to its own development, even to the point of full integration and political unification—if all six so desired—without impairing the endeavors of the other seven. Today it is commonly held to be impossible, on economic and

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psychological grounds, for the powerful and partially integrated Common Market to join the far looser organization of the Seven. This to me is a superficial argument. For even a fully integrated great national economy—which the Common Market is not yet—might join the loose organization of a free-trade zone.

But perhaps today one should not, as a matter of fact, speak of joining, but rather of a collective agreement between the two communities to make the plan acceptable. Under such a plan the separate identity of the Common Market would be entirely compatible with the loose structure of the free-trade association. Another point in favor of the plan is that the very difficult bilateral negotiations could be entirely avoided.

What we need today is a real political initiative to overcome the present European malaise. We are living in a world of stormy political changes, and if free Europe lets its hour pass by, it will one day be embarrassed to find that its opportunities exceeded its foresight. If General de Gaulle had the two hard alternatives placed before him, either to admit Britain to the Common Market or to join the Common Market to EFTA, one might well suppose that he would at least accept the second.

Policy toward trade with Eastern Europe is also assuming ever greater significance. The increasing industrial development of that area requires greater trade with the outside world. Through their commercial policies, the Western countries have the opportunity to encourage the tendencies that already exist in Eastern Europe to open up economically. They will be the more successful in this effort if their commercial policies are coördinated, especially in the matter of credit terms. In view of the efforts of some of the Eastern states to achieve economic autonomy, some differentiation in dealing with them is entirely possible and appropriate: the East cannot be regarded as a monolithic bloc. However, in building up trade, an agreed "international division of labor" within the Western world is also possible. Why should not some countries become more heavily engaged in trade with the East than others? It is enough if we on our side are united on basic principles; this much is in fact necessary, in view of the particular structure and organization of the state-trading countries. The O.E.C.D. would be an excellent instrument for the purpose, for it is a more comprehensive organization than the others presently concerned with Eastern trade. Its membership includes not only all the industrialized states of the free world but also

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the neutral countries of Europe, and herein lies its advantage for this purpose.

V

The Federal Republic of Germany stands at an economic and social crossroads. The economic progress so far achieved through the coöperative efforts of all must not lead us to ignore the greater and more complicated tasks which await us. The period of reconstruction through which we have passed was to a large extent characterized by a policy of laissez-faire. It was not without reason that it reached its culminating point and its most pregnant expression in the slogan "No experiments." But this cannot represent the lasting order of things. Changes already under way during this period have established new political yardsticks.

Contemporary German society is different from the society of the immediate postwar years—far more dynamic, more open and more aware. Social and occupational mobility is increasing, both vertically and horizontally; old social classes will thereby be abolished, but new fields of tension will emerge. Nevertheless, our society today is more homogeneous than that of many other countries. Placed in a world of vast change, that federal German society requires policies with clear definition and clear priorities, a readiness to venture and to create new institutions, in order to pursue social progress while preserving the gains that continuity and stability can bring.

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NATO STRATEGY: WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE

By Henry Owen

BEFORE World War I, German planners prepared for only one contingency: an all-out, two-front war. In July 1914, this made it difficult for Germany to match Russia's military preparations without automatically escalating into general war. Before World War II, French military planners also prepared for only one contingency: full-scale invasion of France. This made it difficult for France to react effectively when Hitler occupied the Rhineland in 1936. Both the German and French governments went wrong by assuming, rather than judging, where the main threat lay. Each country put tremendous effort into elaborating its war plans and force structure, down to the most minute detail. And yet each seems to have given only the most cursory attention to the political contingencies in which those plans and forces might have to be used. Hence the plans and force structures turned out to be not only irrelevant but—because of their rigidity—downright harmful.

These experiences, at which we will presently look in greater detail, offer lessons for those who formulate NATO policy. To avoid a similar distortion in NATO planning, we need to spend some time thinking about *why* the Alliance needs military strength before we engross ourselves in controversy as to *how* it should organize and use that strength. Such a review of likely contingencies suggests, for example, that the notion of stripping NATO down to a trip-wire, backed by massive strategic nuclear capabilities, makes very little sense. This proposal, so much discussed in the press, seems to assume that there is only one threat: that of deliberate attack. It wholly fails to take into account the threat of unintended conflict, and hence it fails to provide the forces needed to deal with this danger.

II

When most people think of Count Schlieffen, the talented soldier who was German Chief of Staff before World War I, they think of the war plan which he produced: the so-called Schlieffen Plan. From a military standpoint, this plan had considerable merit. It recognized that war, arising on either German front,

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would inevitably involve both Russia and France, in view of their alliance. It called, therefore, for Germany to invade France as soon as Russia began to mobilize for war. France would then be crushed before Russian mobilization could be completed. A two-front war would be avoided.

The trouble with this plan was that it was directed to the least likely threat: a deliberate decision by either the Dual Alliance or the Triple Entente to attack the other—out of the blue, so to speak. It was not well suited to the contingency which the events of 1908, 1912–13 and 1914 made clear was a more likely threat: that of a Balkan crisis, which both sides might wish to limit. In such a crisis, Germany would feel compelled to support Austria. If Russia mobilized, while negotiations were under way, Germany would wish to match her military preparations. But it was important that Germany be able to do this without automatically bringing on general war—so that diplomacy could have time to seek a peaceful settlement.

The war plan which Schlieffen had inherited from his predecessor, the elder von Moltke, would have permitted this. It called for Germany to stand on the defensive against France. Thus it did not require her to go to war in instant reaction to Russian mobilization. A perceptive view of the most likely threat would have led Schlieffen to be more cautious in discarding this plan. This is made evident by the events of July 1914.

A little before noon on July 28, Austria declared war on Serbia. Austria had long felt threatened by growing discontent among its Slav subjects, and considered this discontent compounded by the example and agitation of nearby Serbia. Since 1908 Vienna had been increasingly tempted by the idea of a war on Serbia, and on July 5, after Franz Ferdinand's assassination, it had secured a promise of German support. Austria then (July 23) delivered its ultimatum to Serbia. Belgrade's reply was conciliatory in tone, but it rejected the two key Austrian demands, thereby supplying the desired *casus belli.*

In offering Austria their support, German leaders had counted on being able to confine the war to Austria and Serbia. But Russian and other reactions to Austria's ultimatum had convinced the Kaiser, by July 28, that this judgment was probably wrong. That morning he suggested to his foreign minister that Germany begin to seek a negotiated settlement. Although he purported to base this suggestion on the mild tone of Serbia's reply,

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growing indication of allied hostility was probably a more important reason. As Virginia Cowles points out in her biography of the Kaiser: "He did not want a European war, only a European victory. And he suddenly saw that he was standing far closer to the edge of the precipice than he had imagined. In a flash all his martial ardour vanished. The dozens of marginal annotations he had made, with their peremptory demands and their fierce bravado, were instantly forgotten. From now onwards the Kaiser was interested only in maintaining peace. From now on, everything he did was born of a frantic effort to stop the cumbersome machine in time to avoid a crash. An overpowering fear had taken possession of his soul."

The German Chancellor and the German Foreign Minister took a dim view of the Kaiser's proposal. They still believed that an Austrian-Serbian conflict could be localized, and did not pass on the Kaiser's suggestion to Vienna till late the night of the 28th, and then only in greatly watered down form. But on July 29, as the news from allied capitals grew steadily worse, they also lost their nerve. They began to put more pressure on Vienna—without, however, threatening withdrawal of German support if it came to war. The Chancellor telegraphed to Vienna: "In these circumstances we must urgently and emphatically commend to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on these honorable terms. The responsibility for the consequences that might otherwise arise would be for Austria and ourselves exceedingly grave." The Italian historian, Luigi Albertini, a sharp critic of German policy, comments: "The appeal was undoubtedly urgent and there is nothing to justify its being described as insincere."

Austria needed two weeks to complete her military preparations against Serbia. It is unlikely Germany could have persuaded her, in this period, to accept a peaceful settlement. Vienna was already far committed to war on the basis of previous German encouragement. But we will never be certain. For at 6 p.m. on July 30, after a number of more limited steps, Russia ordered general mobilization in order to put pressure on Austria to agree to a satisfactory settlement, and to prepare for the possibility of war.

Three hours later, unaware of this Russian decision, the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, sent the famous telegram No. 200, reinforcing his previous urgings, to the German Embassy

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in Vienna. If Austria continued her present policy, he warned, "that would place us in an untenable position in the eyes of our own people. We can therefore only recommend most urgently that Austria should accept Grey's proposal. . . ." But at 11:20 p.m., after receiving a phone call from the General Staff, Bethmann-Hollweg instructed the German Embassy in Vienna to disregard telegram No. 200. An unsent telegram explained why: "I just suspended the execution of instruction No. 200, because General Staff just tells me that the military preparations of our neighbors, especially on the East, compel speedy decision. . . ."

We are still not sure what specific intelligence the General Staff conveyed to Bethmann. Probably there were some tentative indications of the recently ordered Russian general mobilization, plus hard news of previous more limited Russian steps. In any event, the basic point is that when major Russian military preparations became known in Berlin, German diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Austria ended. For prompt German resort to war was then necessary, if the German military were to discharge their responsibility under the agreed war plan. A German ultimatum was sent to Russia the following day threatening her with war if she did not stop mobilization. When she refused, Germany declared war on Serbia, Russia and France, and directed her main armies against France, as per the Schlieffen Plan.

In theory, there was nothing to prevent Germany from changing that plan at the last minute, in order to avoid war and continue negotiations, despite the Russian mobilization. In practice, so many complex details were geared to the plan as to make the military pressures for holding to it very hard to resist. As the Chief of Staff said to the Kaiser when Wilhelm proposed another last-minute shift: "Such a change would bring to the frontier not an army ready to fight but a confused and disordered mass of armed men."

Thus, German military planning, by focusing only on the unlikely threat of premeditated war, made it difficult to deal with an Austro-Serbian crisis without rapid escalation into general war.

III

The same point—the need for realistic military planning—is underlined if we look at another case. After World War I, the French Government had to determine what military posture would best serve its political interests in Europe. When the ques-

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tion arose as to where the most likely threat to those interests lay, the French decided it, as Justice Brandeis would say, without answering it. They decided it by determining that the peacetime French army would consist only of cadres, which could not be operationally effective until their units were fleshed out by general mobilization. This, in turn, was a measure so vast in its impact on French national life that no government was likely to contemplate it, except in defense of France itself. Thus France could exert its power effectively only in response to a single contingency: direct invasion. As R. A. C. Parker pointed out in his discerning study of the Rhineland crisis in *World Politics:* "The French Army, indeed, had made plans since 1919 on the assumption that no action would be required of it in Europe short of a full-scale war."

In 1924, Paul Reynaud, then a rising politician, published an article entitled, "Do We Have the Army of Our Needs or Our Habits?" He argued that the real threat was not German invasion of France, but rather lesser violations by Germany of the Versailles Treaty, *e.g.* Germany's breaking the ceiling on its armaments or attacking its eastern neighbors. France needed, he suggested, a mobile standing army which could take the offensive quickly to right such violations. A conscript army could not meet this need, since the initial Treaty violations might be too ambiguous to justify such a massive measure as general mobilization.

His warnings met no echo until 1934, when a young and promising officer (then a protégé of Pétain), Lt. Col. Charles de Gaulle, published his book, "Vers l'Armée du Metier." This brilliant work translated Reynaud's general concept into a specific proposal—an all-professional armored force. In 1935 de Gaulle called on Reynaud, then a Deputy, and persuaded him to lay the proposal before the Chamber. When Reynaud did so in the debate of March 15, 1935, government spokesmen maintained that the existing military posture would meet the only real threat, invasion of France, and that there was no need to incur the expense of creating other forces as well. The Minister of Defense, General Maurin, concluded the debate: "The government, at least in my person, knows perfectly its plan of war."

The test of that plan was posed on Saturday, March 7, 1936. At dawn German troops occupied the Rhineland in defiance of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, proving Reynaud and de Gaulle right in their judgment of the threat. At 9:45 a.m.

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the French ministers met. Several demanded immediate action, but no decision was taken. At a second meeting in the early evening, it was decided to recall men on leave and order covering units up to the border.

On the following morning, Sunday, the Cabinet and the President of the Republic met in the decisive conference at 10 o'clock. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister both seemed to lean, in varying degrees, toward French military entry into the Rhineland. Then the Minister of Defense, the same General Maurin, lowered the boom. To move effectively, he demanded general mobilization. "To resort to general mobilization only six weeks before the election would be folly," one startled minister exclaimed. Another made the point more clearly: "We would be swept out of Parliament." Paul-Boncour, who was there, comments wisely that to ask for general mobilization to chase the few detachments Hitler had sent into the Rhineland was to terrorize the Council of Ministers and public opinion.

The political infeasibility of such a massive measure as general mobilization to deal with anything short of deliberate attack on France became evident. But Maurin insisted that to act he needed "the white posters, that is to say total mobilization." One minister, at least, was astonished at "the disproportion between the measure proposed and the operation in question."

The Prime Minister telephoned the Chief of Staff, General Gamelin. The General was confident that he could clean out the Rhineland, but to do this, he confirmed, he needed the means; and the means could be secured only through general mobilization. The reason, of course, was that an army of cadres could only move if those cadres were filled out by calling up reservists. Again, a prior decision on force structure proved irreversible in time of crisis. Faced with a choice between general mobilization and doing nothing, the Cabinet did nothing.

From then on, the story takes a melancholy turn. On March 10, the government read a declaration to the Chamber indicating that France would act only if her allies—notably Britain—went along. This was little but rationalization for inaction. As Churchill remarks in his memoirs, it was evident then that the only way to pull Britain along was for France to be willing to go ahead without her.

On March 11, Gamelin and Maurin responded formally to the government's earlier request for a study of possibilities for

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limited action. They suggested steps which were not only limited but irrelevant: either Franco-Belgian occupation of Luxembourg with that country's consent, or an advance to a maximum depth of six miles, on a front of only 24 miles, into the Saar—leaving the overwhelming part of the formerly demilitarized Rhineland under German military occupation. Even these steps would require mobilization of over a million men, and, if Germany resisted, general mobilization would have to follow immediately. On that same day Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin departed for London, where the lack of British interest put an end to what was becoming an increasingly academic discussion.

We now know that if the French had moved into the Rhineland, Hitler would probably have withdrawn. He had apparently so decided beforehand, under pressure from his generals. And, in this event, the deterrence to further German aggression would have been very strong indeed.

The French *could* have moved if their prior planning had been based on a sound assessment of the contingencies that were most likely to arise, and if their force structure had been geared to these contingencies. Whether they *would* have moved is harder to say, for there was little public or parliamentary support. But some of the ministers saw the issue as it was. The most one can say is that there would have been a greater likelihood of action; if nothing else, the dependence on general mobilization gave the Cabinet a pretext for inaction.

Indeed, it is just barely possible that the mere existence of a mobile professional French army which was clearly designed to enforce the Treaty, and ready to move at a moment's notice, would have deterred Hitler from going into the Rhineland in the first place. As General Hering, who commanded at Strasbourg in 1936, wrote ten years later: "The situation would have been entirely different if we had, in peacetime, disposed of an assault force of a hundred thousand or so men, ready to march at the first signal." But, by defining the threat too simply, the French denied themselves this option.

IV

NATO's political and military position is obviously very different from that of Germany in 1914 or France in 1936. But NATO could none the less make a mistake not unlike the one made by prewar German and French military planners, if its

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conventional forces became little more than a trip-wire to trigger nuclear retaliation. This change is sometimes suggested, in public and press discussion of NATO's future, as a means of reducing military budgets, while deterring deliberate Russian attack—either on a massive or a limited scale.

The risk of deliberate attack will remain so long as massive Soviet forces are at hand. But now, as before 1914, there is also the danger of unpremeditated conflict. Now, as then, that danger arises out of instability in Central Europe. Whereas in 1914, it was the disaffection of Slavs under German rule in Austria which helped to create that instability, today it is the disaffection of millions of Germans under Soviet rule in East Germany. As evolution proceeds elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the dangers to peace posed by Ulbricht's still rigid rule in East Germany may grow.

The problem is compounded by the existence of an isolated beacon of freedom in West Berlin, 100 miles deep in Communist territory. The several Berlin crises through which we have passed suggest that its vulnerable communication lines could be a tempting target (as Serbia was in 1914) for rulers hoping to meet insoluble domestic problems by striking at external influences that seemed to exacerbate these problems. If a Berlin crisis should some day lead to a local clash, this might trigger the very disorders the Soviets hope to avoid.

We need a NATO force structure which would permit us to deal with these possible forms of unintended conflict in ways that would fulfill the interests of all the allies, and with minimum risk of escalation. A trip-wire would, very clearly, not meet this need. A more substantial and flexible force structure is needed not only to cope with these contingencies, but to deter them. The Communists might not expect an instant massive Western nuclear response to the more ambiguous forms of pressure on Berlin's communications lines, for the same reasons that Hitler did not fear French general mobilization in 1936—the apparent disproportion between the threat and the proposed response. If, however, the Soviets see at hand a Western capacity for action on a more limited scale, they will take more seriously the possibility of an instant and effective Western response.

Now, as in 1936, however, the maintenance of an effective deterrent force will be prevented if the West proceeds from an unduly narrow assessment of the threat to an unduly narrow

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estimate of needed capabilities—if, in other words, it judges that the only threat is deliberate attack and that it does not need forces for deterring or dealing with other contingencies.

NATO now has substantial forces on the central front which can serve these purposes. We must resist the temptation, in the face of a diminishing threat of deliberate attack, to believe that such forces are not needed. We must not deprive ourselves of the "assault force, ready to march at the first signal," that General Hering found so sadly wanting in 1936.

Unintended conflict is not, of course, the only contingency that NATO needs to be able to handle. It requires a powerful nuclear and non-nuclear capability for dealing with deliberate aggression in various forms. It must be able to defend against such aggression promptly and with whatever weapons are needed to maintain the territorial integrity of countries under attack. What it needs, in short, is what Germany and France lacked before World Wars I and II: sufficient flexibility to respond to a wide variety of contingencies with means suited to each. NATO will be most likely to maintain this flexibility if, unlike prewar German and French planners, we assess realistically the kinds of threats that have to be faced before fixing our strategy and force structure.

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CUBA AND PEARL HARBOR: HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT

By Roberta Wohlstetter

TO recall the atmosphere of September and October 1962 now seems almost as difficult as to recreate the weeks, more than two decades earlier, before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But if we are to understand the onset of the Cuban missile crisis, it is worth the effort. Indeed we may learn something about the problems of foreseeing and forestalling or, at any rate, diminishing the severity of such crises by examining side by side the preludes to both these major turning points in American history. In juxtaposing these temporally separate events, our interest is in understanding rather than in drama. We would like to know not only how we felt, but what we did and what we might have done, and in particular what we knew or what we could have known before each crisis.

Afterthoughts come naturally following the first wave of relief and jubilation at having weathered the missile crisis and forced the withdrawal of the missiles. But it is good to keep in mind the obvious contrast with Pearl Harbor. At the least, Pearl Harbor was a catastrophe, a great failure of warning and decision. At the very worst, the missile crisis was a narrow escape. Taken as a whole, however, its outcome must be counted as a success both for the intelligence community and the decision-makers. But a comparison of the failure at Pearl Harbor and the Cuban success reveals a good deal about the basic uncertainties affecting the success and failure of intelligence.

It is true for both Pearl Harbor and Cuba that we had lots of information about the approaching crisis. In discussing this information it will perhaps be useful to distinguish again between signals and noise. By the "signal" of an action is meant a sign, a clue, a piece of evidence that points to the action or to an adversary's intention to undertake it, and by "noise" is meant the background of irrelevant or inconsistent signals, signs pointing in the wrong directions, that tend always to obscure the signs pointing the right way. Pearl Harbor, looked at closely and objectively, shows how hard it is to hear a signal against the prevailing noise, in particular when you are listening for the wrong signal, and even when you have a wealth of information. (Or perhaps especially then. There are clearly cases when riches can be embarrassing.)

After the event, of course, we know: like the detective-story reader who turns to the last page first, we find it easy to pick out the clues. And a close look at the historiography of Pearl Harbor suggests that in most accounts, memories of the noise and background confusion have faded quickly, leaving the actual signals of the crisis standing out in bold relief, stark and preternaturally clear.

After the crisis, memories fade and recriminations take their place. For a time the Cuban missile crisis figured as an outstanding triumph for the United States—in the swift discovery of "hard evidence," in the retention of Ameri-

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can initiative, in the strict security maintained and in the taut control of power by the Executive Committee. Today, some of these aspects of the Cuban crisis have been thrown into doubt, and in particular, critics talk of a significant intelligence failure in anticipating the crisis. In both Pearl Harbor and Cuba the notion of a conspiracy of silence has been raised, the suggestion that we knew all along and failed to act, that Kennedy, like Roosevelt, had some special information which he withheld, or that information was so obvious that even a layman could have interpreted it correctly.

New York's Senator Keating, for example, was explicit and articulate in insisting that he believed long-range or medium-range missiles and Soviet combat troops were in Cuba as early as August. On August 31 he said in the Senate that he had reliable information on landings between August 3 and August 15 at the Cuban port of Mariel of 1200 troops wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms. He also reported that "other observers" had noted "Soviet motor convoys moving on Cuban roads in military formation," the presence of landing craft, and of suspicious cylindrical objects that had to be transported on two flatcars, and so on. He claimed that his statements had been verified by official sources within the U.S. Government. Between August 31 and October 12 he made ten Senate speeches warning of the Soviet military build-up.

After the crisis, Congressmen naturally wondered why we had not listened to Senator Keating, why it was possible to have had these warnings and many others and still be surprised on October 15. But failures to foresee and to forestall catastrophes are by no means abnormal. Military men and statesmen have no monopoly on being taken by surprise. The example of the Dallas police department springs to mind, and the murder of Oswald which gave rise, like Pearl Harbor, to rumors of conspiracy in high places and in local governments. Nor are American businessmen and financiers immune. Witness the $150 million De Angelis vegetable-oil scandal, where normally cautious bankers suddenly found they were holding empty storage tanks as security for their loans.

Conspiracy with the culprit, however, is hardly a universal line of explanation, as is suggested by a recent natural catastrophe—the earthquake in and near Alaska that sent a tidal wave to shatter the northern shore of California and caught some towns unprepared in spite of timely warnings. For the warnings sounded just like many others in the past that had not been followed by tidal waves. These are all American examples, but Singapore, "Barbarossa" (the German attack on Russia) and many others suggest that we are not dealing with a purely national susceptibility to surprise.

II

Defense departments and intelligence agencies, of course, continually estimate what an opponent can do, may do, intends to do. They try to gauge the technical limits within which he is operating, to determine his usual ways of behavior, under what conditions he will probe, push or withdraw. They try to measure what risks he will take, and how he might estimate the risks to us of countering him. Much of this work by American analysts is sound, thorough, intelligent, frequently ingenious and sometimes brilliant—but not infallible. Unhappily, any of these estimates may be partly, but critically, wrong. A wealth of information is never enough.

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To get a rapid idea of the mass of data available for predicting the Cuban crisis and the Pearl Harbor attack, let us run through the main intelligence sources. In the case of Cuba, there was first of all magnificent photographic coverage as well as visual reconnaissance. The Navy ran air reconnaissance of all ships going in and out of Cuba, especially ships originating in Soviet or satellite ports during the summer of 1962, and intensified this sort of coverage during September. High-level photographic reconnaissance by U-2s over the island of Cuba was taking place at the rate of one flight every two weeks until the month of September, when it increased to once a week.[1] Low-level photographic reconnaissance began only after the President's speech of October 22—the first being on October 23. In addition to photography, we had voluminous accounts from Cuban refugees who were leaving the island in a steady stream. We had agents stationed on the island who were reporting, and we were listening to radio broadcasts from Cuba. The Cuban press, while carefully controlled, was making some announcements which are interesting in retrospect. A number of European correspondents stationed on the island were reporting to their newspapers, though the American press was not welcome.

Finally, but by no means least, we had Castro's pronouncements. His casual interviews with reporters, debates with students, interrogations of prisoners, and nearly interminable television speeches offer a rich fount of information. If you wait long enough, it seems, Castro will tell you everything. The only problem in a crisis is that you may not be able to wait that long. Castro is noted for his slyness, and he is perhaps better able than most Cubans to keep a secret. But sometimes he cannot resist hints that may reveal a trap before his victim falls into it. And often in real rather than calculated anger he will show his hand.

For predicting the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States Government had an equally impressive array of intelligence sources. Though aerial surveillance of the Japanese fleet was limited, the Navy had developed a system of pinpointing the location of ships and deducing their types by radio-traffic analysis. This was accomplished by analyzing the call signs of various ships, even though we could not read the content of the messages. Any change in call signs was in itself a cause for alarm, and it took usually several weeks of close listening to an enormous amount of traffic to re-identify the call signs. Call signs were changed on November 1, 1941, and again on December 1. We had not identified the new ones by December 7.

While we had not broken any military codes, we did have one superlative source that is perhaps comparable to the evidence provided by U-2 photography. That was the breaking of the top-priority Japanese diplomatic code, known as MAGIC, as well as some less complicated codes used by Japanese consular observers. We were listening in on diplomatic messages on all the major Tokyo circuits—to Rome, Berlin, London, Washington and so on. Colonel Friedman, an Army cryptographer, had devised a machine for rapidly decoding these messages, so that, in general, we knew what a message said before its intended Japanese recipients. Our ground observers, stationed in

[1] Flights over the island took place on September 5, 17, 26, 29, October 5, 7 and 14. The irregularity is attributed to bad weather.

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key ports along the coast of China and Southeast Asia, were reporting in by radio.

Ambassador Grew and his Embassy staff in Tokyo were experienced observers of local economic and political activities. Grew himself had a very sound estimate of Japanese character and diplomacy, but as Japanese censorship closed in during the last few weeks before the attack, Grew had to warn Washington that he was unable to report accurately on any military preparations then under way. American newspaper correspondents in Japan were also quite well informed and shrewd in their reporting. In addition to our own sources, we exchanged information with British intelligence. At that date, our own intelligence officers did not trust British intelligence fully. They expressed a certain amount of unease over British methods of picking up information, which they regarded as sophisticated but underhanded. As General Sherman Miles put it, U. S. intelligence preferred to be "above board." However, the British provided us with some good leads and lots of corroborative information. And there was, of course, the Japanese press, which proclaimed Japan's undying hostility to the American presence in Asia, and announced with increasing violence the Japanese intention to expand to the south.

In sum, for each of the two crises there was plenty of information suggesting its advent. Even though Cuba is a closed society, and even though Japan, in the last weeks, was under heavy censorship and tight security, the data provided by U. S. intelligence agencies were excellent. Once more, then, we come to the question, what went wrong? With all these data, why didn't we know that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor on December 7? Why, when it seems so clear in retrospect, didn't we anticipate that Khrushchev might put medium-range missiles into Cuba? Why didn't we seize the first indications that such installations were on the way? Weren't these early signs clear enough?

Unfortunately, they were not, and almost never are. Even with hindsight, we are not able to reconstruct the exact sequence of events that led to the Cuban missile crisis. Most of our sources are alive, and some of them are talking. But what can we say with certainty about Cuban and Soviet motives? Castro, for example, has spoken on many occasions about why missiles were put into Cuba. But he swings between the view that he requested them and the view that Khrushchev suggested the idea and that he, Castro, felt so indebted economically he had to accept. He has mentioned two motives—one, defense against an American invasion that he believed was imminent, and the other, the need to advance the international cause of socialism, which implied that the missiles were for offense as well as defense. Khrushchev's story is more consistent, but also more "official": he cites only the need to help Cuba prepare against an American invasion. But of course for active Cuban defense, long-range missiles are not necessary. Speculation on Soviet and Cuban motives still continues.

With hindsight, we can look back now and see that during the crisis there were naturally many confusions embedded in the mass of intelligence reports. A report of a "missile" might refer to a surface-to-air missile which is approximately 30 feet long, to the nose cone of a surface-to-surface missile which is about 14 feet long, to its body which is almost 60 feet long, or to a fuel

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storage tank. Or perhaps it might just represent the imagination of an excited Cuban refugee. Most of these objects were seen at night through closed shutters and in motion. Visual observation, except by a highly trained observer, was not likely to be accurate even as to the length of the object. And Senator Keating did not act altogether responsibly in perpetuating this confusion centering around the word "missile." He was right when he described the total build-up as alarming, but he was proceeding beyond the evidence in suggesting, as he did, that he had positive proof of the presence of medium-range missiles,[2] and of the capability for rapid transformation of surface-to-air missiles into medium-range surface-to-surface missiles.

Or take the presence of Soviet combat troops. President Kennedy's critics noted after the crisis that in his October 22 speech he made no mention of combat troops in Cuba, although the American public was later informed of their presence. Actually, Soviet troops, organized into four regimental units, totaled approximately 5,000 men. They were located at four different spots, two near Havana, one in Central Cuba and one in Eastern Cuba. They were equipped with modern Soviet ground-force fighting equipment, including battlefield rocket launchers similar to the American "Honest John." This equipment, along with the accompanying barracks and tent installations, was not identifiable, or at least was not identified, until we started photographing at low level. For this reason, President Kennedy made no demand about removal of troops on October 22, but kept to the colorless term, "Soviet technicians." While U-2 photography is almost as magical as the MAGIC code at the time of Pearl Harbor, like the code, it is limited; it cannot reveal all.

III

For the layman, the feeling persists that there must be some marvelous source that will provide a single signal, a clear tip-off that will alert the American forces and tell them exactly what to do. Unfortunately, there is no instance where such a tip-off arrived in time, except perhaps in the Philippines in 1941, when General MacArthur had a minimum of nine hours' warning between his knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack and the initial Japanese assault on his own forces. The news of the attack on Pearl Harbor clearly did not tell him what alert posture to take, since his planes were found by the Japanese attackers in formation, wing-tip to wing-tip on their bases.

Instead we must wait for a number of signals to converge in the formation of a single hypothesis about the intentions and actions of an opponent. This is a necessary but slow process. In 1962, for example, General Carroll, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, became suspicious of Soviet activities on the basis of several pieces of data from different sources. According to Secretary McNamara's testimony,

> . . . [Carroll] had had thousands of reports like this. What gradually formed in his mind was a hypothesis based on the integration of three or four pieces of

[2] See testimony, September 17, 1962: United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, *Situation in Cuba,* 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, p. 7, 12; *U. S. News and World Report,* November 19, 1962 (distributed week of November 12), p. 87; and speech to the Senate, October 12, 1962.

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evidence, one of which was not a report at all, one of which was a recognition through photographic analysis that a SAM (surface-to-air missile) site appeared to be in a rather unusual place. . . . Gradually over a period of time—I do not know over what period of time—but sometime between the 18th of September and the 14th of October, there was formulated in his mind a hypothesis specifically that there was the possibility of a Soviet ballistic missile installation in a particular area, a hypothesis that had been formulated previously and had been tested previously and found to be in error with respect to other locations.

His only action here—I think quite properly his only action here—was to test that hypothesis, to submit it to the targeting group that targets the reconnaissance missions, and place that target on the track for the next reconnaissance mission, which was the October 14 mission.[3]

This period of time from September 18 to October 14 is not long for the crystallization of a hypothesis.[4] It is long only in relation to the speed of the missile installation. This sort of time difference is a perpetually agonizing aspect of intelligence interpretation. Collection, checking of sources and interpreting all take time. There is always delay between the intelligence source and the evaluation center, and between the center and the final report to the decision-maker. Even then, the decision-maker may merely request more information before taking action. In the meantime, the opponent moves forward.

In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, there were delays in the identification of surface-to-air missiles. From July 29 to August 5, Cuban refugees reported that "an unusual number of ships" unloaded cargo and passengers at the ports of Havana and Mariel. All Cubans were excluded from the dock. By August 14 these reports reached U. S. intelligence agencies, which the next day requested U-2 photo coverage of the suspect areas. On August 29 the flight was made. From the first visual observation on July 29 to the overflight on August 29 a full month passed.

This August 29 flight turned up the first hard evidence of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba. During September, surveillance flights seem to have been stepped up: the U-2 flew on September 5, 17, 26, 29, and on October 5, 7 and 14. On the September 5 flight, which took in the San Cristobal area a hundred miles east of Havana, the photographs showed no evidence of medium-range missiles. A flight scheduled for September 10 was canceled, perhaps because a U-2 had been shot down over Red China the previous day. According to the American press, all U-2 flights stopped while the United States waited for the world reaction.

Secretary McNamara testified that available evidence indicated the first landing of mobile M.R.B.M.s occurred on September 8, and that construction of the sites did not begin before September 15 to 20. It is possible that September 10 photography might have shown some activity at the San Cristobal site. The September 17 flight was of little use because cloud cover

[3] U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 45–46. These hearings contain most of the intelligence data cited in this article.

[4] According to Roger Hilsman, the request for a U-2 flight covering the western end of the island was made on October 4—ten days before the flight was actually made. "The Cuban Crisis: How Close We Were to War," *Look*, August 25, 1964, p. 18.

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obscured the areas photographed. However, between September 18 and 21 further Cuban reports came to U. S. intelligence, and these were evaluated on September 27. They eventually led to the flight on October 14, again over San Cristobal. This flight produced the first reliable evidence of medium-range missiles on the island.

In spite of the frequency of the U-2 flights, there is a lag of 33 days from the first visual observation made by a Cuban exile on September 8, and reported on September 9, to October 14, the day that hard evidence was obtained. There is a lag of 39 days between September 5 and October 14, during which no flights covered the San Cristobal area. This gap in coverage was not apparent until some inquiring Congressmen pressed their cross-examination. When William Minshall of Ohio asserted that the U-2 flights had been covering the wrong end of the island, General Carroll pointed out that it was necessary to cover the eastern and central portions also. Secretary McNamara supported him by pointing out that the September 5 flight over San Cristobal "showed absolutely no activity whatsoever." He also recalled that this was the hurricane season, "and the weather in that part of the Caribbean is very bad. We had a number of flights canceled during that period." Mr. Minshall then produced the official weather report showing clear days in the vicinity of Havana, and said that "the weather from September 25 to October 2, at least at 7:00 in the morning, was generally clear." No one pointed out at that time that weather forecasts, not actual weather, determined the schedule of U-2 flights.

Photographic coverage, then, was apparently being scheduled on the assumption that any Soviet construction would proceed at a pace which might be considered rapid according to our own experience in installing similar equipment. Secretary McNamara repeated several times that there was no missile construction activity in the Havana area on September 5, as if this, coupled with the pressing need to get clear pictures of other parts of the island, were sufficient reason for not covering the area again until October 14. This judgment, with hindsight, may have been correct, but in the absence of the full intelligence picture the layman can only wonder why it was not possible to cover more than one section of the island on a single U-2 sortie, or why it was not possible to make several simultaneous sorties when good weather prevailed. Perhaps Secretary McNamara's statement, made under pressure of Mr. Minshall's criticism, to the effect that "we were facing surface-to-air missile systems that might be coming into operation," indicates that the flight schedule was sensitive to the political atmosphere. The fact is that there *were* increasing dangers to our pilots as the SAM sites became operational. With the Republicans now in opposition, it was easy for some of them to forget the extreme embarrassment of the Eisenhower régime at the shooting down of the U-2 over the Soviet Union in 1960 and the collapse of the Paris summit that followed. Certainly after the publicity given to the U-2 shot down over Red China on September 9, the United States would not want to lose such a plane over Cuba. U-2 planes are never armed; and the August 29 flight had showed surface-to-air missile installations in western Cuba.

Naval photography shows a somewhat similar gap. Photographs of the crates containing IL-28 bombers were taken on September 28 but not

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evaluated until October 9, and not disseminated until October 10. This identification of bombers capable of carrying a nuclear or non-nuclear payload of 6,000 pounds and with a combat radius of about 700 nautical miles[5] came together with a report of October 15 evaluating the U-2 photographs of M.R.B.M.s.

This sort of delay can easily be paralleled in the Pearl Harbor intelligence picture. In the handling of the coded messages, there was inevitably a delay —from interception of the message at the intercept station through transmission to the decoding center in Washington, determination of priority in handling, assignment for full decoding, assignment for translation and the actual translation, to final delivery to the approved list of recipients. The longest delay recorded in the Congressional hearings is 54 days between interception and translation. Part of the delay is a function of the time necessary for transmission. Part of the delay comes from checking the accuracy of the reports, which is necessary for responsible decision. But these delays in response must all be seen against the forward march of events.

In Cuba, the rapidity of the Russians' installation was in effect a logistical surprise comparable to the technological surprise at the time of Pearl Harbor. Before September 1962 we were scheduling U-2 flights approximately two weeks apart, because we couldn't believe that capabilities could change significantly within a shorter period. But Secretary McNamara testified in his first background briefing (October 22) that the medium-range mobile missiles were planned to have a capability to be de-activated, moved, re-activated on a new site and ready for operation within a period of about six days. The Stennis Report, which reviewed the entire intelligence operation, refers to "a matter of hours."[6] In one instance, between two sets of photographs separated by less than 24 hours, there was an increase of 50 percent in the amount of equipment visible. On the date of withdrawal, October 28, the medium-range missiles were fully operational. Intelligence estimates set December 15 as the outside date for the non-mobile I.R.B.M.s to be operational.

This kind of technological or logistical surprise may be either a secret so carefully guarded that it doesn't reach our intelligence agencies until after the event; or it may happen too swiftly, too near the outbreak of the crisis, to be transmitted and evaluated in time. In the case of Pearl Harbor, there were two technological changes that failed to reach either the intelligence agencies or the commanding officers who needed the information: (1) that the Japanese had fitted fins to their torpedoes which would permit bombing in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor; and (2) that the combat radius of the Zero fighter plane had been stretched to 500 statute miles, making possible aerial attack on the Philippines from Formosa. Both of these developments came to fruition only a few weeks before Pearl Harbor.

[5] According to W. W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy,* Harper & Row, 1964, p. 270. According to John Hughes, Special Assistant to General Carroll, "about 600 nautical miles," *Hearings,* p. 15.

[6] U. S., Congress, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Investigations of the Preparedness Program, Interim Report on Cuban Military Build-Up,* 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 3.

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IV

Besides technological surprise and the inevitable physical delays involved in transmission and checking, there are more subtle obstacles to accurate perception of signals. First, there is the "cry-wolf" phenomenon. Admiral Stark actually used this phrase in deciding not to send Admiral Kimmel any further warnings about the Japanese. An excess of warnings which turn out to be false alarms always induces a kind of fatigue, a lessening of sensitivity. Admiral Kimmel and his staff were tired of checking out Japanese submarine reports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. In the week preceding the attack they had checked out seven, all of which were false.

General Carroll had the same problem with missiles in Cuba. Refugee reports of missiles had been coming in for a year and a half and the first San Cristobal report of September 9 describing that suspect area, later confirmed as harboring medium-range missiles, was "comparable to many other reports . . . similarly received and checked out," and found to reveal not surface-to-surface missiles, but surface-to-air or nothing at all. This history of mistaken observations by the refugees tended to reinforce the feelings of fatigue and disbelief. There was also a justifiable reaction to the fact that refugee exaggerations of anti-Castro ferment in Cuba had not been properly discounted at the time of the Bay of Pigs, and that their self-interest in wanting to return to Cuba had not been properly weighed. This background increased the reluctance of the intelligence agencies to credit their reports without careful verification. Besides the refugees, members of the Congressional opposition were also using exaggeration and pressure, because they had an interest in overstating provocation in order to indicate laxness on the Administration's part. Senator Keating claimed to have hard evidence at a time when, it seems, such evidence did not exist. Opposition pressure tended to evoke a natural counter-pressure from the Administration, which responded by charging irresponsibility in its critics, and which insisted on caution and the necessity for special evidence before entering on such serious action. In this way the opposition served in some respects as rein rather than simply as spur.

Another obstacle to objective evaluation is the human tendency to see what we want to see or expect to see. The Administration did not want open conflict with the Soviet Union. It was working on a program of trying to relax tensions, of which a test-ban agreement was one important though distant goal. It most definitely did not want an offensive Soviet base in Cuba, in the same way that Zermatt, the famous Swiss ski resort, did not want typhoid fever and refused to acknowledge its existence until epidemic proportions had been reached. Just as President Roosevelt wanted no war in the Far East—no war on two fronts—and didn't want to believe that it could happen, so we didn't want to believe that the Soviets were doing what they were doing.

When this is the background of expectation, it is only natural to ignore small clues that might, in a review of the whole or on a simple count, add up to something significant. For example, the large ships that turned out to be the villains in the Cuban case had especially large covered hatches. They were unloaded at night by Soviet personnel, and all Cubans were excluded from the docks. The contents, whatever they were, were moved at night. The

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decks were loaded with 2½- and 5-ton trucks and cars. But these ships, in transit, had been noted to be riding high in the water. If intelligence analysts in the American community had been more ready to suspect the introduction of strategic missiles, would this information have led them to surmise, before as well as after October 14, that these ships carried "space-consuming [*i.e.* large volume, low density] cargo such as an M.R.B.M."[7] rather than a bulk cargo? Roger Hilsman points out that these vessels had been specially designed for carrying lumber, and "our shipping intelligence experts presumably deduced that lumbering ships could be more easily spared than others." "We knew," Hilsman writes, "that the Soviets had had some trouble finding the ships they needed to send their aid to Cuba."[8] This is a good illustration of the way we can adjust (without doing violence to the facts) a disturbing or unusual observation to "save" a theory—in this case that the Soviets would not send strategic missiles to Cuba.

Our estimate of Soviet behavior included, of course, some expectation of how the Russians would react to what we were telling them, to our warnings in words and acts. However, we overestimated the clarity of our signals. General Maxwell Taylor had visited Florida bases on August 25 with a great deal of publicity. Naval reconnaissance of ships approaching Cuba had been stepped up to the point where U. S. planes were shot at by nervous Cubans on September 2. Castro reacted with great restraint in commenting on this incident—a fact which might in itself have been thought suspicious. But above all, on September 4, President Kennedy announced the installation of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba which had been confirmed by the photographs of August 29. He said with the greatest care that we would not tolerate an offensive base or the installation of missiles capable of reaching U. S. territory. He made the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, and he did this publicly in a way that put him on the spot. To anyone familiar with the workings of the American political system, this should have indicated that we were "contracting-in." The President was deliberately engaging his own prestige and that of the country. He was reacting to the Republicans as well as to Castro. He was justifying not acting up to a certain point, but making it more likely that he would act beyond that point. In other words, he was drawing a line, and he was making it extremely unlikely that we would back down if that line were crossed. Again on September 13, the President called attention to the firmness of his commitment.

To the official Administration statements, we must add the formal announcements by the opposition party. Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois and Charles Halleck of Indiana, the Republican Congressional leaders, both issued statements on Cuba on September 7. Halleck warned that the increases in armaments and numbers of military technicians supplied by the Soviet Union to Cuba made the situation there "worse from the point of view of our own vital interests and the security of this country." Senator Dirksen invoked the Monroe Doctrine and defined current Soviet military aid to Cuba as a violation of that doctrine. He pointed out that, in view of our treaty

[7] "Department of Defense, Special Cuba Briefing by the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, State Department Auditorium, 5:00 p.m., February 6, 1963." A verbatim transcript of a presentation actually made by General Carroll's assistant, John Hughes.

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 18

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commitments, either the Organization of American States should immediately agree on a course of action or, quoting President Kennedy's speech of April 20, 1961, the United States should act on its own, "if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration."

American elections and their accompanying distractions have been the subject of world-wide speculation and concern. Yet they are not always easy for an outsider to understand. These protests from the opposition were taking place in a setting of pre-election debate, and Khrushchev may have hoped to exploit that fact. He may not have been aware that the alarm expressed by the Republicans was something President Kennedy could not ignore. In addition to explicit proposals and resolutions about the Monroe Doctrine, there was the President's request for Congressional authorization to call up 150,000 reserves. This action too should have been a warning signal; it did trigger a Soviet reassurance that Moscow had no need for an offensive base in Cuba. However, the Soviets did not find these warnings weighty enough to reverse their plans for installation.

V

Another major barrier to an objective U. S. evaluation of the data was our own estimate of Soviet behavior. The Stennis Report isolated as one "substantial" error in evaluation "the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba."[9] Khrushchev had never put medium- or long-range missiles in any satellite country and therefore, it was reasoned, he certainly would not put them on an island 9,000 miles away from the Soviet Union, and only 90 miles away from the United States, when this was bound to provoke a sharp American reaction.

In considering this estimate of Soviet behavior, let us remember that the intelligence community was not alone. It had plenty of support from Soviet experts, inside and outside the Government. At any rate, no articulate expert now claims the role of Cassandra. Once a predisposition about the opponent's behavior becomes settled, it is very hard to shake. In this case, it was reinforced not only by expert authority but also by the knowledge both conscious and unconscious that the White House had set down a policy for relaxation of tension with the East. This policy background was much more subtle in its influence than documents or diplomatic experience. For when an official policy or hypothesis is laid down, it tends to obscure alternative hypotheses, and to lead to overemphasis of the data that support it, particularly in a situation of increasing tension, when it is important not to "rock the boat."

In the case of Pearl Harbor, there was a concentration on Atlantic and European affairs, which led to a kind of neglect of, or tendency to ignore, Far Eastern signals, and to a policy of staving off the outbreak of a Pacific war as long as possible. In the last months especially, this tendency was combined with a desire to avoid incidents. The wording of the final warning messages to the Army and Navy reflected this concern:

If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

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commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. . . . Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.[10]

These directives have been frequently characterized as "do-don't."

Another attempt to avoid incidents was the Navy order of October 17 to re-route all trans-Pacific shipping to and from the Far East through the Torres Straits (between New Guinea and Australia), thus clearing the sea lanes to the north and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. This order followed a warning of possible hostile action by Japan against U.S. merchant shipping. We avoided any incidents in these sea lanes, and at the same time we cut off the possibility of visual observation of the Japanese task force bound for Pearl Harbor.

In the autumn of 1962, pursuing a policy of reducing tension, the Kennedy Administration made very little allowance for deception in Soviet statements, for false reassurances that would quiet justifiable American fears. On September 2, TASS published a joint communiqué on Soviet military aid to Cuba, referring to the August 27 visit to Moscow of Che Guevara and Emilio Aragones. The Soviet Government announced assistance in metallurgical work and the sending of technical specialists in agriculture to Cuba. They added that

views were also exchanged in connection with threats of aggressive imperialist quarters with regard to Cuba. In view of these threats the government of the Cuban Republic addressed the Soviet government with a request for help by delivering armaments and sending technical specialists for training Cuban servicemen.

The Soviet government tentatively considered this request of the government of Cuba. An agreement was reached on this question. As long as the above-mentioned quarters continue threatening Cuba, the Cuban Republic has every justification for taking necessary measures to insure its security and safeguard its sovereignty and independence, while all Cuba's true friends have every right to respond to this legitimate request.[11]

This was reassuring in a negative understated way: it limited military aid to vague "armaments" and "technical specialists." On September 11, in response to the President's request to call up reserves, a higher-keyed, if not hysterical, pronouncement was issued by TASS. This started with an attack on "bellicose-minded reactionary elements" and "the provocations the United States Government is now staging, provocations which might plunge the world into disaster of a universal world war with the use of thermonuclear weapons." In the U.S. Congress and in the American press, the Soviet Government claimed, an unbridled propaganda campaign was calling for an attack on Cuba and on Soviet ships "carrying the necessary commodities and food to the Cuban people." "Little heroic Cuba" was pictured as at the mercy of American imperialists, who were alarmed by the failure of their economic

[10] U. S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, Part 14, p. 1407.

[11] *The New York Times*, September 3, 1962.

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blockade and calling for measures to strangle her. Particularly serious was the President's action in asking Congress' permission to call up 150,000 reservists. The statement then embarked on a series of jeers at the ridiculous fears of the American imperialists. The peace-loving Soviet Union was sending agronomists, machine-operators, tractor-drivers and livestock experts to Cuba to share their experience and knowledge and to help the Cubans master Soviet farm machinery.

> What could have alarmed the American leaders? What is the reason for this Devil's Sabbath? . . . Gentlemen, you are evidently so frightened you're afraid of your own shadow. . . . It seems to you some hordes are moving to Cuba when potatoes or oil, tractors, harvesters, combines, and other farming industrial machinery are carried to Cuba to maintain the Cuban economy. We can say to these people that these are our ships and that what we carry in them is no business of theirs. . . . We can say, quoting a popular saying: "Don't butt your noses where you oughtn't." But we do not hide from the world public that we really are supplying Cuba with industrial equipment and goods which are helping to strengthen her economy.[12]

A bit farther on, having had its fun, TASS recalled that "a certain amount of armaments is also being shipped from the Soviet Union to Cuba" and that Soviet military specialists had also been requested by the Government of Cuba. However, the number of Soviet military specialists sent to Cuba "can in no way be compared to the number of workers in agriculture and industry sent there. The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes and the President of the United States and the American military just [like] the military of any country know what means of defense are." The statement went on to imply that any threat to the United States was a figment of the American imagination. The major reassurance then followed:

> The Government of the Soviet Union also authorized TASS to state that there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. We have said and we do repeat that if war is unleashed, if the aggressor makes an attack on one state or another and this state asks for assistance, the Soviet Union has the possibility from its own territory to render assistance to any peace-loving state and not only to Cuba. And let no one doubt that the Soviet Union will render such assistance just as it was ready in 1956 to render military assistance to Egypt at the time of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in the Suez Canal region.

This sort of reassurance had also been privately delivered to the President, and the misuse of the private channel apparently shocked President Kennedy as much as the creation of the strategic base in Cuba.

President Kennedy and his staff had believed the Soviet reassurances. Their reaction to what they regarded as deception was one of genuine outrage, for one of the President's basic tenets had been that a state of mutual trust between the great powers was an important part of the problem of relaxing tension. And there is a considerable body of literature which goes farther and

[12] Text of Soviet statement, *The New York Times*, September 12, 1962.

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isolates the attitude of mutual suspicion itself as the central danger today in international relations.

It is a permanent problem of diplomacy to know where to draw the line in extending trust to unfriendly states. A certain amount of healthy suspicion of the opponent's public statements is in order. The President deliberately tested the willingness of Gromyko to lie, after the President knew the truth, but before the Russians knew that he knew. The trap set by the President aroused the indignation of some of those very Americans who urge mutual trust. But the President of the United States would be simple indeed if he did not build his trust cautiously on the basis of many such probings. The Russian performance in the fall and winter of 1962 made it perfectly clear that we cannot take at face value Russian statements—even those made only to the top American leadership in privacy and without those constraints that might be imposed by having the Chinese or other Communist powers or the non-aligned or our own allies listening.

In periods of high tension it is commonly accepted that deception will be an enemy tactic. Before the Pearl Harbor attack Japanese deception was very refined and ingenious. It involved, among other things, giving shore leave to large numbers of Japanese sailors, reinforcing garrisons on the northern border of Manchuria to give an impression of a thrust to the north, issuing false war plans to Japanese commanders and substituting true ones only days before the attack, and on the diplomatic side continuing the appearance of negotiation. For deception is not confined to statements, but must also be translated into actions.

It is important for the enemy's security that he keep his signals quiet. On the Soviet side this meant that all movement on the island of Cuba must take place at night. The Cubans were excluded from the docks and from many of the missile construction areas. Troops were kept below decks, and unloaded equipment was camouflaged or hidden under the trees. On our own side, in the period before October 22, tight security was important to preserve the initiative. And this tight security was maintained through the next few weeks. The members of the group close to the President, known as the Executive Committee or EXCOM, were directly supervising decisions normally left to lower command levels and were doing paper work normally handled by their staffs. This sort of procedure is fine for a couple of weeks, but it means the neglect of other areas of government and, in particular, other areas of foreign policy.[13] Richard Neustadt, a keen observer, reminds us that the Sino-Indian conflict was in progress at the same time, and offers a "lay impression" that "at least one side effect of Cuba" was to tighten the time and narrow the frame of reference of the decision—then in the making—on Skybolt.[14] Under conditions of tight security, there is also a danger that we may keep signals not only from the enemy but also from ourselves. There are a good many who

[13] According to Secretary Rusk, "Senior officers did their own typing; some of my own basic papers were done in my own handwriting, in order to limit the possibility of further spread. . . ." *C.B.S. Reports,* televised interview of Secretary Rusk by David Schoenbrun, November 28, 1962.

[14] U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, *Administration of National Security,* 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, Part 1, p. 97, testimony of March 25, 1963.

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feel that careful study by a wider range of experts might have been useful at the time and would be useful now, particularly with regard to the Kennedy-Khrushchev communications. These, like MAGIC, were very closely held during the crisis and had to be read and interpreted swiftly at the time.

Another set of signs we may have misread or missed were those appearing in official Cuban statements. Castro is so verbose and temperamental that we tend not to listen carefully to his speeches. And his controlled press is so dull that we are equally careless about that. In addition, the policy of embargo and explicit isolation of the island tends to carry over in a curious way to ignoring the voice of Cuban officialdom.

It is interesting now to review the Cuban press of 1962 for clues we might have picked up. After Raul Castro's July visit to Moscow, the warmth of the references to the Soviet Union increased noticeably. Thanks and praise became the order of the day. On September 11, the day of the falsely reassuring TASS statement, the Cuban newspaper *Revolución* underlined the threat of thermonuclear war invoked by TASS. The front page was printed with a single white headline on a black background, and it said: "Rockets Over the United States if Cuba is Invaded." Forcing the Soviet Union's hand in this way had been Cuban policy for some time, so that it was natural for our experts to take this as another instance of Cuban wishful thinking.

Finally, in intelligence work the role of chance, accident and bad luck is always with us. It was bad luck that September–October is the hurricane season in the Caribbean, so that some reconnaissance photography was unclear and certain flights were canceled. It was bad luck that the Red Chinese shot down a U-2 on September 9. In 1941 it was bad luck that we had cut all traffic on the Northwest Passage to Russia, and thereby made visual observation of the Pearl Harbor task force impossible. It was bad luck that there was a radio blackout in the Hawaiian Islands on the morning of December 7, and that Colonel French of the Communications Room then decided to use commercial wire instead of recommending the scrambler telephone for the last alert message.

VI

To sum up then, in both the Pearl Harbor and Cuban crises there was lots of information. But in both cases, regardless of what the Monday morning quarterbacks have to say, the data were ambiguous and incomplete. There was never a single, definitive signal that said, "Get ready, get set, go!" but rather a number of signals which, when put together, tended to crystallize suspicion. The true signals were always embedded in the noise or irrelevance of false ones. Some of this noise was created deliberately by our adversaries, some by chance and some we made ourselves. In addition, our adversary was interested in suppressing the signs of his intent and did what he could to keep his movements quiet. In both cases the element of time also played against us. There were delays between the time information came in, was checked for accuracy, evaluated for its meaning, and made the basis for appropriate action. Many of these delays were only prudent, given the ambiguities and risks of response.

The interpretation of data depends on a lot of things, including our esti-

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mate of the adversary and of his willingness to take risks. To make our lives more complicated, this depends on what he thinks the risks are, which in turn depends on his interpretation of us. We underestimated the risks that the Japanese were willing to take in 1941, and the risks that Khrushchev was willing to take in the summer and fall of 1962. Both the Japanese and the Russians, in turn, underestimated our ultimate willingness to respond.

It is important to understand that the difficulties described are intrinsic. By focusing on misestimated capabilities, dispositions and intentions, we obscure the fact that, without a very large and complex body of assumptions and estimates, the data collected would not speak to us at all. If there were no technological constraints whatsoever—if, for example, a large missile installation could be put in place in an instant—no reconnaissance, no matter how frequent, could provide assurance that we would not at any moment face a massive new adversary. The complex inferences involved in the act of interpreting photographs are made possible only by a large body of assumptions of varying degrees of uncertainty, ranging from principles of optics and Euclidean geometry through technological, economic and political judgments. The inferences from the interpretations themselves in turn are based on an even wider range of uncertain beliefs. But just because a very large body of partially confirmed beliefs and guesses is involved in interpreting a reconnaissance photograph or the observations of a Cuban refugee or intelligence agent, it is possible to interpret the photograph or observations in many differing ways. Our beliefs, as Willard Van Orman Quine has put it, are "underdetermined" by our experience, and they do not face experience separately, statement by statement, but always in mass, as a collection. We have a good deal of freedom as to what statements to adjust in the light of any new and seemingly disturbing report.

An observation or its report does not seize us, then, and force any specific interpretation. This relatively free situation of hypotheses in intelligence is no different in kind from that of hypotheses in the more exact sciences such as physics. A more naïve empiricism once suggested that statements in physics could be refuted definitively by observation, by the result of a crucial experiment. But a great many physicists and students of the logic of science, at least since Pierre Duhem, have shown that even the interpretation of the simplest experiment depends implicitly on comprehensive theories about the measuring instruments and a great deal else. It is always possible therefore to "save" a theory or hypothesis by altering some other one of the large set of our beliefs that connects it with any given observation.

If this is true in the more exact sciences it is most obviously true for the role of observations and their interpretation in such spheres of practical activity as the operation of an intelligence agency, and the inferences and decisions of an executive. Here the assumptions that shape interpretation are likely to be more multifarious and also less explicit and therefore often less tentatively held. This puts it mildly. Some of the relevant assumptions may be held passionately. They are likely to include wishful or self-flattering beliefs, items of national pride or claims at issue in partisan debate. In the case of Japan, some of the critical assumptions concerned technology—the range, speed and manœuvrability of the Zero plane, the supposed inability of

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the Japanese to do any better than the Americans in launching torpedoes in shallow water. In the case of Cuba again some critical assumptions were technological; for example, the minimum time required to put into place and make operational a medium-range ballistic missile. Others concerned the politics and character of the Soviet, Cuban and American leadership and their estimates of each other's willingness to take a chance. Our expectations and prior hypotheses guide our observations and affect their interpretation. It is this prior frame of mind, now changed, that we forget most easily in retrospect. And it is this above all that makes every past surprise nearly unintelligible—and inexplicable except perhaps as criminal folly or conspiracy.

The genuine analogies between Pearl Harbor and Cuba should not obscure the important differences. A study of the Pearl Harbor case makes clear that the problem of getting warning of an impending nuclear raid today is much harder than the problem of detecting the Japanese attack some 20 years ago. It is against this increased difficulty that we must balance improvements in intelligence techniques and organization. But the missile crisis illustrates something else, namely that there are other acts very much short of nuclear war of which we want to be apprised, and here our improved techniques and organization can put us ahead of the game. Action *was* taken during the missile crisis and taken in time to forestall Soviet plans. For while we can never ensure the complete elimination of ambiguity in the signals that come our way, we can energetically take action to reduce their ambiguity, by acquiring information as we did with the U-2. And we can tailor our response to the uncertainties and dangers that remain.

In the Cuban missile crisis action could be taken on ambiguous warning because the action was sliced very thin. After reconnaissance reduced the ambiguity, the response chosen kept to a minimum the actual contact with Russian forces, but a minimum compatible with assuring Khrushchev that we meant business: quarantine, the threat of boarding, the actual boarding of one Lebanese vessel chartered to the Soviet Union. Further, it was a response planned in great detail as the first in a sequence of graded actions that ranged from a build-up of U.S. Army, Marine and Tactical Air Forces in Florida and our southeastern bases to a world-wide alert of the Strategic Air Command. We had been partially prepared for such sequences of action short of nuclear war by the Berlin contingency planning, and this put us in a position to use the warning we had accumulated. If we had had to choose only among much more drastic actions, our hesitation would have been greater.

The problem of warning, then, is inseparable from the problem of decision. We cannot guarantee foresight. But we can improve the chance of acting on signals in time to avert or moderate a disaster. We can do this by a more thorough and sophisticated analysis of observers' reports, by making more explicit and tentative the framework of assumptions into which we must fit any new observations, and by refining, subdividing and making more selective the range of responses we prepare, so that our response may fit the ambiguities of our information and minimize the risks both of error and of inaction. Since the future doubtless holds many more shocks and attempts at surprise, it is comforting to know that we do learn from one crisis to the next.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE RECKONING: THE MEMOIRS OF ANTHONY EDEN, EARL OF AVON. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 716 p. $8.50.

This volume of the former Prime Minister's memoirs covers the climactic period of his career—from his resignation as Foreign Secretary under Neville Chamberlain to the end of the Second World War. While not stylistically on the level of the Churchill memoirs for the same period, they are an indispensable source for the war and the diplomacy of those years, with many items of interest about leading personalities and powers.

UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY. By D. W. Bowett. New York: Praeger (for the David Davies Memorial Institute), 1964, 579 p. $15.00.

A comprehensive discussion, both historical and prescriptive, of the use of U.N. forces in maintaining the peace. The author, an international lawyer, spent two years in the U. N. Secretariat.

ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: FOR A BROADER CONCEPTION OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN EUROPE. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, 208 p. $5.95.

Taking account of recent changes in both Eastern and Western Europe, Professor Brzezinski advocates a policy of "peaceful engagement" involving measures that at once may help to end the partition of Europe and also to relieve certain mounting problems that American policy has been facing in Western Europe.

BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By Ernst B. Haas. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 595 p. $11.50.

An extended inquiry into the prospects and measures for furthering the growth of "mutual deference and institutional mingling" between nations. The International Labor Organization is used as an "empirical whetstone" for the undertaking.

TOWARD WORLD PEACE. By U Thant. New York: Yoseloff, 1964, 404 p. $7.50.

A selection of U Thant's speeches and public statements both as the Permanent Representative of Burma to the U.N. and as Secretary-General.

STATE AND NATION. By Benjamin Akzin. London: Hutchinson, 1964, 214 p. 15/. (New York: Hillary House, distributor, $3.00).

A concise but able study of the relations between state and nation, by a professor of political science and constitutional law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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POWER AND HUMAN DESTINY. By Herbert Rosinski. New York: Praeger, 1965, 206 p. $5.95.

This posthumously edited study is a valuable and wide-ranging analysis of the problem and meaning of power in man's history.

PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM: THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS. By Leonard W. Doob. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 297 p. $6.75.

A professor of psychology at Yale undertakes to view "patriotism and nationalism as they function inside patriots and nationalists." The study is based in part upon data gathered in South Tyrol.

IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT. Edited by David E. Apter. New York: Free Press, 1964, 342 p. $9.95.

An interdisciplinary symposium on the role of ideology both in newly emerging countries and in advanced industrial states; includes a chapter on the radical right in the United States.

POLITICS IN WARTIME AND OTHER ESSAYS. By A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Atheneum, 1965, 207 p. $5.00.

A collection of essays by a lively British historian, a producer, as he says, of "dry biscuits" rather than "rich plum puddings." The larger part of the book is devoted to the First World War and its immediate antecedents.

WELTWENDE 1917: MONARCHIE, WELTREVOLUTION, DEMOKRATIE. Edited by Hellmuth Rössler. Göttingen: Musterschmidt (for the Ranke-Gesellschaft), 1965, 214 p. DM. 19.80.

Essays on the cataclysmic events of the last year of the First World War.

THE ANARCHISTS. By James Joll. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1965, 303 p. $6.00.

An able, if not definitive general history of the anarchist movement in the nineteenth and first third of the twentieth centuries.

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. By Geoffrey Barraclough. New York: Basic Books, 1965, 272 p. $4.95.

A leading British historian sketches some of the central themes of twentieth-century history.

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE: THE GREAT REPORTERS AND THEIR TIMES. By John Hohenberg. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 502 p. $8.95.

An able and by its nature most interesting history of foreign reporting from the turn of the eighteenth century to the present.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. By Henry A. Kissinger. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, 266 p. $5.95.

In this volume in "The Atlantic Policy Studies," sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, a leading student of U.S. foreign and military policy re-examines the Atlantic Alliance, its structural problems, the major political and strategic issues and the prospects for the future.

DESIGN FOR SURVIVAL. By General Thomas S. Power with Albert A. Arnhym. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965, 255 p. $5.00.

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Not surprisingly, this book by the recently retired Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command urges the need for the maintenance of overwhelming military superiority in face of the continuing Communist militancy.

COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE. By Major John S. Pustay. New York: Free Press, 1965, 236 p. $6.95.

A study centering on the means by which a régime can defend itself against Communist-initiated insurgency warfare; a final section discusses the role and scope of U.S. assistance in this field.

ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS. By Herman Kahn. New York: Praeger, 1965, 308 p. $6.95.

The author of "On Thermonuclear War" here turns to an analysis in his characteristic fashion—through metaphors and scenarios—of the problem of escalation, the product of "competition in risk-taking."

NATO IN TRANSITION: THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. By Timothy W. Stanley. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, 417 p. $7.50.

NATO should be transformed from an alliance cemented by fear to a partnership for building a stable world order based on hope. This is among the conclusions reached by a high civilian official of the U.S. Defense Department following a wide-ranging examination of alternative strategies for the future defense of the Atlantic area. Particular attention is given to problems posed by nuclear power in the political, economic and historical context of the alliance.

PEACE IS A THREE-EDGED SWORD. By Lloyd Mallan. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 253 p. $4.95.

A popular, and optimistic, account of U.S. deterrent capabilities.

AN END TO ARMS. By Walter Millis. New York: Atheneum (for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), 1965, 301 p. $5.95.

The author of numerous books over the last 35 years on the subject of war and peace, Mr. Millis here makes a general inquiry "into possible demilitarization of the international politics system, rather than merely into its disarmament."

THE WAR-PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. By Arthur Herzog. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, 271 p. $4.95.

A journalist's effort to identify, describe and appraise the various schools of thought engaged in the "arms debate." Readable but somewhat oversimplified.

RUSSIA AT WAR, 1941–1945. By Alexander Werth. New York: Dutton, 1964, 1,100 p. $10.00.

While Mr. Werth observes that this is not a "formal history" it is a very full and ambitious reconstruction, based both on the author's experiences as a war correspondent in the U.S.S.R. and his very considerable use of subsequently published Soviet materials. A substantial study, though the interpretations of a number of Stalin's diplomatic and military policies may be debated.

HITLER MOVES EAST: 1941–1943. By Paul Carell. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965, 640 p. $10.00.

An extensive but somewhat episodic and anecdotal account of the Nazi campaign in Russia to 1943 by a German author of several military narratives.

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BARBAROSSA: THE RUSSIAN-GERMAN CONFLICT, 1941–45. By Alan Clark. New York: Morrow, 1965, 522 p. $10.00.

A quite readable and informed account, by a British military historian, of the German attack on Russia and its eventual defeat; more satisfactory than Carell.

BLITZKRIEG TO DEFEAT: HITLER'S WAR DIRECTIVES, 1939–1945. Edited by H. R. Trevor-Roper. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, 231 p. $4.95.

The text of Hitler's 74 secret directives to his army commanders. An important source for Hitler's conduct of the war, rendered more valuable by Trevor-Roper's excellent introduction and elucidating commentaries. (The original German text was edited by Walter Hubatsch and appeared in 1962.)

INSIDE HITLER'S HEADQUARTERS, 1939–45. By Walter Warlimont. New York: Praeger, 1964, 658 p. $9.95.

The author was a deputy to General Jodl in Hitler's headquarters from September 1939 to September 1944. His personal recollections, supplemented by other evidence, provide an important account of Hitler's relations to his generals.

OPEN SPACE AND PEACE. Edited by Frederick J. Ossenbeck and Patricia C. Kroeck. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964, 227 p. $6.00.

A quite intensive symposium on the political, technical and military aspects of satellite observation from open space.

WHERE SCIENCE AND POLITICS MEET. By Jerome B. Wiesner. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 302 p. $6.95.

Papers on science, education, society and disarmament, written for the most part while the author was Special Assistant for Science and Technology to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

General: Economic and Social

BRITISH EXPORT PERFORMANCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By S. J. Wells. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 235 p. $8.50.

An excellent analysis of the decline in the competitive strength of British exports in the '50s. Close investigation by products and comparison with other countries leads the author to suggestive conclusions about reasons for Britain's difficulties and for its lag in productivity. There are valuable tables and other data.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Hla Myint. New York: Praeger, 1965, 192 p. $5.50 (Paper, $1.95).

This excellent, concise discussion of the basic issues by a Burmese economist teaching at Oxford deals harshly with some widely accepted ideas and practices. One of the great strengths of the book is its emphasis on the differences among underdeveloped countries that make many generalizations inept.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE: CONVERGENCE THROUGH GROWTH. By Cyril A. Zebot. New York: Praeger, 1964, 262 p. $6.50.

To achieve satisfactory economic growth the underdeveloped countries must improve their human resources, the Communist countries must give consumers and managers a greater share in decisions, and the West must check inflation by more understanding between labor and capital.

POSTWAR ECONOMIC GROWTH: FOUR LECTURES. By Simon Kuznets. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 148 p. $4.25.

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A leading authority on growth here compresses the results of a tremendous amount of work into a few pages. Questions and suggestions are as numerous as firm conclusions.

DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT. By Celso Furtado. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 181 p. $5.00.

Drawing on classical, Keynesian and Marxian economics and his own experience of the underdeveloped world, a leading Brazilian economist sets out his views on some major problems of growth. (The book first appeared in Brazil in 1961.)

CENTRAL PLANNING. By Jan Tinbergen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 150 p. $5.00 (Paper, $1.45).

The former chief planner for the Netherlands who has also advised many underdeveloped countries has condensed great experience in this compact book. A description of how planning is done (supplemented by an original comparison of the practices of many countries, largely tabulated) is followed by his own prescription for "optimal planning."

WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND POLICIES. Edited by Herbert V. Prochnow. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, 382 p. $6.95.

Mr. Prochnow, who was once in charge of foreign economic policy in the State Department and is now back in banking, has assembled the views of practitioners and a few academic experts on some major economic issues.

INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS, DEBTS, AND GOLD. By Fritz Machlup. New York: Scribner, 1964, 472 p. $7.50.

Professor Machlup's originality and ingenuity extend to the form of this collection as well as its content. The papers, dating from 1929 to 1963, are shuffled, spliced, commented on anew and meticulously annotated to show how they have been revised. Some appear here for the first time; all deal in one way or another with international monetary and financial issues.

The United States

FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF URGENCY, 1938–1941. By John Morton Blum. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 443 p. $7.50.

In this second volume drawn from the vast so-called "diaries" of Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Blum ably traces the turn from domestic to foreign concerns, in which Secretary Morgenthau proves to have played a very significant role. An important source for the years between Munich and Pearl Harbor.

THE JOHNSON TREATMENT. By Jack Bell. New York: Harper and Row, 1965, 305 p. $4.95.

An interim report, by a Washington correspondent, on the style of the Johnson Administration.

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE. By Louis W. Koenig. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, 435 p. $9.50.

An extensive study of the U.S. Presidency, its powers, responsibilities and the roadblocks it encounters. The author, professor of government at New York University, definitely favors a strong Presidency.

HOUSE OUT OF ORDER. By Richard Bolling. New York: Dutton, 1965, 253 p. $4.95.

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The Democratic Representative from Missouri, who has served eight terms in the House, casts a critical eye on that body and its operations. Quoting Gambetta, he finds it a "broken mirror in which the Nation cannot recognize its own image."

THE WAR SYSTEM. By Bert Cochran. New York: Macmillan, 1965, 274 p. $5.95.

A sharp critique of the "militarization" of American life: "The first duty of the political analyst is to expose the hollowness and the sham of the diplomacy and military system that is supposed to save us from war."

THE CROSSROAD PAPERS: A LOOK INTO THE AMERICAN FUTURE. Edited by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York: Norton, 1965, 279 p. $5.50 (Paper, $1.45).

Initiated by A.D.A., this collection of essays seeks to come to grips with some of the major issues that will confront the U.S. in the areas of economics, international relations, race, education and government.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941–1945. By Gaddis Smith. New York: Wiley, 1965, 194 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A brief review, with considerable stress on the illusions entertained by U.S. leaders.

"GOOD EVENING!" By Raymond Swing. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, 311 p. $5.95.

Memoirs and reflections on his profession by a foreign correspondent who achieved greatest prominence as a radio news commentator.

YOUR HUNDRED BILLION DOLLARS: THE COMPLETE STORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID. By Jacob A. Rubin. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1964, 299 p. $6.95.

A popular treatment that is, for a change, favorable to foreign aid. The stress is on humanitarian and educational elements.

The Western Hemisphere

MR. PRIME MINISTER: 1867–1964. By Bruce Hutchison. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965, 394 p. $7.50.

A lively history, by a leading Canadian journalist, of the origins and development of the Prime Ministry in that country.

THE TWO AMERICAS: DIALOGUE ON PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS. Edited by William Manger. New York: Kenedy, 1965, 144 p. $4.50.

Lectures delivered at Georgetown University during 1963 and 1964, in which six distinguished statesmen and Latin American specialists discuss contemporary inter-American problems. Included are: Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva, the former Presidents of Colombia and Costa Rica—Alberto Lleras Camargo and José Figueres—Senator Wayne Morse and Professor Arthur P. Whitaker.

THE CHURCH AND THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By François Houtart and Emile Pin. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965, 264 p. $5.95.

In this translation from the French two priests discuss the role of the Catholic Church in the contemporary social revolution of Latin America and note that, while centers of resistance remain, progressive forces within the Church are succeeding in identifying it with the developing revolution in Latin America.

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FORTRESS CUBA: RUSSIA'S AMERICAN BASE. By Jay Mallin. Chicago: Regnery, 1965, 192 p. 75 cents (Paper).

Journalistic reflections on the Communist "takeover" in Cuba and its subversive hemispheric operations. The author calls for a return by the United States to the policies of Teddy Roosevelt.

THE CARIBBEAN: MEXICO TODAY. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964, 232 p. $7.50.

Papers on economic, political, social and cultural trends of contemporary Mexico prepared for the annual conference on the Caribbean at the University of Florida (1963).

DANGER OVER PANAMA. By Jules Dubois. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, 409 p. $4.50.

An American journalist defends U.S. actions, past and present, in Panama. In focusing his attention on the riots of January 1964, Mr. Dubois depicts the subversive influences, "both Communist and Nazi," which have helped to distort our relations with Panama. The author believes that measures such as dropping the word "Company" from the operating agency's title, opening Zonian schools to Panamanian students, raising Panama's annuities via increased tolls and improving public relations between the two countries will alleviate tensions between them. Of the need for a fundamental re-examination of the existing treaty, little is said.

BRITISH GUIANA: PROBLEMS OF COHESION IN AN IMMIGRANT SOCIETY. By Peter Newman. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1964, 104 p. $1.95 (Paper).

In this primer dealing with the political, economic, social and demographic background of British Guiana, the author traces recent developments in that strife-torn country and concludes that the real danger is not a "takeover" by any single clique but "simply the prospect of breakdown of any effective government at all."

SOCIETY AND EDUCATION IN BRAZIL. By Robert J. Havighurst and J. Roberto Moreira. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965, 263 p. $6.00.

Educational problems are examined in this statistically oriented study of contemporary Brazilian institutions and social forces.

PERU AND THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1962. By James C. Carey. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964, 243 p. $6.50.

In this well-written study the author stresses the economic development of Peru and the role therein of the United States. He believes that "private economic interests have been more of a liability than an asset in the relations between Washington and Lima."

ARGENTINA: A CITY AND A NATION. By James R. Scobie. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 294 p. $6.50.

In this excellent historical survey a professor of history at the University of California examines Argentina's transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Emphasizing the country's formative years—the nineteenth century—the author is particularly concerned with the transformation of the pampas and the rapid growth of Buenos Aires.

Western Europe

ONE EUROPE: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EUROPEAN

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UNITY. By René Albrecht-Carrié. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 346 p. $5.95.

A judicious and informative survey of Europe's common traditions and divergent national histories, with particular emphasis on the last 150 years. Professor Albrecht-Carrié, a well-known historian, is a partisan of European unity, but points to the many difficulties on the path to it.

DECLINE AND RISE OF EUROPE. By John Lukacs. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 295 p. $4.95.

A very personal, cultivated and suggestive essay about Europe's recent past and the growth of a European consciousness. By an American historian, who was born in Hungary and who himself shares the new discovery of Europe.

LE PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN. By Henri Manzanarès. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1964, 321 p. Fr. 30.

The first comprehensive scholarly study of the organization and functions of the European Parliament.

WHAT KIND OF EUROPE? THE COMMUNITY SINCE DE GAULLE'S VETO. By Miriam Camps. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 140 p. $1.70 (Paper).

After reviewing the two years following de Gaulle's veto of British entry, a leading American authority on the European Economic Community concludes that with all the differences there are among the main views of Europe "the area of overlap . . . appears to be large enough to enable the 'federalizing' process of the Community to continue, albeit more slowly than many would wish."

A HANDBOOK ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. Edited by Gordon L. Weil. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the European Community Information Service), 1965, 479 p. $7.50.

The Information Service's Director of Research and Studies has arranged complete documents and excerpts to give a full and fairly detailed picture of the growth and operations of the European Economic Community. There is a bibliography of the published official documents of the Community.

AGRICULTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Michael Tracy. New York: Praeger, 1964, 415 p. $10.00.

The history of farm production and policies since 1880 is covered rather comprehensively for the main countries. The emphasis is on adjustment and the obstacles most policies have put in its way. The prescription for the future is for more enlightened policies but little is said about how to get them.

THE BRITISH POLITICAL ELITE. By W. L. Guttsman. New York: Basic Books, 1964, 398 p. $7.50.

A well-written, sociological survey of the recruitment of the British political élite since the Reform Act of 1832. Familiar in its conclusions, rewarding in its details and reflections.

THE BRITISH PRESS AND JEWS UNDER NAZI RULE. By Andrew Sharf. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1964, 228 p. $4.80.

An Israeli scholar presents a sober and informative survey of how the British press reported and interpreted Nazi persecution of the Jews. Sympathy for the victims was at times mitigated by willing disbelief in the existence or extent of their plight.

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HAROLD WILSON: THE AUTHENTIC PORTRAIT. By Leslie Smith. New York: Scribner, 1965, 231 p. $4.95.

An authorized, but not wholly persuasive biography of Britain's new leader from whose "bold imagination, dynamic authority, and intellectual eminence" much is expected.

MR. CHURCHILL IN 1940. By Isaiah Berlin. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 38 p. $3.00.

In this beautifully evocative essay, Sir Isaiah Berlin does justice to his subject.

WAVELL: SCHOLAR AND SOLDIER. By John Connell. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965, 573 p. $8.75.

An impressive and admiring biography of an outstanding soldier, based in part on Wavell's papers. The book ends in June 1941, when Churchill sent Wavell from Egypt to India, after the two leaders had suffered from a long period of tensions.

FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. Edited by Sydney Nettleton Fisher. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965, 176 p. $5.00.

Culture, law, security, agriculture, economics, integration and relations with the Soviet bloc are some of the subjects explored in this symposium that took place in the fall of 1963.

DE GAULLE. By François Mauriac. Paris: Grasset, 1964, 345 p. Fr. 20.

A famous French writer records and analyzes his admiration for de Gaulle, and compares his portrait with de Gaulle's own sense of himself, as revealed in the latter's spoken and written word. A book not without pathos, anachronistic, at once attractive and exasperating, as befits the subject. Mauriac sought to illuminate de Gaulle; he certainly illuminated the *mystique* of Gaullism.

THE KING AND HIS COURT. By Pierre Viansson-Ponté. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 250 p. $5.00.

An entertaining yet instructive guide to de Gaulle's style as ruler and to his entourage. Written by one of the editors of *Le Monde* who knows de Gaulle's court well—and who can laugh at the foibles without losing sight of the serious.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES: DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN. By Nils Andrén. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1964, 241 p.

An admirable introduction.

SWITZERLAND: EXAMPLE OF CULTURAL COEXISTENCE. By Kenneth D. McRae. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1964, 74 p. $2.00.

A brief, useful survey of Switzerland's way of accommodating several languages in one state, by a Canadian political scientist who is aware that there are other "plurilingual countries."

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. By Alfred Grosser. New York: Praeger, 1964, 150 p. $4.50 (Paper, $1.75).

An informative survey by a leading French authority on contemporary Germany.

KONRAD ADENAUER. By Rudolf Augstein. London: Secker and Warburg, 1964, 128 p. 18/.

A book in two parts: a slanted chronological account of Adenauer's life and a hostile summary of his career as Chancellor, by the pugnacious editor of *Der*

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Spiegel. Adenauer is charged with indifference to German reunification and with pervasive political amorality—on a scale that to Augstein recalls Machiavelli.

EIN GRUNDSTEIN WIRD GELEGT: DIE JAHRE 1945–1947. By Reinhold Maier. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1964, 415 p. DM. 19.80.

Important recollections of a leading German politician who in the first years of the postwar occupation collaborated with American authorities in the establishment of a new *Land,* Württemberg-Baden.

DER SYNTHETISCHE TREIBSTOFF 1933–1945: EIN BEITRAG ZUR NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTS- UND RÜSTUNGSPOLITIK. By Wolfgang Birkenfeld. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964, 279 p. DM. 36.

This careful, well-documented study traces the history of German synthetic fuel production through the whole Nazi period. The author hardly needs to underline the importance of this industry for the German war effort but suggests that the allies were mistaken not to give it a higher priority as a bombing target.

THE MEN WHO TRIED TO KILL HITLER. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. New York: Coward-McCann, 1964, 272 p. $4.95.

A readable and reliable account of the final conspiracy against Hitler. (The English edition has the title "The July Plot," London: Bodley Head, 1964, 30/.)

THE GESTAPO: A HISTORY OF HORROR. By Jacques Delarue. New York: Morrow, 1964, 384 p. $6.95.

A partial reconstruction of this network of terror, with some new information on its activities in France. The French author, himself a victim of the German occupation, has written a book for the general reader, not the specialist. (The book originally appeared in France in 1962.)

REVOLUTION IN BAVARIA, 1918–1919: THE EISNER REGIME AND THE SOVIET REPUBLIC. By Allan Mitchell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 374 p. $8.50.

An admirable and absorbing account of one of the most fascinating revolutionary upheavals in post-1918 Europe. The author, a young historian, contributes sound judgments on many hitherto obscure aspects of German history.

DEUTSCH-RUSSISCHE BEZIEHUNGEN VON BISMARCK BIS ZUR GEGENWART. Edited by Werner Markert. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964, 236 p. DM. 9.80.

A collection of articles and conversations on Russo-German relations, chiefly since 1914, by leading experts of West Germany.

DIE DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN IN DER ÄRA STRESEMANN. By Robert Gottwald. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1965, 167 p. DM. 18.

A revealing study of German-American relations and of the many influences which shaped them. The author, a German historian, used new German and American archival sources. One of the series "Studien zur Europäischen Geschichte aus dem Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin."

DAS ZWEITE DEUTSCHLAND: EIN STAAT, DER NICHT SEIN DARF. By Ernst Richert. Gütersloh: Mohn, 1964, 341 p. DM. 16.80.

One of the most informative and thoughtful analyses of East Germany's de-

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velopment and present condition. The author, a newspaper editor in East Germany until 1948, has written extensively on this subject, and is not uncritical of West German prejudices against the Ulbricht régime which, he finds, has made important progress in the last decade.

REISE IN EIN FERNES LAND. By Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, Rudolf Walter Leonhardt and Theo Sommer. Hamburg: Nannen, 1964, 143 p. DM. 6.80.

Three distinguished West German editors report on their travels and talks in East Germany, a country they find 30 years behind the times in everyday life, and with which, according to them, West Germany should establish closer, if informal, ties. An intelligent travelogue and a persuasive plea.

L'ITALIA IN UNA ECONOMIA APERTA. By Roberto Tremelloni. Milan: Garzanti, 1963, 431 p. L. 2000.

Papers on Italy's economic problems by a well-known socialist economist who has frequently held ministerial and other governmental posts.

THE SPANISH REPUBLIC AND THE CIVIL WAR, 1931–1939. By Gabriel Jackson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 578 p. $12.50.

An important, thoughtful reassessment of Spanish politics before and during the Civil War, by an American historian who supplemented earlier published accounts with recent interviews. Strongly republican in his sympathies, he is historical in his method and judgments.

LE MYTHE DE LA CROISADE DE FRANCO. By Herbert Rutledge Southworth. Paris: Éditions Ruedo Ibérico, 1964, 327 p. Fr. 24.

A valuable review of recent literature on the Spanish Civil War and a vigorous refutation of various attempts to depict Franco's struggle as something other than a brutal Fascist onslaught. The author is unafraid of controversy and in his attacks on apologists of Franco enters the present dispute about the attitude of the Catholic Church toward Fascism. A shorter version of this book appeared in Spanish, but was printed in Paris ("El Mito de la Cruzada de Franco").

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN THE USSR. By Myron Rush. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965, 223 p. $5.95.

An able, if not watertight effort, "to present a theoretical analysis and historical account of the problem of succession in the USSR." While the author had not expected Khrushchev's ouster he feels that his argument is not weakened by it.

RUSSIA AFTER KHRUSHCHEV. By Robert Conquest. New York: Praeger, 1965, 267 p. $5.95.

The author of "Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R." here pursues his analysis of Soviet politics, with particular emphasis on changes and continuities since Stalin, the characteristics of the new leadership and the persistent jockeying for position.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN. By Harry Schwartz. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965, 256 p. $5.00.

A timely and informed review of the accomplishments and failures of the Soviet economy in the period between Stalin's death and Khrushchev's fall.

THE SOVIET UNION AND DISARMAMENT. By Alexander Dallin and

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OTHERS. New York: Praeger (for the School of International Affairs, Columbia University), 1964, 282 p. $7.50.

A report based on working papers and discussions of a group of scholars and specialists and dealing with the attitudes and possible intentions of the U.S.S.R. in the question of disarmament and arms control.

THE THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE. EDITED BY THOMAS PERRY THORNTON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 355 p. $7.50.

A sample of Soviet writings on the problems of the developing areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

I REDISCOVER RUSSIA. BY ISAAC DON LEVINE. New York: Duell, 1964, 216 p. $4.95.

An interesting account of a recent visit to the Soviet Union by an old Russia hand well known for his vigorous anti-Stalinist writings.

DIE TOTENGRÄBER DES KOMMUNISMUS. BY HERMAN F. ACHMINOW. Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1964, 486 p. DM. 24.

A sociological inquiry into Soviet Communism, which the author sees to have been a sort of "Ersatz-Frühkapitalismus" that cannot lead to Communism's goals.

THE TROTSKY PAPERS, 1917–1922. VOLUME I: 1917–1919. EDITED AND ANNOTATED BY JAN M. MEIJER. The Hague: Mouton, 1964, 858 p. Gldrs. 90.

This excellently edited collection of documents in the possession of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam comprises centrally the correspondence of the Bolshevik leaders during the years of the Civil War. The material is presented in the original and in English translation.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA. BY GEOFFREY WHEELER. New York: Praeger, 1964, 272 p. $7.00.

A useful introduction, by a leading British authority, to the five Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

RED PAWN: THE STORY OF NOEL FIELD. BY FLORA LEWIS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 283 p. $4.95.

An able and most interesting effort to unravel the mysteries and political ramifications of the disappearances, arrests and reappearances in Communist Eastern Europe of Noel Field, his wife and brother.

SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WORLD COMMUNISM. COMPILED AND EDITED BY THOMAS T. HAMMOND. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 1,240 p. $25.00.

This major reference work is an annotated bibliography of 7,000 books in some 30 languages, covering Soviet foreign relations by period and by region, international Communism and a number of related topics.

RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. EDITED BY PAUL L. HORECKY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 473 p. $8.95.

This valuable annotated bibliographic guide to Western-language publications is a companion volume to the editor's "Basic Russian Publications" (1962).

THE FORMING OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL. BY JAMES W. HULSE. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 275 p. $6.50.

A scholarly study of the nascent Communist International in the period between the First and Second Congresses in 1919–1920.

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THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS: ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS. By Kazimierz Grzybowski. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 300 p. $7.50.

While the author speaks of the "legal unity" of the "socialist commonwealth," and of such organs as the Council on Mutual Economic Aid and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, one wonders about the reality of this entity. (Prepared under the auspices of the American Society of International Law.)

LE MARCHÉ COMMUN COMMUNISTE: PRINCIPES ET PRATIQUE DU COMECON. By István Ágoston. Geneva: Droz, 1964, 353 p. Swiss Fr. 36.

A substantial dissertation on COMECON. Useful bibliography.

THE COMMUNIST STATES AT THE CROSSROADS: BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING. Edited by Adam Bromke. New York: Praeger, 1965, 270 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

A collection of papers dealing with the impact of the Sino-Soviet rift on the Communist world. Treatment is chiefly by individual country.

ÜBER KALKUTTA NACH PARIS? By Kurt Müller. Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1964, 584 p.

An important survey of the strategy and activities of the Soviet bloc countries in the underdeveloped nations of the world. It contains a very extensive selection of relevant treaties and agreements.

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND EAST GERMANY, 1937–1962. By Alfred Zauberman. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 338 p. $8.00.

The energy, metal and chemical industries receive special attention in this detailed study which also devotes chapters to the labor force, foreign trade and the effect of planning and other governmental measures. The author rests his case for the choice of these three countries (especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia) on the interesting proposition that it was only in Central Europe that "Marxian socialism came into its own in its doctrinally postulated environment as the successor of a mature capitalism."

DER KROATISCHE USTASCHA-STAAT 1941–1945. By Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (for the Institut für Zeitgeschichte), 1964, 183 p. DM. 9.80.

A substantial account, based largely on German records, of the Pavelić régime.

The Middle East

ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by J. Harris Proctor. New York: Praeger, 1965, 221 p. $6.50.

An examination of Islam as a factor in world and inter-Arab politics in essays by well-qualified authorities: H.A.R. Gibb, Majid Khadduri, Dankwart Rustow, Fayez Sayegh, Bayard Dodge, P. J. Vatikiotis, Vernon McKay and T. Cuyler Young.

FROM ANKARA TO MARRAKESH: TURKS AND ARABS IN A CHANGING WORLD. By Hans E. Tütsch. London: Allen and Unwin (for the Congress for Cultural Freedom), 1964, 224 p. 30/.

Articles dealing with the Arab world, Turkey and Cyprus in 1959–63, first published in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* by its able foreign editor, are combined and updated in this perceptive and informative book—which does not escape inaccuracies, however, nor the limitations of its piecemeal journalistic origin.

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ATATURK: A BIOGRAPHY OF MUSTAFA KEMAL, FATHER OF MODERN TURKEY. By Lord Kinross. New York: Morrow, 1965, 615 p. $7.50.

This sumptuous volume, definitive and absorbing, is biography on the heroic scale, the first to live up to the Churchillian dimensions of its subject.

UNDER FIVE SHAHS. By General Hassan Arfa. London: Murray, 1964, 457 p. 45/.

Lively personal memoirs spanning 70 years and the evolution of medieval Persia into modern Iran by a soldier-diplomat close to the center of events.

MAN AND SOCIETY IN IRAN. By A. Reza Arasteh in Collaboration with Josephine Arasteh. Leyden: Brill, 1964, 193 p. Gldrs. 28.

An informative effort to "define the place of man in Iran in relation to his society and cultural achievement" by methods of "historical, statistical, descriptive and speculative analysis."

FROM THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: THE PEOPLES OF ISRAEL. By Howard Morley Sachar. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1964, 510 p. $7.95.

A sequel to the author's "Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel," this fascinating volume is an evocation of modern Israel through the stories of representative citizens of diverse origin. It includes a detailed account of the "Lavon Affair," the abortive 1954 sabotage effort in Egypt and its political repercussions in Israel.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. By Alfred M. Lilienthal. New York: Devin-Adair, 1965, 420 p. $6.50.

Aptly titled, this is the latest and most substantial manifestation (earlier volumes: "What Price Israel?" 1953; "There Goes the Middle East," 1957) of the author's dogged struggle to warn America against Zionism, Israel and their undue influence on U.S. policy.

THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL GRIVAS. Edited by Charles Foley. New York: Praeger, 1965, 226 p. $4.95.

The character of the General, brave, self-righteous, opinionated, cunning, and murderously ruthless in his pursuit of *enosis,* becomes chillingly clear in this one-sided account of the EOKA campaign to force the British out of Cyprus.

South and Southeast Asia

SOUTH ASIA PACIFIC CRISIS: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY. Edited by Margaret Grant. New York: Dodd (for the Council on World Tensions), 1964, 314 p. $3.25.

This book results from a University of Malaya Conference on Development and Cooperation in the South Asia Pacific Region, attended by specialists from six continents. Contents cover economic planning, international aid, public and international affairs, economics, and business and industry. "South Asia" here includes Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

BUDDHISM OR COMMUNISM: WHICH HOLDS THE FUTURE OF ASIA? By Ernst Benz. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 234 p. $4.50.

Buddhism from Ceylon to Japan, its religious and political forces and its exploitation by Red China. The author's theory of "a kind of ecumenical Buddhism" is especially thought-provoking.

BRITAIN AND INDIA: REQUIEM FOR EMPIRE. By Maurice and Taya Zinkin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, 191 p. $5.00.

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A well-coördinated survey of India's relation to Great Britain. Mr. Zinkin is head of the Economics and Statistics Department of Unilevers, Ltd., which he represented in India from 1949 to 1960. Mrs. Zinkin is a newspaper correspondent and author.

ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY. By B. K. Madan. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964, 363 p. Rs. 22.50.

An economist instrumental in the formulation of India's monetary and economic issues produces, by accumulating essays written during the last 30 years, a study in three parts: planning and economics, money and banking, and international economic policies—all particularly relevant to developing economies.

FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN. By Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964, 125 p. Rs. 7.50.

Speeches (1962–64) by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, mainly concerned with his country's relations with India, opposition to India's "No War Pact," and with Pakistan's adherence to United Nations Charter principles.

VIETNAM DIVIDED: THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE. By B. S. N. Murti. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, 228 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $8.50.)

An authoritative record of the workings of the International Commission established in 1954 to implement the provisions of the Geneva Agreement reached at the end of the Indochina war. By the former Public Relations Officer and Deputy Secretary-General of the Commission.

THE LAST OF THE MANDARINS: DIEM OF VIETNAM. By Anthony Trawick Bouscaren. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965, 174 p. $3.95.

A political scientist very briefly sketches Diem's early life and then turns to a defensive critique of the Viet Nam leader's years in power. He judges the Buddhist campaigns and activities to be politically, not religiously, inspired and criticizes the prominence given by the press to accusations against Diem.

VILLAGE IN VIETNAM. By Gerald Cannon Hickey. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 325 p. $10.00.

An ethnological study of Khanh Hau in the Mekong basin southwest of Saigon, based on field research in 1958–1959, 1962 and 1964.

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN LAOS: A STUDY OF TRADITION AND INNOVATION. By Joel M. Halpern. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1964, 184 p. (Detroit: Cellar Book Shop, distributor, $4.50.)

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF LAOS: A BRIEF SURVEY. By Joel M. Halpern. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1964, 180 p. (Detroit: Cellar Book Shop, distributor, $5.25.)

Companion volumes based on field data collected in 1957–1959, together with subsequent research, covering both national and local levels of this complex country.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

COMMUNIST CHINA'S CRUSADE: MAO'S ROAD TO POWER AND THE NEW CAMPAIGN FOR WORLD REVOLUTION. By Guy Wint. New York: Praeger, 1965, 136 p. $4.50 (Paper, $1.75).

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Mr. Wint, of St. Antony's College and long a writer on Asia for *The Observer*, analyzes the rise of Communism in China and Sino-Soviet relations. Emphasis is on China's individual solutions to problems common to much of the world and on the effects of the power struggle on the rest of Asia and on Africa, Latin America and the United States.

CHINA AND THE BOMB. By Morton H. Halperin. New York: Praeger (for the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University), 1965, 166 p. $4.95.

Chapters on Communist China's foreign policy and the role of force within it precede this Harvard professor's keen analysis of the implications of China's first detonation of an atomic bomb. The American-Chinese confrontation in Asia occupies much of the book.

MAO AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By Jerome Ch'ên. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 419 p. $7.50.

Professor Ch'ên, of the University of Leeds and a Chatham House associate, uses important Chinese and Western-language materials to produce an impressively scholarly, factual treatise on Mao's role in the Chinese Revolution and its aftermath. He rejects a number of long-accepted theories and replaces them with his own studied views.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND TIBET: THE FIRST DOZEN YEARS. By George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964, 218 p. Gldrs. 23.25.

An able review of Sino-Tibetan affairs during the last 12 years. The authors foresee little hope of severing Tibet from China and have a dim "outlook for a successful containment of Red China at the Indian-Tibetan border."

AUSTRALIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Trevor R. Reese. New York: Praeger, 1964, 239 p. $6.00.

A chronicle of the political, constitutional and economic development of Australia from the birth of the federal commonwealth in 1901 to 1962.

Africa

THE U.S.S.R. AND AFRICA. By David Morison. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations and the Central Asian Research Centre), 1964, 124 p. $2.25 (Paper).

An analysis of Soviet aims in and attitudes toward Africa; an appendix quotes or paraphrases Soviet views on each African country.

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN NEW AFRICAN STATES. By A. L. Adu. New York: Praeger, 1965, 242 p. $6.00.

Mr. Adu's wide experience in West and East Africa uniquely qualifies him to write this perceptive study of the role of the civil service, its structure and administration, and finally the policy-making process itself. Invaluable to all concerned with public administration in Africa.

ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN AFRICA. Edited by Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 444 p. $7.95.

A collection of papers on economic change in Africa delivered at the Conference on Indigenous and Induced Elements in the Economics of Subsaharan Africa held

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at Northwestern University in 1961 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council. Of particular interest is the attempt at an interdisciplinary treatment of economic problems.

CONSCIENCISM. By Kwame Nkrumah. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965, 122 p. $3.50.

An explanation of the causes of the present social and political unrest in Africa, by the President of Ghana. The book provides insights into the intellect and philosophy of one of Africa's most influential leaders.

LES BANQUES DE DÉVELOPPEMENT EN AFRIQUE. By Robert Badouin. Paris: Pedone, 1964, 271 p. Fr. 35.

One of the series, "Collection du Centre de Recherches, d'Études et de Documentation sur les Institutions et les Législations Africaines," providing valuable detailed documentation on institutions and laws in French-speaking Africa; introductory essays raise provocative questions.

HISTOIRE DE L'ORGANISATION DE L'ARMÉE SECRÈTE. By Morland, Barangé and Martinez. Paris: Julliard, 1964, 605 p. Fr. 18.

A record of the O.A.S., "a private enterprise of unlimited irresponsibility" in the authors' final judgment, which wrought a nightmare of senseless bloodshed and destruction in Algeria and brought France itself to the edge of disaster.

ALGERIAN VOICES. By Richard and Joan Brace. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965, 233 p. $5.95 (Paper, $3.95).

An absorbing account of encounters with Algerians high and low in Tunis and Algeria in 1961–62 during the closing stages of the war of independence, by two Americans whose mission was to establish homes for children orphaned by the war.

FROM FRENCH WEST AFRICA TO THE MALI FEDERATION. By William J. Foltz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, 235 p. $6.50.

A well-written and stimulating study of the formation and failure of the Mali Federation. Illuminates the continuing efforts in Africa toward unity.

THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE: GHANA AND THE IVORY COAST. By I. Wallerstein. The Hague: Mouton, 1964, 200 p. Gldrs. 22.

The sections on the formation and role of voluntary associations distinguish this book from other studies of Ghana and the Ivory Coast. One regrets that the book, based on research undertaken in 1956–1957, was so long delayed in publication.

GOVERNMENT AND BANKING IN WESTERN NIGERIA. By Charles V. Brown. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research), 1964, 141 p. $1.20 (Paper).

A brief analysis of the political and economic history of Western Nigeria, based on the recent Coker Commission hearings.

THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE. By Victor T. Le Vine. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 329 p. $7.50.

An excellent and detailed analysis of political developments in the Cameroons, with particular attention to the structure and role of political parties.

CRISIS IN THE CONGO: A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN ACTION. By Ernest W. Lefever. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965, 215 p. $3.50.

A detailed review and analysis of the U.N. peace-keeping effort in the Congo.

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The book brings into focus the range of concerns which underlay the U.N. action and makes a major contribution to a clearer understanding of the U.N. role.

HAILE SELASSIE: THE CONQUERING LION. By Leonard Mosley. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, 288 p. $6.95.

A fascinating biography, informed and well balanced.

EAST AFRICAN UNITY THROUGH LAW. By Thomas M. Franck. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 184 p. $5.50.

A description and analysis of the institutions which have laid the foundations for unity in East Africa, prepared under the auspices of the American Society of International Law.

AFRICAN BATTLELINE: AMERICAN POLICY CHOICES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Waldemar A. Nielsen. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, 156 p. $3.50 (Paper, $1.95).

An analysis of situations of present and future crisis in the white-controlled areas of southern Africa, paying special attention to the international implications of racial conflict. The author of this "Policy Book," President of the African-American Institute, gives his specific conclusions on American interests and policies.

AN AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Leo Kuper. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, 452 p. $12.50 (Paper, $2.95).

A superb, exhaustive study of a critical section of the African population by one of the outstanding scholars working on South Africa today.

NOTES ON THE FORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Edwin S. Munger. Pasadena: Castle Press, 1965, 102 p. $6.75.

Useful insights into the principles and procedures which underlie the formation of South African foreign policy.

SOUTH AFRICA, A STUDY IN CONFLICT. By Pierre L. Van den Berghe. Middletown (Conn.): Wesleyan University Press, 1965, 371 p. $8.95.

The facts presented here are not new, but they are well analyzed in a sociological framework. One of the most lucid studies on South Africa to have appeared in recent years.

WHITE LAAGER. By William Henry Vatcher, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1965, 309 p. $6.95.

A description of some of the factors which have contributed to and strengthened the development of Afrikaner nationalism.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR. By W. H. Hutt. London: Deutsch (for the Institute of Economic Affairs), 1964, 189 p. 15/.

Professor Hutt's thesis is that the color bar, which limits a competitive market situation, works to the economic disadvantage of South Africa.

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by Ronald Segal. Baltimore: Penguin, 1964, 272 p. $1.25 (Paper).

An illuminating collection of papers, given at the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa, held in London in April 1964.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 22. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D.C. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington 6, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 89th Congress, 1st Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Agreement establishing the African Development Bank; preparatory work, including summary records of the Conference of Finance Ministers. N.Y., 1964. 259 p. (64.II.K.6.) $2.50.

Agriculture

Problems of manpower in agriculture. Paris, OECD, 1964. 158 p. (Documentation in Agriculture and Food, 67.) $1.50.

Atomic Power

Use of nuclear power for the production of fresh water from salt water. Hearing, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., Aug. 18, 1964. Washington, 1964. 157 p.

Canada

A Preliminary report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ottawa, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965. 211 p. $1.00.

Colonialism

The United Nations and decolonization; summary of the work of the Special Committee of Twenty-four. N.Y., 1965. 68 p. (65.I.8.) 50¢.

Anticolonialismo e subdesenvolvimento; conferência proferida no Clube Militar Naval em 24 de Julho de 1964, by A. R. da Silva Tavares. Lisbon, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1964. 38 p.

Informações jurídicas para conhecimento da orgânica administrativa do ultramar Português. Lisbon, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1964. 97 p.

Lei Orgânica e regimento do Conselho Ultramarino. Lisbon, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1964. 100 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

Automotive products agreement between the United States and Canada. Hearing, Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Feb. 10, 1965. Washington, 1965. 30 p.

Glossary of terms relating to restrictive business practices. Paris, OECD, 1965. 95 p. $1.50.

Cultural Relations

American professors in Asia; a study of the selection and adaptation of fifty American professors who went to India, Pakistan and Korea under the Fulbright-Hays Program during 1962–63, by Leonard Goodwin. Washington, Dept. of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1964. 84 p.

International understanding . . . through the performing arts. A report on the cultural presentations program of the Department of State. July 1, 1963–June 30, 1964. Washington, 1965. 106 p. (Dept. of State. International Information and Cultural Series, 88.) 35¢.

A Sequel to a beacon of hope . . . the exchange of persons program. Report, August, 1964. Washington, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1964. 34 p.

Teacher and scholar abroad. First-person reports of the U.S. exchange program. Washington, Board of Foreign Scholarships, 1964. unp.

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Disarmament

To Amend further the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 2998, Jan. 26–27, 1965. Washington, 1965. 88 p.

——. Report, Feb. 10, 1965. Washington, 1965. 10 p. (H. Rept. 37.)

——. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 672 and H.R. 2998, Feb. 22–23, 1965. Washington, 1965. 132 p.

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 2998, Mar. 5, 1965. Washington, 1965. 10 p. (S. Rept. 73.)

Further documents relating to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. London, 1964. 8s.6d. each.

The Eighteenth General Assembly of the United Nations and the session in Geneva from July 30 to August 29, 1963. 158 p. (Cmnd. 2353.) Session January 21 to April 28, 1964. 142 p. (Cmnd. 2486.)

Eastern Europe

Bibliography of social science periodicals and monograph series: U.S.S.R., 1950–1963. Washington, Bureau of the Census, 1965. (Social Science Bibliographies Series P-92, No. 17.) $2.25.

Far East and Asia

Regional economic co-operation: report of the Ministerial Conference on Asian Economic Co-operation, held at Manila, Philippines, 3 to 6 Dec., 1963. N.Y., 1964. 77 p. (64.II.F.14.) $1.00.

Report on land and water development in the Indus Plain by the White House-Department of Interior Panel on Waterlogging and Salinity in West Pakistan. Washington, 1964. 454 p. $3.00.

SEATO: 1954–1964. Bangkok, South-East Asia Treaty Organization, 1964. 81 p.

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